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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper analyzes the rise of get-tough crime legislation to the American public 
policy agenda and examines the effects of these policies on crime and inmate 
populations. Get-tough policies analyzed include sentencing reform, the War on Drugs 
and collateral consequences. Because there is no empirical literature on the effect of 
collateral consequences on crime, the paper employed an OLS regression model partly 
derived from institutional anomie theory to test for criminogenic effects. The study then 
employed OLS regression analysis to determine the affect of these independent variables 
on crime rates in each of the 50 states. The study concluded that state policies hindering 
the ability of offenders to find employment have a significant and positive impact on 
crime. According to the model, the most significant factors affecting crime rates are 
urban density, high school drop-out rates, a state’s population of blacks, non-economic 
institutions, and policy barriers to offender employment. The research suggests that 
policy makers should reduce ecomomic barriers to reentry, particularly those barriers 
focused on employment, to improve public safety.  
 1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
The Escalation of U.S. Prison Rates and Public Policies Impeding Inmate 
Reintegration 
Introduction 
The number of citizens who have moved through the criminal justice system in 
the United States has skyrocketed over the past three decades, resulting in the world’s 
highest incarcerated population (Aizenman, 2008). At a rate of one in every 100 persons, 
there are about 2.3 million Americans behind bars. The United States now imprisons 
more people than Russia and China, accounting for one fourth of the world’s incarcerated 
population (Pew Center on the States, 2008). Many have argued that a paradigm shift in 
criminal policy helped skyrocket the population behind bars by more than 600 percent 
since the 1970s (Mauer, 2003, p. 1). 
 Complicating the problem is the fact that most incarcerated people will eventually 
leave prison—about 95 percent of incarcerated inmates (Petersillia, 2003, p. V).  As a 
result, the number of citizens who seek reintegration into society after “doing time” is 
about 630,000 per year— a figure of considerable public policy concern (Department of 
Justice, 2008, p. 28).  Adding up the droves that have been arrested or convicted, about 
one fourth of Americans  currently possess or have spent some time with a criminal 
record (Mukamal and Samuels, 2003, p. 1501).  The obstacles for former convicts and 
arrestees created by easy access to criminal background information are made tougher 
still by public policies called collateral consequences that potentially impede societal 
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reintegration (Bushway 2006). For example, job applications often require statements of 
arrests and convictions, while public policies grant employers the right to deny 
employment to those with criminal records (Bushway, 2006, p. 1; Grogger, 1995); and in 
most states, having a criminal record can mean the denial of: employment, trade licenses, 
driving privileges, public education grants, housing and other welfare benefits (Bushway, 
2006, p. 2; Legal Action Center 2002).   
 Much media attention has cited “get-tough” policies as contributing to the 
incarceration boom (Levitt 2004), which has accompanied a significant drop in crime 
over the past 30 years (BJS 2010). In light of this, the paper seeks to trace the 
development of get-tough policies and focuses on the effect these policies have had on 
incarceration rates and crime. The paper’s structure is in some way a guide for policy 
development. By considering both the implications of how incarceration policies 
developed and what is to be done to solve some of the new problems they have created, 
this paper hopes that formulators of new sentencing policies will focus as much on the 
reentry question as they have on calls for intensely punitive sentencing laws. 
Organization of Paper 
Chapter 2 is concerned with various theories that helped influence this paper. 
Theorists addressed include David Easton, John Kingdon, Robert Merton, Richard 
Rosenfeld and Steven Messner.  Chapter 2 explains how Easton’s work on political 
systems influenced the structure of this paper, which constitutes an analysis of both 
inputs into the political system and an evaluation of outputs. The chapter goes on to 
discuss Kingdon’s work on streams and windows, which provided the theoretical lens 
that shapes this paper’s perspective on agenda setting. Chapter 2 also reviews works from 
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Merton, Rosenfeld and Messner on institutional anomie theory (IAT), which influenced 
much of this paper’s study of get tough outcomes. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 each apply Kingdon’s model to examine how certain crime 
policies were able to make it unto government’s agenda before analyzing he effects these 
policies have had on crime and/or incarceration rates. Chapter 3 focuses on sentencing 
reform, Chapter 4 on the War on Drugs, and Chapter 5 directs its attention to collateral 
consequences. 
While a review of existing studies provides sufficient information on the impact 
of the drug war and sentencing reform, there is no body of work that systematically 
measures the impact of collateral consequences. As such, Chapter 5, influenced by the 
works of Merton, Rosenfeld and Messner, provides a regression analysis of the effect of 
collateral consequence policies on crime rates. Chapter 6 summarizes the paper, discusses 
results, and provides policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Influences 
Frameworks for understanding policy 
Scholars have found that sentencing reform guidelines and the War on Drugs have 
driven the rapid rise in U.S. incarceration rates (Jacobson, 2005; Pager, 2003). This paper 
complements that body of work by tracing the development of incarceration-increasing 
policies as they move through the agenda setting process and examining whether policies 
aimed at curbing some of the post-incarceration barriers to offenders would help reduce 
crime. However, before delving into each policy, the paper shall review the theoretical 
frameworks that have influenced this study, beginning with the political science and 
public policy work of David Easton and John Kingdon and culminating with macro-
criminological contributions of Robert Merton as well as Steven Messner and Richard 
Rosenfeld.    
Easton (1956) tried to conceptualize the rule of law as resulting from the 
interaction of a political system (government) with its environment (society). In this 
conceptualization, the environment places “demands” on the system and provides the 
system with diffuse “support” for its institutions, its method of governing as well as 
specific support for particular laws. More stable political systems maintain their support 
primarily by way of diffuse support (Easton, 1975, pp. 436-439). Thus, although 
members of society may champion or protest particular policies (the War on Drugs and 
increased police expenditures, for example), these very citizens may likely— regardless 
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of the policy views— support the institutions and traditions of government that make up 
American democracy. By obeying laws, voting, voicing opinion, and organizing 
opposition and support for particular policies, citizens participate in accepted procedures 
of democratic activity, reaffirming these methods as the proper way to go about things. 
Thus, when a group of citizens lobbies a Congressman or marches in protest of a 
government policy, they are, by their participation, upholding the norms and conventions 
that prop up a democratic system, ensuring government’s legitimacy and stability despite 
policy outcomes. Furthermore, by placing pressure, “demands,” on the system citizen 
activity ensures that the government is ready to respond to the environment’s needs 
(Easton, 1975).  
Demands and supports makeup what Easton (1956) calls “inputs” into the 
political system. The political system responds to these inputs, which can take the form of 
support for laws on the books or demands to combat a perceived problem, such as rising 
crime rates, with new legislation. The resulting policies and laws, called “outputs 
(Easton, 1956), are implemented and dispersed into society. Society, in turn, may find 
fault or favor with the policy as implemented, or the policy may result in new unintended 
problems or benefits, which members of society may support or protest. The result is the 
introduction of new inputs into the political system through a feedback loop, thus 
continuing a cyclical process— a constitutive policy relationship.  
Easton’s work influenced the structure of this paper. While chapters 3,4 and 5,  
via a review of the literature and the study of certain cases, examines the movement of 
certain get-tough proposals from the environment to the political system, each of these 
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chapters also seeks to examine the impact these get-tough policy outputs have had on the 
environment.    
While Easton provided a clear framework that understood policy as a homeostatic 
relationship between society and government, Harold Laswell (1956) contributed to 
political science and public policy theory with his depiction of policy as a process that 
takes place in stages. Laswell has influenced the prevalent literature describing a public 
policy process comprised of five stages: agenda setting, formulation, adoption, 
implementation and evaluation (Dye, 2005; Kingdon, 2003; Jones, 1984). The stages 
describe how societal issues move from the environment unto the agenda of governments 
(agenda setting), to which governments and those close to it develop solutions 
(formulation), for which some are enacted into laws (adoption), enforced 
(implementation) and later examined for effectiveness and/or unintended consequences 
(evaluation). Evaluation can serve as a feedback loop through which new issues are 
brought to the attention of government, thereby providing more inputs to the political 
system (Dye, 2005).  
Problems, proposals and politics 
This paper’s third chapter, with its concern over how certain incarceration-
increasing policies arrived on government’s agenda, spends much time focusing on 
inputs— the agenda setting process in particular. To analyze the inputs that led to 
incarceration-increasing policies, the paper applies a windows and streams model. In this 
paper, windows and streams, which John Kingdon applied to case studies in health and 
transportation, is used as a lens through which to examine the agenda process involved in 
get-tough crime policy.  
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Like many public policy scholars, Laswell’s model of stages in the political 
system influenced Kingdon’s work. However, Kingdon (2003, 3) directed much of his 
work to the agenda setting stage, which he defines as the list of problems on which 
government, and those with government’s ear, focus. This definition of agenda is 
compatible with what Roger C. Cobb and Charles D. Elder (1983, 85) refer to as the 
“governmental agenda,” which they distinguish from the “systemic agenda.” The 
systemic agenda includes all those problems that merit public attention. While systemic 
agenda items are merely up for discussion, items on a governmental agenda, however, are 
those issues on which policy makers have decided they will act. Agenda setting is the 
process by which issues make it to a governmental agenda.  
Kingdon (2003) also stresses a difference between alternatives (or proposals), and 
the agenda. For Kingdon, a “problem” may elicit policy maker attention; but “proposals” 
on how to solve that problem follow a separate path; and the “politics’ surrounding that 
problem also take a different route. These distinct paths, what Kingdon calls “streams,” 
merge to create a proverbial whirlpool that sucks in proposals to solve problems to the 
agenda. Kingdon calls this whirlpool a “window.”    
Kingdon’s perspective is fresh in several ways. One important factor in Kingdon’s 
agenda setting process is the hunting of opportunities by those wishing to apply their 
proposals. Thus, though Kingdon distinguishes between agenda and proposals, he 
considers them integral to the agenda setting stage (Kingdon, 2003). This perspective is a 
departure from the norm because traditional public policy models describe the proposal 
stream, often called the formulation stage, as separate from the agenda setting process.  
Kingdon also departs from theorist who, following Laswell’s example, model policy as 
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semi-rigid, organized, and sequential. Instead, he sees the process as somewhat chaotic, 
comprised of rationalized and structured moments, but supported by idea and situation 
flows that are complex and highly disorganized (Kingdon, 2003).  
Kingdon does not clearly define the term “problem;” but, taken in context, he 
seems to be using a traditional public policy definition. In this sense, problems are those 
concerns for which a public remedy is sought (Jones, 1984).  Such problems may come to 
the attention of government playmakers via “routine monitoring activities (Kingdon, 
2003, p. 91).”  These activities can include analysis of annual statistical reports such as 
the Department of Justice’s Uniform Crime Report, which provides data on violent crime 
rates, arrest rates, prison and jail population sizes as well as studies on recidivism, drug 
treatment programs, and other information criminal justice agencies can use to assess 
success or failure. Dramatic changes in these reports can result in calls for policy action. 
In Kingdon’s case studies of the public health and transportation sectors (2003, p. 93), he 
found the assessment of routine reports to be a frequent factor in determining whether a 
problem would make it to the governmental agenda.     
 Another way that problems may rise to government’s agenda are through events, 
“like a crisis or a disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem, a powerful 
symbol that catches on, or the personal experience of a policy maker (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 
94-95).” In the case studies of the next chapter, events are extremely important in 
affecting the governmental agenda.  Such events include the heavily reported murders of 
children Kimberly Reynolds (whose father pushed for a new three strikes law) and Polly 
Klaas. Though Kingdon does not discuss the role of the media here, it seems logical to 
believe that if crises and events have an effect on public opinion, then the media, the 
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medium through which information about these crises are spread and framed, can affect 
whether policy makers decide the issue is something government needs to address 
(Cavender, 2004; Garland, 2001).  
 Kingdon (2003, pp. 94-110) also emphasizes the importance of interpretation, 
perception and ideology in defining a problem. Readings of annual statistics are subject 
to interpretation and debate, and events are not themselves influential unless they elicit 
call for reform from the public or policy-makers. Furthermore, how a problem is defined 
affects whether policy action is taken and what kind of policy action is taken (Kingdon, 
2003, p.94). For example, if poverty is ideologically viewed as a trigger for crime, then 
preventing poverty can be defined as crime control, which, as it will be shown later, 
occurred during the Johnson administration (Baum, 1996, pp. 5-7). Also, if an increase in 
intensity of a particular problem such as drug abuse and overdoses is defined as a health 
problem (see War on Drugs, Chapter 4), the policy initiatives taken would be far different 
were drug abuse primarily defined as a crime control problem (Hawdon, 2001, p. 424). 
Perhaps this paper’s most pertinent examples of problem definition’s importance are 
“collateral consequences,” post-incarceration “policies” that are directed at offenders but 
often are neither defined as criminal justice legislation nor included in the penal code. 
Because collateral consequences have generally not been included in the discussion and 
debate surrounding crime policy their effect on offenders and society has often been often 
ignored by the criminal justice community (see Chapter 5).   
Various actors have different effects of problem definition, including the media—
although Kingdon downplays their role. From his studies of agenda setting in the health 
and transportation sectors Kingdon concludes that the media has a minimal impact on 
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bringing certain problems to the attention of policy makers. Kingdon argues that the 
affect is nonetheless there and cites a case in which a high-level bureaucrat filed many 
reports on a problem but did not get a response from the White House until the 
Washington Post published an article on the problem. Kingdon concluded that media can 
serve as a tool through which public officials make each other aware of the importance of 
an issue.  
The political stream refers to factors that government officials frequently consider 
in their decisions regarding policy action. Such factors include public opinion, election 
results, campaigns, change of political officials (for example, the election of a new 
president or majority party change in Congress), influence of pressure groups, and 
changes in ideology or political party (Kingdon, 2003, p. 145). The three categories 
within the political stream that Kingdon finds most important are public mood, interest 
group organizations, events within government and the effectiveness of political 
entrepreneurs.  
While many scholars have discussed the importance of public opinion polls on the 
choices elected officials make, Kingdon deemphasizes their impact on the agenda.  
Instead of monitoring public opinion polls, Kingdon says public officials gage the public 
mood by speaking with other officials, communicating with interest groups and listening 
to the media.  Therefore, where possible, the following chapters will take this observation 
of Kingdon’s into account when analyzing political streams. However, the paper will 
depart from Kingdon by emphasizing relationships between public opinion polls, the 
political stream and the agenda.  This departure is validated by the considerable literature 
that documents the importance of opinion polls on policy (Manza and Cook, 2002; 
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Monroe, 1998; Verba, 1995; Page and Shapiro, 1983). Furthermore, the public is more 
likely to have an impact on crime policy than on issues related to transportation and 
health, Kingdon observed. Transportation and health care— although the current debate 
over national health care may be an exception— tend to be policy areas over which 
technocrats and professionals in the field wield tremendous influence (Kingdon, 1984). In 
these sectors, physicians and engineers offer technical expertise on policy to which many 
average citizens may be willing to differ. On the other hand, while criminology experts 
may impact policy, expert opinion does not always drive it.  Rather, because crime is 
frequently presented as a morality issue, there is often considerable citizen involvement 
in the policy process (Meier, 1994, pp. 7-8). For these reasons, public opinion polls such 
as the Gallup Report’s “Most Important Problem,” which is easy to access and represents 
a standardized measurement of the nation’s pulse, will be employed when analyzing 
some of the political streams in the following chapters.     
 Kingdon argues that the intensity and organization of interest groups can also 
weigh in considerably on whether an issue makes the agenda. Also, when there is a 
conflict among organized groups, political officials generally try to gage which direction 
the preponderance of group support is tilting. As in measuring public opinion, politicians 
are not always accurate in determining where the balance of organizational support rests. 
Sometimes the group that is simply the most vociferous wields the most influence 
(Kingdon, 2003, pp. 150-153). The effect of interest group organization and intensity is 
evident in the upcoming discussions of sentencing reform and the War on Drugs. 
Within government, the most important political factors include changes of office 
and consensus building (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 154-157). In the case studies below these 
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factors are particularly evident during the conception and development stages of the War 
on Drugs during the ascensions of the Nixon and Reagan administrations as well as the 
consensus battling over the Congressional bill containing Truth in Sentencing legislation. 
 Finally, there is the importance of policy entrepreneurs, people who are “willing 
to invest their resources, time, energy, reputation and sometimes money in hopes of a 
future political return (Kingdon, 1984).” Elected officials, academics, or other agents 
who have an interest in a particular policy can all become policy entrepreneurs (Hayes, 
1992, p. 154). In some cases, .the effect of policy entrepreneurs cannot be overstated. 
The final independent stream is the proposal, or formulation, stream. Described 
by Kingdon as “primordial soup,” the proposals sector is the realm of technocrats and 
academics specializing in particular areas (criminal justice for example) (Kingdon, 2003, 
p. 117). Such specialists work as: Congressional staff, members of presidential or 
gubernatorial task forces, policy writers for interest groups, implementers in the 
government bureaucracy, academics, and so forth (Kingdon, 2003). These experts 
communicate, pushing their ideas onto each other, members of the policy community and 
the public (Kingdon, 2003). For example, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, the works of 
scholar James Q. Wilson, David Fogel, and Andrew von Hirsh were published in 
academic and policy journals, where they influenced actors within the academic and 
policy field. Furthermore, because major television networks and print media interviewed 
some of these academics, the general public was able to learn of these policy proposals.  
Those who wish to gain support for their proposals also do so via draft bills, 
meetings, and speeches. This process, which can take many years, helps “soften up” 
conditions, helping to determine which proposals are accepted unto the agenda and which 
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ones are not. Communication also helps ideas evolve, as newly introduced proposals 
build upon old ones by extracting from and adding elements to older propositions 
(Kingdon, 2003).  
How consistent proposals are with the values of those within the proposal 
community affects a formulated plan’s chances of surviving long enough to make it onto 
the political agenda (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 132-133). Such values can include traditional 
liberal-vs.-conservative ideologies of the role of government, or American values on 
equity and fairness (Kingdon, 2003, pp. pp. 132-134). The following chapters suggest 
that these values are not static, but are transformed overtime when crime policy is 
concerned. Taking a page from Thomas Kuhn, Kingdon argues that the logic of 
proposals—or in more Kuhn-like terms, the paradigm (Kuhn, 1996, p. 3) that governs 
which proposals are acceptable and which are not— are shaped by the values and beliefs 
of those within the proposal community (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 132-134).  
The get-tough movement, for example, was marked by a surge in conservative 
beliefs about individualism, the role of government, and punishment that led to a new 
paradigm in which law makers molded crime policy. The following chapters demonstrate 
how a change in ideology triggered a paradigm shift, in which the policy community 
softened up to proposals based on conservative ideals about crime (Bushway, Stoll and 
Weisman 2007, p. 32; Griswald and Wiatrowski, 1983, p. 29). Eventually the 
conservative emphasis on retribution, punishment, the role of government, individual 
responsibility and punishment would, in the public eye, hold more clout than liberal 
concepts of rehabilitation. Realizing this, Democrats eventually dropped rehabilitation-
minded proposals in favor of more populist notions of punishment and deterrence (see 
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section on three strikes). Eventually, both parties would try to out-tough each other on 
crime. 
Kingdon is not the only scholar who argues that ideology has an influence on 
policy. Walter Miller (1973), for one, agrees with Kingdon’s conclusions about the role 
of values and applies it to criminal justice. Miller contends that ideology “constitutes a 
permanent hidden agenda of criminal justice, exercising a powerful influence on the 
policies and procedures of those who conduct the enterprise (1973, p. 142).” Miller 
claims several tenets represent the core of a crusading, conservative ideology in crime 
policy. These include opposition to policies that are “soft” on offenders and practices 
favoring the rights of offenders over victims’ rights (Miller, 1973, p. 143). 
Whereas the media, by its affect on public opinion and perception, wields an 
indirect affect in the problem and political streams, Kingdon (2003) argues that the media 
affect on the proposal stream is more direct. The willingness of certain newspapers, 
television stations, radio programs and academic journals to feature certain proposals, 
after all, has direct impact on the softening process. Chapter three, in its discussion of 
media attention to particular proposals, exemplifies this trait. 
The arrival of certain policies on the governmental agenda are not the result of 
any one of the streams discussed above but are instead born from processes in which the 
three streams merge (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 166-167). Such processes open a brief 
‘window’ through which policies can make it onto the very “short list of issues within the 
governmental agenda that government is actually deciding on (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 166-
167).”  
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Problem and political streams, via catastrophic events, elections and their results, 
open windows; and proposal streams do not (Kingdon, 2003, 168-169). Once windows 
open, proposals that have gained prominence and some consensus within the policy 
stream enter (Kingdon, 2003). For example, the election of a new president with a new 
value system may influence the desire to address issues that were not priorities for a 
previous administration. This results in windows opening in the political streams and 
calls for proposals to address the issues (Kingdon, 2003). 
In another example, a dramatic murder that captures the attention of the public or 
a rise in crime rates may bring attention to a crime problem, creating a thirst for proposals 
that have been aging and chilling in the specialists’ cellar. Problems do not open 
windows without political support and political streams do not open windows for 
problems that are not perceived to exist. Thus, a confluence of all three streams is 
necessary for certain policies to make it to government’s short list (Kingdon, 2003). The 
following chapters demonstrate the process of streams and windows in the development 
of sentencing legislation, the drug war and collateral consequences.  
Kingdon (2003, pp. 79-83) does not argue that all governmental policies are the 
result of the three streams merging, acknowledging that once a policy is adopted, policy 
changes are often made by way of routine, incremental changes. The chapters below 
provide some evidence of this. Once sentencing reform got on the agenda, we see a move 
toward gradually increased sentencing along with policy jumps that are characterized by 
the merger of the streams. Also of note, is a strong element of federalism, with policies 
spreading from state to state or from the central government via federal tax incentives. 
 16 
 
The federal Truth in Sentencing act, which provided prison construction grants to states 
that ensured convicts served at least 85 percent of their sentencing, exemplifies this.   
It also must be noted that in this paper there is no clear division of labor in parts 
of the policy process. Formulation and agenda setting, often construed as executive 
functions, are frequently dominated by corporate and citizen interest groups, legislators 
and department heads. Likewise, adoption is not limited to Congress and state legislators, 
as the impact of lobbyists, bureaucrats, and the executive is often felt during adoption.  
Indeed, the processes of agenda setting, formulation or adoption may “be readily 
distinguished analytically although they may be empirically more difficult to pull apart 
(Anderson, 2005, p. 28).” This blurring of actors and roles becomes more evident as one 
observes the process involved in forming those policies that have most contributed to 
rising incarceration rates.  
 While explorations of the policy process and Kingdon’s theory of streams and 
windows provide a valuable insight into how policy proposals rose to the agenda, other 
tools are needed to examine the impact of these policies. The third and fourth chapters do 
this by reviewing the literature that examines the impact of sentencing reform and the war 
and drugs. Because there have been no studies examining the impact of collateral 
consequences on crime, the fifth chapter attempts to do so via its own regression analysis. 
Several theories in macro-criminology have helped influence this regression, particularly 
institutional anomie theory.  
Institutional Anomie Theory.   
Institutional anomie theory owes much to sociology founding father Emile 
Durkheim’s (1897) concept, anomie. Anomie, Durkheim wrote, occurs when individuals, 
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due to social transformation, often via industrialization or modernism, feel they no longer 
fit into their societies. Such transformations can separate individuals from their previous 
role in a once more organically whole community, in which traditional values function to 
maintain a social structure. When modernizing processes and changes in social structures 
make it such that traditional values no longer fit the new order, a certain gap between 
value, function and structure occurs. This gap is what Durkheim called anomie; and 
anomie, Durkheim contended, could lead to abnormal behavior such as suicide. Though 
anomie occurred during times of social transformation, the move from an agrarian society 
to a modern industrial one, for example, Durkheim theorized that modern capitalist 
societies, which he perceived as in perpetual economic change, could exist in a constant 
state of anomie.  
Robert Merton (1938) introduced the concept of anomie to American 
criminology. Influenced by Durkheim, Merton said anomie occurred when the disparity 
between the cultural ideal and people’s ability to attain it are too great. In the United 
States, Merton said, anomie can lead to the weakening of pro-social norms and values 
because the American Dream (the desire for success through upward mobility) trumps 
those values, creating a get-it-by-any-means attitude. Merton added that while American 
culture encourages competition for wealth at all levels of society, social structure limits 
the ability of many to achieve these goals. The resulting gap between the desire for “a 
deluxe apartment in the sky” and people’s ability to pay for it via legitimate methods, i.e. 
college education, hard work, leads to crime.   
“Aberrant conduct, therefore, may be viewed as a symptom of dissociation 
between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means (Merton, 
1938).”  
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His emphasis on both culture and structure led Merton to conclude that poverty 
and limited opportunity do not lead to crime on their own. Rather, poorer societies, in 
which intense values of social mobility do not transcend class, are not likely to have the 
high crime rates that wealthier societies possessing pervasive values for pecuniary 
success do (Merton, 1938, p. 681). Perhaps due to his idea that American values could be 
criminogenic, Merton fell out of favor in the 1970s and 1980s (Pratt, 2001). Then, 
criminological theories that suggested welfare programs and education investments were 
a way of shrinking the gap between expectations and abilities were no longer in step with 
a more right-leaning political culture, which looked at crime through the lens of  
individual responsibility. However, Merton’s theories resurfaced when Messner and 
Rosenfeld (2001) published Crime and the American Dream.  
While agreeing with Merton’s contention that the American Dream could lead to 
anomie-based crime, Messner and Rosenfeld (2001, p. 56) departed from Merton by 
contending that increased economic opportunities could indeed be criminogenic. The 
authors argued that providing more pathways to economic success could reinforce the 
ideals of the American dream, while redirecting anomic pressures to those who do not 
have the skills to survive in the marketplace. Messner and Rosenfeld therefore provided 
an alternative method of reducing crime, directing their attention away from the mere 
reduction of structural impediments and toward the propping up of pro-social values.  
In reworking Merton’s work, Messner and Rosenfeld took a page from social 
disorganization theory, particularly the work of Shaw and McKay (1969). Shaw and 
McKay suspected that much crime resulted from dynamics at the neighborhood level.  
Poor population-shifting neighborhoods attracted crime because bad economic conditions 
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eroded families and churches, drove residents away, and attracted new residents with 
different cultural norms and values. Because community organizations, families and 
churches traditionally serve as promoters of pro-social behavior, their erosion in such 
poorer neighborhoods meant a rise in antisocial behavior such as crime. Furthermore, 
delinquent norms and values would replace the traditional middle class values that 
formerly established, pro-social institutions once perpetuated, also leading to higher 
crime rates. 
 Messner and Rosenfeld agreed with social disorganization theory’s tenet that 
institutions such as, polity, family, and schools each have their own function in instilling 
means values. The polity, or civic structure, ‘mobilizes and distributes power to attain 
collective goals;” families function as havens from the tensions of the world and 
emotionally reinforce the ability of persons to withstand the pressures of American life; 
and educational institutions instill cultural standards in new generations. All three of 
these institutions are heavily interdependent, particularly the family and educational 
system (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001).  
However, Messner and Rosenfeld departed from social disorganization theory 
by contending that it was not the replacement of middle class norms with new subservient 
norms that lead to crime. Rather, Messner and Rosenfeld posited that middle class values 
themselves weakened the ability of pro-social institutions to prevent crime. The economic 
logic of the American Dream, they contended, “devalues, accommodates and 
penetrates”-- other value inducing functions of family, education and polity (Messner 
and Rosenfeld, 2001, p.70). For example, rather than valuing education as its own end, 
Americans increasingly see degrees and diplomas as a way to get jobs. Furthermore, the 
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market “devalues” educators, through their relatively low pay and prestige factor when 
compared to teachers in other wealthy nations. It devalues the polity, as evidenced 
through the nation’s paltry participation in public service or even at the ballot. And it 
devalues the family by providing families or day care workers little support (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 70). Messner and Rosenfeld believe that noneconomic institutions 
“accommodate” to the economy when noneconomic and economic institutions are in 
competition. Subsequently, working families mold their family schedule to their work 
schedules but rarely mold their work schedules to their family schedules. In another 
reference to family economic accommodation, the authors compare the United States to 
other wealthy nations, citing mandatory maternity and paternity laws in other countries 
and the absence of such laws in the United States. Schools also accommodate to 
economic conditions by scheduling times and creating curriculums aimed at market 
demands. The polity, in turn, falls to the mercy of businesses who are owed favors after 
making contributions to political candidates. Governments also need “to create 
environments hospitable for private investment. If they do not, they run the risk of being 
literally ‘downgraded’ by financial markets (Messner and Rosenfeld 2001, pp. 70-86).” 
Finally, the logic of the economy “penetrates” noneconomic institutions. Schools, for 
example, become businesses in their own rights, competing for dollars and customers. In 
families, both parents are increasingly becoming breadwinners while the role of 
homemaker is decreasing among women and not being filled by men. And in 
government, a bottom-line mentality takes over and businessmen are increasingly seen as 
viable candidates for political positions (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, pp. 70-75), i.e. 
Ross Perot, Michael Bloomberg, Mitt Romney, Donald Trump, or Herman Cain. 
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Via such accommodative, penetrating, and devaluing policies, the American 
Dream assumes a dominant role at all levels of society. However, the end result is not 
solely an increase in crime for monetary gain. Rather, Messner and Rosenfeld, argue that 
by eroding institutional power to instill means values, means are justified to achieve any 
end, not solely those that result in economic benefit.  
“The anomie associates with its cultural ethos; this tends to neutralize and 
overpower normative restraints generally, and the selection of means for 
realizing goals of any type, not simply monetary goals, tends to be guided by 
considerations of technical expediency. The American penchant for owning guns 
and using them reflects in other words, a more general anomic cultural 
orientation  (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 78).” 
 
In fact, recent work by Messner et al. (2007) focuses specifically on weakened 
noneconomic institutions in times of economic deprivation and their effect on increases 
in violent crime rates. In a reevaluation of the predictive powers of institutional anomie 
theory, the authors focus on Durkheim’s comments on “egoistic individualism,” a 
pathological departure from the cooperative individualism that Durkheim contended 
would normally characterize democratic societies. Differing from Durkheim, Messner, 
Thome and Rosenfeld (2007, pp. 170-172) argue that excessive individualism is 
increasingly a modern society norm. In such societies, the logic of the market, a logic 
based on perpetual cost benefit analysis and immediate utility, extends beyond monetary 
considerations. When such “marketness” takes over, individuals begin to see their 
interactions with others as a mere means to an end. Under this logic, benefits of hurting 
another to address perceived humiliations or disrespect, or of violently eliminating 
competition that may stand in the way of another goal such as sex or power, are seen as 
legitimate means to this end. Of course, such excessive individualism only occurs when 
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means values institutions are weakened by the power of the market and marketness 
(Messner, Thome and Rosenfeld., 2007, pp. 171-173).     
When looking at possible method of reducing crime rates, the authors look at both 
conservative and liberal crime policies and argue that both have failed. Exceedingly 
punitive, conservative policies have, by increasing the number of persons the system 
processes, have exhausted the capacity of district attorneys and public defenders to 
administer justice effectively—with expediency often trumping defendant rights. 
Furthermore, tougher laws have taken male bread winners away from families weakening 
their power to instill means values among the young, thereby increasing crime rates 
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 96).  
On the other hand, liberal policies, based on providing society’s have-nots with 
legitimate access to success have also not proven effective. The authors cite Johnson-era 
programs such as the Mobilization for Youth initiative as an example, noting that while 
such Great Society programs help reduce poverty, crime rates actually increased during 
the 1960s and 1970s, paving the way for the get-tough backlash that would eventually 
ensue. Furthermore, some of the crime increases that occurred in these years may have 
been result of liberal reforms. As economic opportunity becomes available, the proverbial 
George Jeffersons of the world leave their poorer communities for better places, taking 
with them the “skills, resources and modes of conventional behavior that contribute to 
community stability (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 96).” 
The failure of both conservative and liberal attempts at crime policy reform, 
Messner and Rosenfeld argue, stem from an unwillingness to look at how a fundamental 
element of American culture, the American Dream, contributes to crime. Looking at the 
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crime problem in that way would make the need for noneconomic institutional reforms 
more apparent. Such reforms, Messner and Rosenfeld state, should include policies that 
try to increase the time parents spend with their children and facilitate the interactions 
with schools and families. In regards to schools, the authors tout policies that will remove 
the economic logic of educational institutions and rather focus on learning as an ends to 
itself. When looking at the polity, the authors focus on the creation of youth civic 
engagement groups. Such public organizations would recruit high school graduates and 
dropouts during their most crime prone years, engaging them in national service and 
instilling a sense of service to a greater good than oneself.  
The result, the authors imply, would be a reinforcement of means values that 
would reduce the individualist, anomic pressures of the American Dream. With an 
extremely expanded budget and recruitment base, governmental organizations such as 
Americorp could serve such a crime-reducing function (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, 
pp. 95 -105). Messner and Rosenfeld do not depart entirely from Merton’s policy 
solutions and contend that policy reforms directed at noneconomic institutions are only 
effective when coupled with general welfare supports aimed a maintaining a general level 
of well being (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, pp. 106-107).   
Chamlin and Cochran (1995) saw value in Messner and Rosenfeld’s work and 
sought to operationalize at least some of its tenets. The authors reasoned that if Messner 
and Rosenfeld’s theory held weight, then one could hypothesize that improvement in 
economic conditions would only reduce instrumental crime when noneconomic 
institutions are also strengthened.  Chamlin and Cochran used the level of families below 
the poverty rate in states to measure economic conditions. To measure noneconomic 
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institutions, Chamlin and Cochran measured polity, family and church by looking at state 
voter turn out, divorce rates and religious organization membership and tested the ratio of 
each to state poverty rates as independent variables affecting crime rates. The results 
suggested that all three variables reduced the effect of poverty on crime. 
Though it is not this paper’s main objective to test the validity of institutional 
anomie theory, Chamlin and Cochran’s work does help understand the possible effects 
that policies directly targeting former offenders can have on crime rates. Such policies 
directed at persons with criminal records are called “collateral consequences.” Again, the 
term refers to punitive policies that are directed at offenders but often are neither defined 
as criminal justice legislation nor included in the penal code. Examples of collateral 
consequence policies include those that bar or limit the access offenders have to 
employment, housing, franchise, health care and parenting.      
How then are collateral consequences related to the value-enhancing, crime-
reducing, noneconomic institutions like family, church and polity? This paper 
hypothesizes that collateral consequences can reduce the ability of those institutions to 
reduce crime, as the struggle to survive and the anomic pressures of the American Dream 
take precedence. It is plausible that barring offenders’ access to employment, housing, 
and other welfare benefits can erode family structure. A father who comes out of prison 
and is barred access to work, a home for his family, or government safety nets to mitigate 
against these obstacles, may feel pressured to engage in instrumental crime as a means of 
supporting his family. Or, this same man may find minimum wage employment, 
requiring him to work two or three jobs to make ends meet, thereby reducing his ability 
to monitor the behavior of his children or engage them in pro-social activities.    
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One source of conflict involves competing demands associated with role 
performance. Given the fact that time is a finite resource, performing a given 
institutional role (e.g., working overtime) may preclude performing another role 
(e.g., taking one’s daughter to soccer practice (Messner et al., 2007, 168)).     
 
It can also be argued that the denial of employment, housing, education and other welfare 
state benefits to former offenders can decrease the time available to participate in 
religious organizations and other pro-social activities, as the struggle to attain basic needs 
takes up an ex-offender’s time. Third, collateral consequence policies that bar access to 
the ballot could arguably discourage participation in the political process, thereby 
reducing the use of legitimate pathways to seek grievances against government, while 
anomic pressures prevail.  
It must be emphasized that the weakening of noneconomic institutions that 
collateral consequences can create, at least following the logic of institutional anomie 
theory, mean that the criminogenic effects of such laws are not limited to recidivism but 
rather extend to instrumental crime rates in general. Furthermore, employing the 
arguments this paper made about the collateral consequences’ effect on noneconomic 
institutions and the recent considerations of violent crime and instrumental crimes as 
potential dependent variables in tests of institutional anomie theory, it can be 
hypothesized that collateral consequences can effect overall crime rates, violent and 
nonviolent.  
Because of the increase of prisoners, there has been a corresponding increase of 
persons with criminal records who are released into society and affected by collateral 
consequences. The following chapters address two major questions. First, how did the 
public policies that contributed to these increasing incarceration rates came to be? And 
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second, what has been the effect of these policies on public safety? Policies addressed 
will include sentencing reform, the War on Drugs, and collateral consequences.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
Get Tough Replaces Rehabilitation and Triggers Sentencing Reform 
On the Agenda: The Drive for Sentencing Reform 
One effect of a change in crime policy that took root in the 1970s has been a 
rising inmate population that has not corresponded to a comparable increase in crime 
rates (Boggess and Bound, 1997; Western 2006, pp. 43-45). In the realm of criminal 
justice policy, many scholars argue that a shift in policy paradigm launched the rise in 
arrests and convictions that drove prison populations upwards (Bushway, Stoll and 
Weiman., 2007, p. 8; Pager, 2007, p. 2; Petersilia, 2003, pp. 12-23; Gest, 2001) and that a 
transformation in ideology made this paradigm shift possible (Bushway et al., 2007, p. 
32; Griswald and Wiatrowski, 1983, p. 29). The new ideological mindset was expressed 
by the phrase “get-tough.” 
 As noted in Chapter 2, Kingdon contends that ideology can shape policy 
alternatives. Miller (1973, p. 43)  also focuses on the effects of values on crime policy 
and says several tenets represent the core of a crusading, conservative ideology in crime 
policy. Get-tough’s central tenets include opposition to policies that are “soft” on 
offenders and practices that favor offenders’ rights over victims’ rights (Miller, 1973, p. 
43). The “get tough” movement that these beliefs propelled were expressed in a move 
from rehabilitative policies towards ones more focused on punishment, deterrence and 
incapacitation (Bushway, 2007; Pager, 2007).   
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If one accepts the notion that ideology drives policy, one must also ask how 
certain ideologies regularly penetrate government’s agenda while others have less 
success.  Employing Kingdon’s (2003) format, one can hypothesize that a confluence of 
problems and politics permitted get-tough proposals to move onto government’s agenda.  
Among the earliest get-tough policies to attain agenda status were a series of criminal 
justice changes known as sentencing reform. These replaced the indeterminate sentencing 
paradigm, which was characterized by a huge range of judicial discretion and a parole 
board with great leeway to grant early release. Once the policy window opened, it set a 
pathway for incremental increases in punitive laws and the development of new get-tough 
proposals, including the drug war and collateral consequence policies. Many of the most 
punitive sentencing reform policies would target drug offenders, and most inmates 
sentenced under these laws would face more collateral consequence policies than any 
time in history, resulting in the internal ostracism of ex-offenders. Furthermore, as 
Messner and Rosenfeld have contended, it can be argued that neither the policy paradigm 
that existed prior to the get tough movement nor the get tough policies that came as a 
backlash were significantly effective in reducing crime. 
Before the backlash: rehabilitation 
Criminal justice policies established before the rise of the get-tough movement, if 
not completely derived from, were in many ways aligned with some of the macro-social 
theories of crime discussed in Chapter 2. For example, juvenile delinquency was 
perceived as resulting from “social disorganization (see Chapter 2),” and Richard Cowler 
and Loyd Ohlin, two anomie theorists, were key members of Kennedy’s Presidential 
Committee on Juvenile Justice and Youth Crime and would impact the types of crime 
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policy the Johnson administration pursued. The following quote from Ohlin, had one not 
known the author, could be easily mistaken as Merton’s. 
“In a democratic society such as ours, equal opportunity is expressed 
constantly. The myth of log-cabin-to-president and city-street-to-bank-
president is deeply ingrained in us. The trouble comes with the break between 
aspirations and opportunities. When we lead people to aspire to higher and 
higher standards and then fail to produce opportunities for them to do so, they 
are left with a sense of having been denied and they often become delinquents 
(Ohlin, 2009, p. A28).” 
 
Influenced by a similar perspective, Kennedy and Johnson-era rhetoric focused on 
providing economic opportunity access to those who were least capable of “success.” The 
result was a rather holistic focus on criminal justice, in which the goals of the welfare 
state and that of the corrections system were viewed as different sides to the same coin. 
“Poverty. Strike poverty down tonight,” President Johnson said; “and much of the crime 
will fall down with it (Gest 2001).” Subsequently, the Great Society programs of the 
Johnson Administration were both welfare and crime policy, aimed at unearthing the 
“root causes” associated with crime (Gest, 2001).   
The U.S. prison system and sentencing, long before the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, had functioned on a treatment/rehabilitative model, and a 1967 
Presidential Crime Commission reaffirmed these principles. The specific rehabilitative 
theme echoed throughout the commission’s publication was Mertonian, defining crime as 
a “psychologically normal though culturally variant response to bad social conditions 
(Zalman, 1987, p. 546).”   
In the field of sentencing, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw no need 
to change the dominant indeterminate sentencing model, as it was cast in a rehabilitative 
mold. At the time, every state practiced indeterminate sentencing, which granted judges 
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considerable discretion when imposing sentence length (in some cases a judge could 
sentence a convict to a term ranging for between 2 and 20 years). After sentencing, it was 
up to parole boards to determine when a prisoner was eligible for release; and eligibility 
was determined by deciding whether the prisoner was considered rehabilitated. To 
receive a proverbial rehabilitated stamp of approval from the parole board, prisoners 
would often have to participate in programs of the ilk the Johnson administration’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Justice recommended. These included vocational 
and educational training and work furlough programs aimed at improving prisoners’ 
chances of economic success once released (Zalmam 1987). 
Problems, proposal, and politics affecting early sentencing reform 
In the mid 1960s and early 1970s, one problem that helped open a get-tough 
window and pave the way for sentencing reform was a violent crime rate that was 
climbing steeply. In 1963, the violent crime rate was at 168 per 100,000. By 1978, it had 
shot upwards to more than 487 per 100,000 (BJS, 2008). Helping draw attention to the 
concern over crime were a series of racial urban riots that began in the wake of the Civil 
Rights movement. The first of these occurred on June 18, 1964, just days after Johnson 
had signed the Civil Rights Act, in response to the New York slaying of a black youth by 
a white police officer. Whereas racial violence had been frequently perceived as a 
southern issue, the New York protests kindled a series of other urban riots that famed 
through New York, Illinois and Pennsylvania that same year. The riots, which continued 
in Los Angeles in 1965 and in Newark and Detroit in 1967, served as a sharp-relief 
depiction of the problems of racial injustice and increasing violence in America.  
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Some helped define the rising violence problem as a consequence of 
indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitation paradigm. One influential study was 
Nothing Works, a study by Robert Martinson (1974), who concluded that amid rising 
crime rates, attempts to rehabilitate criminals were completely ineffective. Mass media 
latched onto this theme, making criminal justice a focus point. The television news 
program, 60 minutes, extremely popular in the 1970s, ran a story on prison 
ineffectiveness, for which host Michael Wallace interviewed Martinson (Cavender, 2004, 
p. 341). A search in the Vanderbilt Television News Archives (2010) shows that between 
1974, the year Martinson’s book hit the press, and 1980, 41 stories on the ABC, CBS and 
NBC nightly news reports mentioned problems with prisons and sentencing.  
While reports such as Martinson’s and media attention help define the crime 
problem as related to indeterminate sentencing or rehabilitation, many political factors 
would bring rise to sentencing reform. Among them was the 1964 presidential campaign 
of Republican Barry Goldwater. In response to soaring violent crime, the urban riots, and 
a public mood shift, Goldwater upped his rhetoric towards “enforcing law and order” and 
fighting “violence on the streets (Gest, 2001, p. 5; O’Reilly, 1988, p. 93).” Although 
Goldwater lost, his noticeable effect on voters stirred Democrats to battle crime from 
their own platform (Gest, 2001, p. 5; Benekos, 1992, p. 4) and host a commission on 
crime and racial violence in 1968 (O’Reilly, 1988, pp. 104-105). Meanwhile, 
Republicans refused to be “out-toughed,” thereby keeping the crime issue alive long 
enough for it to spillover into the next presidential election. Then, Richard Nixon gave 17 
stump speeches on crime, calling for a toppling of the ideals of the “soft, liberal” Warren 
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Court (Gest, 2001, p. 15). With Goldwater, Johnson and Nixon giving crime attention, 
the issue had a bipartisan feel. 
The aftermath of the Civil Rights movement also led to support from the left and 
the right. Calling for an increase in victim’s rights, conservatives began to vociferously 
oppose the 1950s rehabilitation paradigm and the corresponding shift in Supreme Court 
decisions towards treating offenders instead of vindicating and protecting them 
(Goodstein and Hepburn, 1985, pp.14-20).  The left would join in the fight for victim’s 
rights through increased mobilization among women’s rights groups, who soon rallied 
against unfair treatment of women in rape cases. They argued that courts often gave the 
perpetrators soft penalties and frequently blamed the victims’ sexuality for the crime. 
Those who fought for rights of the elderly also mobilized, drawing broader public support 
for victim’s rights and tougher laws against criminals (Greene, 2002).  Kingdon (2003, p. 
150) states that government officials often look towards interest group positions to weigh 
the balance of support for certain agenda items. The policy makers who looked at interest 
group activity in the 1970s and early 1980s would have seen broad support on both sides 
of the political fence for a change in the way the criminal justice system was handling 
affairs.  
The mood of the Civil Rights movements also reverberated in a report by the 
American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker-based civil rights and anti-violence 
organization. The AFSC study (1971) concluded that minorities and individuals with 
low-income generally served longer sentences than others due to judicial discretion, 
which was deemed capricious and arbitrary. Backing the AFSC’s findings was a 1971 
study by the Senate Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, which found that judges 
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sentenced blacks more often and for longer terms than they did whites. On average, the 
Senate committee concluded, African American convicts served sentences of more than 
4.5 years, while whites served more than a year less in prison (Saint-Germain and 
Calamia, 1996).  
Along with mobilization from groups advocating more rights for minorities, 
women and the elderly, public sentiment toward crime changed. A 1965 American 
Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) poll, which asked respondents whether they felt at risk 
walking anywhere within one mile of their home, said 17 percent of men and 43 percent 
of women were afraid.  By 1972, the numbers rose to 20 percent of men and 58 percent, 
while another AIPO poll reported that four out of every five Americans wished the justice 
system was tougher on crime (Hindelang, 1974, pp. 102-106).   
The merger of the problem stream (comprised of increasing violent crime rates 
and perceived criminal justice unfairness to victims and minorities) with the political 
stream (comprised of victim and minority right’s mobilization along with rising public 
concern with crime) would open a policy window in the 1980s that elicited a call for 
proposals. Most of these proposals resulted from scholarly works that began circulating 
in the late 1960s, when attention to the deterrence model in criminal justice resurfaced, 
spurring several theoretical works from major scholars, including Franklin Zimring and 
Gordon Hawkins (1973), Gary S. Becker (1968), and Jack Gibbs (1968). The works of 
these authors shared several common themes, including a focus on the decision making 
process of individual actors and the effect of certainty of  punishment or level of 
punishment in deterring current and potential offenders from crime. The focus on the 
rational process of individuals marked a sharp turn from the macro-criminology of 
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scholar’s like Merton, who studied structural and cultural factors affecting aggregate 
groups. It is this paper’s contention that the focus on crime as an individual choice would 
complement a Republican emphasis on individual responsibility over collective 
responsibility.  Such a perspective would affect ideas on how policies such as welfare and 
drug treatment affected crime, and this shift would lead to profound changes in criminal 
justice policy.  
Deterrence-minded theory would have more of an impact on policy alternatives 
when the works of Martinson and James Q. Wilson (1974) drew media attention. Wilson 
argued in favor of sentencing structures that would mandate definite time behind bars for 
most offenders and that increased chances of punishment would deter offenders from 
recidivism. If not, stiffer penalties would at least incapacitate them from committing 
crime during their stints in prison or jail. Wilson emphasized the value of punishment 
over rehabilitation in improving public safety. Among the most conservative reformers, 
he railed against the Mertonian belief that welfare support was a form of crime reduction, 
countering that welfare triggered a sense of entitlement, eroded work ethic and led to 
criminal behavior. Reducing welfare benefits, Wilson posited, would conversely 
encourage work ethic and reduce crime (1974). For this reason, he wrote, the Johnson 
Administration’s New Society expansions were accompanied by a nation-wide rise in 
crime rates (Wilson, 1974). Following the 60 Minutes interview with Martinson, Wilson, 
also received heavy coverage in The New York Times (Wilson, 1974).”  
Others wielded influence in the sentencing reform movement. David Fogel, head 
of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, advocated doing away with power of 
parole boards to release an inmate before a sentence was completed (Bagley, 1979). 
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Scholar Andrew von Hirsh supported curtailing judicial discretion and eliminating parole 
boards, while replacing them with a “sentencing structure that would shape and constrain 
judicial practice” (Greene, 2002, p. 6).  U.S. And District Court Judge Marvin E. Frankel, 
in his book Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1972) called for a national 
commission to evaluate the federal sentencing and parole practices of the time and to 
create rules based on their findings, which Congress would have the power to overrule 
(US Sentencing Commission Report 2003). Frankel would have the ear of some powerful 
political figures, including Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who in 1975 invited Frankel 
to dinner and thereafter quickly moved to enact some the key provisions in Frankel’s 
book (Stith and Kohn, 1993). The proposals these academics made influenced sentencing 
reform proposals that rose to the agendas of various states and the federal government. In 
their attempts to increase sentence length, decrease disparity, and reduce parole or 
judicial discretion, the new policies marked a fundamental move away from the 
rehabilitative ideal in criminal justice.  
Determinate sentencing was among the first sentencing reforms proposed and 
eventually adopted. Aligned with Fogel’s recommendations, such reforms generally strip 
the power of parole boards to decide whether prisoners are qualified for early release 
(Stemen and Renfigo, 2010, p.11). The reforms also ensure that inmates, via a good-time 
credits system, serve a certain percent of the sentence judges impose before qualifying for 
parole (Stemen, Renfigo and Wilson, 2010, p.18). Since the beginning of the sentencing 
reform movement, 17 states have enacted some form of determinate sentencing (Stemen, 
Rengifo and Wilson, 2006, p.12).  
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Structured sentencing reform, which shows Frankel, Wilson and Von Hirsch’s 
influence, reduces judicial discretion to determine sentence length. Forms of structured 
sentencing include presumptive sentencing guidelines and voluntary sentencing 
guidelines. Presumptive sentences legislatively recommend single prison terms for each 
of a state’s various felonies. A judge may depart from the recommendation only under 
extenuating circumstances (Stemen and Rengifo, 2010, p.7). Voluntary sentencing 
guidelines are similar in nature to their presumptive counterparts except that voluntary 
sentencing guidelines allow judges more leeway to depart from the recommended 
guidelines (Stemen, Rengifo and Wilson., 2006, p.16).  Nine states have implemented 
some variation of presumptive sentencing. And the federal government has enacted 
sentencing guidelines, which Frankel’s work significantly influenced (Stith and Kohn, 
1993).  
Mandatory sentences address particular crimes and generally try to control a 
judge’s ability to decide whether an offender will go to prison and for how long 
(Goodstein and Hepburn, 1985, pp. 29- 30). However, forms of mandatory sentencing 
can vary drastically. Some states require judges to order prison time for particular 
offenses, while leaving sentence length up to the judge; others mandate higher sentence 
ranges, which the judge must choose from; and others stipulate precise sentencing length 
for particular crimes, for example, 10 years for crack-cocaine position. Since 1975, every 
state has enacted some sort of mandatory sentencing (Stemen et al., 2006). Three Strikes 
legislation, which this chapter shall soon address, is a form of mandatory sentencing. 
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Summary of early sentencing reform’s rise to the agenda 
  Quickly reviewing the agenda setting process for early sentencing reform, one can 
see the streams system at work. Problem and political streams merged to create a window 
during the 1980s for reform proposals that had been circulating since the mid 1970s. In 
the problem stream, high crime rates were a factor, while scholars and the media helped 
define the problem as related to the indeterminate system, the principle of rehabilitation, 
the system’s unfair treatment of minorities, and insensitivity to victims.  Factors at work 
in the political stream included attention to the matter in presidential campaign rhetoric 
and interest group pressure from the left and the right for reform. Public opinion was also 
a factor, as Americans increasingly said they felt less safe and wished crime laws were 
tougher. This may have been the result of media attention to crime and prison system 
problems. Such coverage increased significantly in the years leading up to reform. As it 
became politically necessary to deal with the problem of crime, policy makers drew from 
already cultivated reform proposals from scholars like Fogel, von Hirsh, Martinson and 
Wilson. Such proposals were also popular because of media attention.  
  It is of note that the media played a role in problem, political and proposal 
streams, a theme that recurs in this paper’s other case studies.  Another theme that all the 
case studies have in common is the presence of a tougher mindset in crime legislation and 
dwindling support for rehabilitative crime policies based on the works of scholars like 
Merton. Instead, policies from micro-economic perspectives that focused more on 
individual choice than macro-social factors began to gain favor. The impact of this 
change in crime policy will be further discussed in this chapter.      
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Later Sentencing Reform: Truth in Sentencing 
Despite prison overcrowding and heavy media attention to the issue (Vanderbilt 
Television News Archives, 2010), the three streams would again merge to bring about 
other sentencing reform policies that favored even tougher approaches, helping to cement 
the concepts of punishment over rehabilitation as a criminal justice standard. The first of 
these policies this paper shall examine was the federal legislation known as Truth in 
Sentencing. The phrase was actually coined in the 1980s during a brain-storming session 
of conservative Republicans, including Newt Gingrich of Georgia and Dan Lungren of 
California. The two men came up with the phrase during a push for the federal sentencing 
reforms of 1984 mentioned above (Gest, 2001, p. 201). Recognizing the importance of a 
politically savvy slogan, the men sought a phrase that would steer the debate towards 
their purpose (Gest, 2001, p. 201). The phrase would help get the 85 percent provision for 
federal crimes in the 1984 act through Congress, but criminal justice reformers, who saw 
continuing problems with the system in states, adopted the phrase when attempting to 
pass similar reforms on the state level. 
Helping to spread the truth in sentencing concept was Robert James Bidinotto, 
who published a very popular and award-winning article entitled “Getting Away with 
Murder (1987).” The article focused on convict Willie Horton, who committed a series of 
violent crimes during his escape from a prison furlough program. Using Horton’s image, 
Bidinotto argued that violent crime was on the rise because of a soft justice system that 
implemented reintegration techniques that did not work, such as parole, probation, 
halfway houses, good time credits and early release. George Herbert Bush’s team 
successfully used Bidinotto’s Willie Horton image in the presidential campaign against 
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Michael Dukakis (Greene, 2002). Bidinotto’s and Bush’s arguments were supported by a 
significant increase in violent crimes between 1985 and 1988 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2010).  
Ironically, a rise in prison populations during the 1980s and 1990s helped open a 
window for the spread of state Truth in Sentencing policies (Driessen and Durham, 2002, 
626; Gest, 2001, p. 203). To deal with overcrowding, states had begun to incorporate 
early release policies (Greene, p. 11), resulting in criticism that prisoners were not 
serving enough of their terms. Criticism increased in the last years of the first Bush 
Administration, when Attorney General William Barr (1992) cited Department of Justice 
statistics that said offenders only averaged 37 percent of their sentence behind bars. Barr 
(1992) had similar criticisms to Bidinotto and cited 24 recommendations for reform. 
Once Barr left his post due to a change in administration, the conservative think tank, the 
Heritage Foundation, re-popularized his report in an attempt to label the Clinton 
administration as soft on crime. The Heritage article cited Barr’s 37 percent figure, 
criticized the early release mechanisms that led states to release prisoners early and used 
the phrase “truth in sentencing” when concluding that states should enact one of the same 
provisions used by the federal sentencing guidelines—that prisoners be required to serve 
at least 85 percent of their sentences (Cary, 1993). As the rallying cry for Truth in 
Sentencing increased, proponents pointed to violent crime figures that were on rise, 
intensely increasing between 1990 and 1994 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010). The 
Heritage Foundation would also argue for the creation of more state prisons (Cary, 1993), 
and these recommendations would shape major Republican stipulations that would be 
introduced into the 1994 crime bill.   
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Several political factors supported the policy proposals of Biddinito, Barr and the 
Heritage Foundation, including the mobilization of the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC), an organization that lobbies for conservative policy, and the National 
Rifle Association, which added to the prevalent pressure on Democrats to take a tougher 
stance on crime (Greene, 2002). The political climate was particularly favorable for the 
Heritage Foundation recommendation after Clinton used a get-tough platform to win his 
campaign against President Bush, and Republicans could spin the absence of TIS from 
the agenda as a Clinton administration failure to keep its promise to address crime 
(Greene 2002).  Other prominent Democrats, such has Sens. Joseph Biden (Delaware) 
and Bill Schumer (New York), saw the coupling of a Democratic president and 
Congressional majority as a chance to steal the crime-policy thunder Republicans had 
wielded since the 1960s (Gest, 2001). The Democrats’ leverage in the White House and 
Capitol Hill was complemented by public opinion, as most Americans now considered 
crime the nation’s most important issue (Carroll, 2005). The media likely played a role 
here, as news shows from the three major networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, which in the 
1990s accounted for 54 percent of the television news market, steadily increased their 
coverage on crime. Between 1991 and 1994 the amount of crime news the “big three” 
networks covered tripled (Turner, Fain, Greenwood, Chen and Chiesa, 2001).  
As a result of these factors a crime bill window opened. The final version of this bill was 
$32.5 billion piece of legislation, of which $9 billion went for new police officers, $7 
billion for crime prevention programs, and $10.5 billion for new prisons, while much of 
the remainder went to gun control and crime prevention programs (Chernoff, Kelly and 
Crogger, 1996). Though Congress passed the bill and Clinton signed it, political 
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conditions that would affect the new law in general and TIS in particular were still 
present. Although the Democrats could call the new law a triumph, Republicans had also 
scored a few significant victories. For one, the Violent Offender Act was not popular. 
Republican attacks on prevention programs and gun laws in the bill seemed to 
successfully affect public opinion. Opinion polls that had redefined Democrats as more 
competent than the GOP on crime control, had, by the bill’s passage, returned a 
Republican advantage (Withlin Group, 1995). Second, the right-wing political 
mobilization that had taken shape during the crime bill debates would remain intact for 
the 1994 Congressional elections. During the elections, the NRA and Republicans, under 
the slogan, “Contract with America,” focused on the crime issue and supported changing 
the prevention elements of the 1994 crime bill (Seelye, 1995).   
The tactic worked well for Republicans, who in 1994 won a landslide 
Congressional victory that gave them control of both houses. By February of 1995, 
House Republicans moved to toughen the crime bill by eliminating Democratic 
provisions and granting more funds to Republican priorities (Seelye, 1995).  By 1996, 
Congress had amended the 1994 act to increase VOITIS grants for prison construction by 
$10 billion (Turner et al., 2006, p. 364) and narrow the qualification standards for the 
grants. In 1994 states had to demonstrate that their laws required serious, repeat violent 
recidivist and drug convicts to serve 85 percent of their sentences (Sabol, Rosich, 
Kamala, Kirk and Dubun., 2002, p. iii). By 1996, states were required to promise that 
within three years all violent offenders and drug convicts would serve at least 85 percent 
of their sentence (Sabol et al., 2002, p. iii). 
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Summary of Truth in Sentencing.  The concept of Truth in Sentencing, which 
required that felons complete at least 85 percent of their sentence, had been existent in the 
proposal stream since the move for sentencing reform in the early 1980s, when it was 
passed as part of federal legislation. However, most crime policy is state implemented, 
meaning this proposal would have its greatest impact once it became a state staple. 
Activity in the problem and political streams helped facilitate the move to make the 85 
percent standard state law. The problems that stirred more interest in TIS were increasing 
crime rates and prison overcrowding, which states tried to solve by using early release 
measures. The problems such early-release measures posed were brought to front stage 
by Bidinotto in his article on Willie Norton and by candidate Bush in his campaign 
against Dukakis. Barr’s article, which noted that the average offender served 37 percent 
of his sentence, kept the issue alive during Clinton’s presidential campaign, thereby 
stirring up the political stream. Because Clinton had promised to be tough on crime, 
interest group mobilization from the heritage foundation, the NRA and ALEC were able 
to create the pressure needed to open a policy window for TIS reform.  
Also discussed briefly was the role of the media, which had intensely increased its 
coverage of crime. This increase in coverage was partly stimulated by a few heinous 
homicides, including the murder of a young girl named Polly Klaas. In addition to its 
indirect effect on TIS, the homicide would affect the sentencing policy phenomena 
known as Three Strikes, our next topic of discussion.  
Three Strikes 
As federal legislation moved to make sure that convicts spent more time in prison, 
many states had already begun to implement reforms aimed at increasing sentence 
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length— even without the TIS 85 percent requirement. In the 1990’s the most famous 
and politically symbolic of these state laws was the sentencing reform movement known 
as “Three Strikes and You’re Out.” Beginning in Washington state and California, three 
strikes quickly spread to other states and the federal government. 
John Carlson, a right-wing Seattle television political commentator, was the first 
to come up with the term “three strikes (Jones and Newborn 2006).”  Carlson, like many 
conservatives, believed that crime increases when criminals do not fear the law, 
reasoning that more punitive penalties would reduce crime by increasing fear of legal 
consequence. Criminals who were not deterred, he argued, would at least be incapacitated 
from committing other crimes against the public while they served their punishment. 
Under Carlson’ plan, which he proposed in 1988 on a local news show, a person 
convicted of two serious crimes would have to serve a mandatory lengthy sentence (Jones 
and Newborn 2006, 783). A third offense would result in a life sentence with no chance 
of parole (Gest, 2001, 190). The three strikes proposal was not entirely new. Habitual 
offender and mandatory sentencing laws have long existed in the United States. However, 
where habitual offender laws generally applied to repetitions of a certain type of crime, 
proposals in the threes strikes mold intensely increased prison sentences for repeat 
offenses of any type of felony. Eventually, Washington would be the first state to pass a 
three strikes law (Vitello, 1997).  
In California, a sensational murder birthed the three strikes proposal in 1991, 
when a released convict, desperate during a botched robbery attempt, killed 18-year-old 
Kimberly Reynolds (Saunders, 2008).  Outraged that the perpetrator was a career 
criminal who under tougher laws would have been incarcerated the day of the murder, 
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Mike Reynolds, the victim’s father, teamed up with Fifth Court of Appeals judge James 
Ardaiz to formulate a proposal for a California three strikes law (Vitiello, 1997, p. 411). 
The proposal went as follows: A person convicted of a serious or violent crime as defined 
by California statute is listed as having one strike. On the condition that a person has a 
first strike on record, a conviction for any subsequent felony would be deemed a second 
strike. Second strikers must serve twice the sentencing term that is listed for an offense 
and are ineligible for release until serving at least 80 percent of sentence. Finally, an 
additional felony conviction of any sort would constitute a third strike, earning the 
convict 25 years to life imprisonment, for which 80 percent of the sentencing term must 
be served (California Three Strikes and You’re Out Criminal Sentencing Measure of  
1994).  
At first it seemed that the political climate needed to launch three strikes was 
absent. In California, the bill had two major interest groups on its side, the NRA 
(Zimring, Hawkins and Kamin, 2001) and the California Peace Officer’s Association— a 
prison guard union that would benefit from prison expansion and had successfully 
supported candidates who voted for measures that increased corrections budgets 
(Macallair, 1994).  However, when Bill Jones, a Fresno assemblyman, sponsored 
Reynolds and Ardaiz’ draft in 1993, it quickly died in committee (Vitiello, 1997, p. 412). 
Although Reynolds claimed he would circumvent the legislature by way of public 
referendum, it seemed unlikely the initiative would succeed (Zimring et al., 2001, p. 4) 
The tide changed after a child’s murder breathed new life into the floundering 
initiative. On a haunting October day in 1993, a two-time violent felon abducted 12-year 
old Polly Klaas from her Petaluma home during a slumber party while her mother slept 
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(Zimring, 2001; Vitiello 1997; Gest, 2001). The kidnapper repeatedly raped Klaas over 
the course of a month before strangling her to death (Zimring, 2001).  The brutal and 
dramatic murder would create the perceived social problem, for which immediate policy 
response was needed. The crime provided an enthralling story and received international 
media coverage as the public became consumed with Mr. Klaas’ search for his daughter’s 
body. There was repeated coverage on major news networks. There were publications in 
the Washington Post, The New York Times and other popular newspapers and magazines. 
The television show America’s Most Wanted televised the Klaas’ hunt for their missing 
daughter, and nightly news reports followed suit. From October 2009 to October 2010, 
ABC, CBS, and NBC referenced the Klaas story 28 times on their prime time national 
news programs (Vanderbilt Television News Archives, 2010), and the crime eventually 
received international attention (Wood, 2005, p. 5).  
Media focus on Klaas’ death occurred at a time that crime news coverage was 
increasing nationwide in all media forms (see section on TIS). In addition to Klaas’ 
murder, the media also heavily covered the infamous crimes of Joe Refkin and paid much 
attention to the Menendez brothers’ killing of their parents (Patterson, 1998, p. 60). The 
effect was a definition of crime as a rapidly increasing problem. The spike in crime 
coverage was particularly felt in the realm of television news. Television crime stories on 
the big three networks, ABC, CBS and NBC, doubled between 1992 and 1993,  and 
would steadily and steeply increase for next few years, making it, by far the decades most 
popular television news subject (Center for Media and Public Affairs, 1997).  
The rise in crime was not only a media-driven perception, however, as violent 
crime had shown steady increase since 1989 (BJS 2010). Even though violent crime 
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increased steadily between 1989 and 1993, U.S. violent crime rates began to decline the 
following year, a trend that continued through most of the millennium (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2010). The crime drop was, however, too late to change public perception. 
While in the 1980s, at most 5 percent of Americans believed crime was the nation's 
biggest problem, by early 1994 more than 40 percent of Americans thought so (Patterson, 
1998). 
The focus on Klaas’ murder had an immediate and measurable effect on support 
for Reynolds’ three strikes proposal. A state-wide poll tallied months after Klass’s death 
and her family’s search for her body, said 84 percent of Californians supported the three 
strikes measure (Harrison, 1994).  The crime and the media attention it garnered also 
came at a crucial political moment for the state’s executive in chief, providing a booster 
shot for Gov. Pete Wilson’s anemic ratings in the polls. In late 1993, Wilson’s approval 
rating had sunk to 15 percentage points, and he was behind his challenger, Democrat 
candidate Kathleen Brown, by 17 percentage points (Jacobs 1994).  To counter that 
problem, he had decided to make crime the major focus of his 1994 campaign.  
Riding that month’s wave of public anger and media attention, Gov. Wilson 
called for a special legislative session on crime and backed a three strikes solution to the 
problem during his  State of the State Address, for which the Klaas family was camera 
ready (Gunnison and Lucas, 1994). And in March 1994, at Poly Klaas’ funeral, he 
restated support for Mike Reynolds’ version of the three strikes law (Zimring et al., 2001, 
p. 6). By springtime, after signing three strikes into law, Wilson had slashed Brown’s 17-
point lead in the polls to six and would, in the end, win reelection (De Lama 1994). 
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Despite the Bill’s passage, Reynold’s would push to have the bill also made law by 
popular referendum (Zimring et al., 2004). 
Reynolds, like Gov. Wilson, was able to use Klaas’ death for his political cause. 
When the child’s body was found, the voices of Mike Reynolds and other crime victim 
advocates flooded the radio talk shows of California’s most populous cities (Gest, 2001, 
p. 193-194). Reynolds, a true policy entrepreneur, was also able to attain and publicize 
Polly Klaas’ father’s signature on his ballot initiative (Vitiello, 1997, p. 412). The effect 
of Polly Klaas’ death and her family’s support was startling. Before the child’s murder, 
there were but 20,000 signatures for Reynold’s initiative, but after her body was found 
there were over 50,000 (Vitiello, 1997, p. 412). As result of Reynold’s work, the three 
strikes initiative was passed by referendum after it was already signed into law. In 
California, a two-thirds majority in the state assembly is needed to repeal laws passed by 
referendum.  
The governor’s campaign and the ballot initiative triggered a reactionary 
transformation in the Democratic Party, which, following Clinton’s example began to 
take a tougher stance on crime. Influencing the change were defeats of some longstanding 
Democrats in states and cities where crime was a dominant political issue. In November 
1993,  Virginia Gov. Mary Sue Terry, New Jersey Gov. James Florio and New York City 
Mayor David Dinkins, all Democrats, lost races in which the top campaign issues was 
crime (Lambro, 1993). These losses came a few years after Bush soundly defeated 
Dukakis with a campaign that successfully labeled the Democratic candidate as a 
criminal coddler (Peters, 2004, p. 414).  Pretty soon, Democratic analysts began calling 
for a new stance on crime (Lambro, 1993), not just for California, but for the nation. 
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Quickly, high profile Democrats in the nation increased party support for three 
strikes. Among these party members, was President Clinton, who gave blessing in his 
State of the Union address for a three strikes federal law (Clinton, 1994).  Back in 
California, Democrat gubernatorial challenger Kathleen Brown, in her battle with Wilson 
to define herself as a tough-on-crime candidate, also had given rhetorical support to three 
strikes legislation (Hamilton, 1994).  As prominent candidates backed the legislation and 
media coverage of three strikes movements in other states increased, the proposal gained 
popularity. Indeed, the term “three strikes” eventually became so popular that by August 
1994 half of states had introduced some sort of mandatory-sentence provision under the 
three strikes moniker, and half of these states did so with bipartisan support (Lambro, 
1993). 
Summary of Three Strikes.   In the case study of three strikes, there is additional 
support for Kingdon’s contention that proposals do not open windows but factors in the 
political and problem streams do. Klaas’ murder and intense media coverage of both the 
homicide and other violent crimes helped draw focus to rising crime rates and existent 
proposals to fight the problem. In the political stream, Reynolds and other policy 
entrepreneurs used the attention given the crime problem to push for three strikes reform 
as did the NRA and the California peace Officer’s Union. Other major political factors 
included: overwhelming public support for three strikes; the California gubernatorial 
campaign, in which both contenders stated support for three strikes; and state pressure to 
appear tough on crime.  The existence of similar pressures on a national level would 
eventually allow for the spread of three strikes legislation to the federal government and 
26 states. 
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The Impacts of Sentencing Reform on Incarceration Rates 
Scholars differ in their opinion of sentencing reform’s effect on incarceration 
rates. After reviewing reforms from the 1980s, many claim that sentencing reform 
legislation has sent offenders to terms that are longer than in most nations. These longer 
terms, they argue, have driven prison populations upward (Blumstein and Beck, 1999; 
Casper, 1984; Joyce, 1992; Mauer, 2001; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991; Tonry, 1991). 
Indeed, prison populations during the 1980s, the time in which early sentencing reform  
shifted into gear, more than doubled from about 400,000 inmates in 1980 to more than 1 
million in 1989— from .2 percent of the overall U.S. population to .4 percent (BJS, 
2010).    
However, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study (Langan, 1991) notes that even 
though such reform movements have spawned tougher sentencing legislation, in practice, 
the average length of time to which convicts were sentenced did not increase between 
1980 and 1986. The BJS study concludes that the lack of actual time-served increases in 
those years suggests that sentencing reform (with the exception of those reforms that 
coupled with the War on Drugs), had little, if any, effect on prison populations. Instead, 
the 1991 BJS study says spikes in the number of prison sentences granted per arrest and 
increased re-incarceration for parole violations explain most of the rise in prison 
populations (Langan, 1991).  
However, the BJS study’s linking of incarceration rates to arrests and parole 
violations could also be interpreted as resulting from sentencing reform. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, one of sentencing reform’s main aims— mandatory sentencing, sentencing 
guidelines and presumptive sentencing, in particular— was to strip judicial discretionary 
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power. Reform made it much more difficult for judges not to sentence offenders to prison 
upon convictions. Supporting the notion that sentencing reform lead to incarceration 
increases, a Cato Institute study (Kopel, 1994) concluded that about 60 percent of prison 
growth between 1974 and 1990 were due to prison commitments for convicts who would 
have in earlier times been sentenced to some sort of probation. 
By focusing solely on the number of offenders sentenced under lengthier 
sentencing laws, the BJS study also ignores the intervening effects such laws can have on 
plea bargains. Several studies have noted that stiffer get-tough sentencing indirectly 
increases the ratio of incarcerations per arrests, as prosecutors use the threat of enhanced 
sentences to deter defendants from seeking trials and to motivate plea bargains (Lynch, 
2011, Abrams, 2010, Stemen et al., 2006; McCoy, 1993).  Examining the influence of 
sentencing reform on incarceration rates in this manner shows consistency with the BJS 
study’s conclusion that the incarceration boom in the 1980s was the result of increased 
incarceration per arrest.  
Similar conclusions can be drawn when examining the effect parole violations 
have had on prison populations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the main tenets of 
determinate sentencing reform was to do away with the power of parole boards, which in 
the era of indeterminate sentencing were tasked with rehabilitative duties such as 
deciding when prisoners were ready for parole and helping them reintegrate into society. 
When reformers curbed parole board power, their duties shifted from reintegration and 
towards surveillance, which increased violations (Lynch, 2011; Caplan, 2006; Petersilia, 
2003). Most offenders who have been re-incarcerated for violating parole or probation 
have not returned to prison or jail for new crimes. Instead, probationers and parolees 
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frequently return to prison for technical violations—failing to provide an address, 
employment or make parole appointments, for example (Lynch, 2011; Caplan, 2006; 
Langman, 2001).  Before the determinate sentencing movement, indeterminate 
sentencing laws charged boards with preparing inmates for release and seeing that they 
developed plans for reintegration that parole officers would help them achieve. Arguably, 
the focus on percentage of ‘time served” as the only source of release from prison and the 
striping of reintegration parole programs within and outside of prisons have subsequently 
helped skyrocket the number parole violators returning to prison (Caplan, 2006).  
While the BJS study could find little direct correlation between, sentencing 
reform and incarceration rates, a more recent and far more comprehensive 50-state study 
by Stemen et al.(2006) examines the combined effect of determinate sentencing (which 
focuses on when inmates are released) with sentencing enhancing measures such as 
mandatory sentencing or sentencing guidelines (which constrain both judicial discretion 
to demand prison time as well as how long a convict sentenced under the law will serve). 
Stemen et al. (2006, p. 150) determined that the combination of determinate and 
voluntary sentencing guidelines significantly increased prison populations and prison 
population rates in most states. Furthermore, states with more mandatory sentencing laws 
yielded higher incarceration levels than other states.   
While early sentencing reforms impacted the contributions parole violations and 
prison sentences per arrest have had on rising prison populations, later reforms like TIS 
seem to have impacted the length of time served and imprisonment rates for violent 
crimes that the legislation sought to address.  For example, Turner et al. (1999) concluded 
that VOI/TIS funds for increased prison construction raised admission rates for violent 
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crimes in 1996. A BJS report (1999) backed the Turner et al. study, noting that between 
1990 and 1997, 50 percent of prison population growth was related to increases inmates 
admitted for violent offenses— the very sort of offenses TIS sought to address.  
Furthermore, between 1990 and 1997 most of the prison growth in incarcerated violent 
offenders was due to increases in sentence length. The 1999 BJS study said this increase 
resulted from TIS laws between 1994 and 1997 requiring state offenders to serve at least 
85 percent of their sentence (Ditton and Wilson, 1999).  After states adopted TIS 
legislation, the 1999 BJS report noted that “about 70 percent of prison admissions for a 
violent offense in 1997 were in TIS states.”  Other studies note that because TIS reforms 
were implemented at a time when violent crimes were statistically on the decrease, the 
impact could be much more dramatic if or when violent crimes begin to increase again 
(Sabol et al., 2002).  
Chapter 3 discussed the relationship that early release valves had on TIS reform. 
The chapter noted that a window for TIS reforms opened following high profile crimes 
by offenders who prisons released early due to inmate population control efforts. Once 
enacted, VOI/TIS grants helped new prison construction become the standard policy tool 
for alleviating prison overcrowding. Lynch (2011, p. 679) contends that TIS was too 
short lived to have a huge impact on admission rates and cites evidence suggesting that, 
before and after TIS, prison construction had become the de rigueur alternative for 
litigation stemming from prison overpopulation problems.        
Among the sentencing reform strategies discussed in Chapter 3, a significant body 
of work suggests that Three Strikes is the measure least directly related to the nation’s 
prison boom (Zhang, Maxwell, Vaughn and Michael, 2009; Stemen et al., 2006; Shultz, 
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2000; Turner et al., 1999) in states that adopted such laws. There is a possible exception 
made for California, for which the studies’ results were mixed (Schiraldi, Colburn and 
Lotke, 2004). One reason for the lack of impact was that many states that adopted three 
strikes laws already had habitual offender laws in place, making three strikes provisions 
superfluous (Stemen et. al., 2006).  Furthermore, either due to law enforcement, 
prosecutor or judicial decisions, most states rarely enforced their three strikes laws. 
However, three strikes legislation can impact admission rates by pushing more 
defendants toward plea bargains (Stemen et al., 2006). 
Impact on Crime.   
The key measure of crime policy is its impact on crime. Chapter 3 noted that 
many sentencing reform advocates believed tougher laws would help reduce crime by 
deterrence or incapacitation. As a result, there is a body of research that tries to determine 
whether sentencing reform, or the at least indirectly resulting incarceration increase, had 
deterrent or incapacitation effects on crime. 
 Incapacitation is the idea that crime reduction occurs when imprisonment bars 
inmates from endangering public safety. A few studies that focus on incapacitation look 
at the percentage of crimes that released offenders commit. The idea here is to calculate 
the crime reduction that would happen were those offenders in prison at the time of their 
crimes. For example, Owens (2009) examined incapacitation effects of decreases in 
sanctioning requirements after Maryland reduced the severity of sanctioning guidelines 
against 22-24 year olds with juvenile records by an average of 222 days. The study found 
these offenders committed an average of 1.4 to 1.6 serious crimes during the 222-day 
period in which they would have otherwise been imprisoned.  Similarly, (Defina and 
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Hannon (2010), after conducting a regression on state level panel date from 1978 to 2003, 
concluded that communities do exhibit crime reducing benefits from having criminals 
locked up. However, where Owens (2009) focuses on the notion that a one year increase 
in the sentence of Maryland’s offenders would reduce crime, Defina and Hannon 
approach their research more deeply by additional attention to the impact on crime once 
offenders return to their community. The authors conclude that the benefits of 
incapacitation quickly deteriorate once prisoners return to their community. The increases 
in crime, Defina and Hannon conclude, are the result of the criminogenic stigma of a 
felony record and the prison experience itself.   
Among the studies searching for a deterrent effect is Zimring et al’s (2001) 
research on California’s three strikes law, which tested for conspicuous changes in felony 
reduction trends after the state enacted the law. They concluded that third strike sentences 
in California have no deterrent effect but found a small 2 percent crime reduction among 
individuals with second strike offenses. Building on Zimring’s work, Helland and 
Tabborak (2007) drew similar conclusions after comparing felony recidivism rates 
between individuals with offenses that were or could be sentenced as first strike and 
individuals with an offense that were or could be sentenced as a second strike. The study 
found a 20 percent drop in crimes among individuals with, or eligible for, a second strike 
offense. The Helland and Taborrack study found that offenders with, or eligible for, a 
third strike had no reductions in crime. The authors conclude that the reduction in crime 
was not worth the financial costs of incarcerating third strike offenders for 20 years or 
more and recommended a shift of resources from prison to policing in order to focus 
more on the deterrent effect on punishment certainty as opposed to punishment severity. 
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Durlauf and Nagin (2010), after conducting an exhaustive review of the literature on 
sentencing enhancements and deterrence, conclude that though deterrence policies should 
comprise a portion of crime policy, there is little evidence that increases in severity of 
punishment has deterred crime. The authors agree with Helland and Taborrak’s (2007) 
support for shifting prison funds to increase police presence, under the belief that 
visibility of police, not necessarily enforcement, would have a more certain impact on 
crime reduction. The authors also recommend the inclusion of psychological and 
sociological perspectives in deterrence based research and serious consideration of the 
fact that psychological and sociologically influenced research has shown incarceration to 
have criminogenic effects.  
Literature supporting the notion that incarceration can be criminogenic, argue this 
idea from various points of view. Studies focusing on the effect of specific sentencing 
reform measures note that three strikes sentencing laws can have lethal consequences, 
including city homicide increases of 12 to 14 percent in the short term and 16 to percent 
in the long term when compared to cities without the law (Kovandzic,  Sloan, and 
Vieraitis 2002). The authors employed a rational choice model to argue that offenders 
facing a third strike would kill witnesses or police during the commission of a lesser 
crime in an effort to avoid the steep legal penalty. There is also the notion that long-term 
incarceration is criminogenic because prisons are “schools for crime (Steffensmeier and 
Ulmer, 2005)” and that released offenders may harbor resentment toward society and 
become more deviant (Matsueda, 1992). Another argument is that criminal records can 
marginalize offenders to a deviant out-class, where their socialization leads them to 
reoffend (Bernburg and Krohn, 2003; Pager, 2007; Sampson and Laub, 1993). An 
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alternative theory holds that barriers to conventional resources (employment, housing, 
family) cause ex prisoners to seek alternative means of income and solace, i.e. property 
crimes and drugs (Western 2002; Western, Kling and Weiman, 2001; Nagin and 
Waldfogel, 1995; Freeman, 1996; Waldfogel, 1994;, Sampson and Laub, 1993).  There is 
also the contention that though incarceration can reduce crime, the effect functions on a 
bell curve that prison population controls. In other words, incarceration reduces crime 
until prisons get crowded.  
More pertinent to later research that this paper can employ is the literature 
valuable to the development of Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT). Surprisingly, there 
has been very little IAT research done on the effects of incarceration on crime. However, 
Rosenfeld and Messner (2009), in an evaluation of the status of institutional anomie 
theory, suggest that mass incarceration is indicative of a society in which there is less of a 
collective interest in maintaining the interest of the individual. The implication, here, is 
that such incarceration-increasing policies are the result of increased market permeation 
of every day life and a highly anomic social order. Since high states of anomie and 
market permeation of everyday informal institutions such as family, education, and civic 
life are deemed by IAT to be criminogenic, then one can deduce that, from an IAT 
perspective, mass incarceration can be considered criminogenic as well. Some research 
points to a similar conclusion. For example, Clear (2008) concluded that the extraction of 
men and women from communities does damage to their family, labor markets, political 
and economic infrastructures. From an IAT perspective, this could mean a weakening of 
informal institutions such as families and civic groups to thwart the criminogenic effect 
of anomie.  
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Summary of the impact of sentencing reform.  A review of the literature on the 
impacts of sentencing reform on incarceration, suggests that these policies have indeed 
contributed the nation’s incarceration boom. However, the impact of sentencing reform 
may not be direct, as plea bargaining and a shift in parole from a rehabilitative role to a 
monitoring function may intervene to increase the number of commitments to prison per 
arrests.  
If we are to conclude that sentencing reform has led to the dramatic prison 
population increase, then it is important to understand what the effect of incarceration has 
been on crime. Despite the precipitous drop in crime of the 1990s, the jury is still out as 
to whether this was the result of incarceration, as the economy, law enforcement 
presence, structural shifts in the crack-cocaine war, the aging of the population, and 
abortion have all been provided as alternative reasons (Levitt, 2004). Even studies that do 
point to incarceration as a reason for the decrease in crime, question whether the financial 
costs are worth it, while hypothesizing that the crime-reduction returns are diminishing.  
Furthermore deeper bodies of work focus on the positive effect incarceration can 
have on crime once prisoner’s return. These criminogenic impacts have been attributed to 
the stigma of a criminal record, being barred from resources, learning criminal ways of 
thinking while in prison, or through weakening of informal social institutions. Similar 
effects have been attributed to the War on Drugs, the subject matter of the next chapter.       
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The War on Drugs 
U.S drug laws have existed since the late 1800s in states and localities that sought 
to slow down sales of opium, cocaine and marijuana (Gray, 2001, p. 20). On a federal 
level, attempts to regulate drugs that are today outright illegal began with the Harrison 
Act of 1914, which aimed to prevent physicians from prescribing addictive drugs and, 
raised the maximum sentence for drug violations from two years to five, beginning a 
trend towards increasingly punitive drug policies (Boyum and Reuter, 2005, p. 5). The 
Johnson and Kennedy administrations saw the beginnings of increased national attention 
to street drugs that would erupt during the Nixon administration and again during the 
Reagan years. However, ideas mulled about in academic circles often followed a 
rehabilitative model. An example of the sort of policy ideas under discussion in the 
Johnson era proposal stream was a study by Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander, which 
argued that administering doses of methadone satiates cravings for heroin but allows 
addicts to remain functional. The researchers reported that 40 percent of the addicts 
treated in this manner at a Chicago hospital either maintained employment or were in 
school, while all patients refrained from crime (Berquist 1966, p. A8).  
The drug/crime issue came alive during the Johnson years partly because 
Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater (see Chapter 3) had campaigned on 
law and order, thereby pressuring Johnson to address crime after he won the election. The 
result was the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act, which among other things, sought new means of 
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combating increased drug use. Drug enforcement policy in the 1968 act focused less on 
punishing users than finding means to prevent the inflow of illegal drugs to the nation 
(Whitford, 1971).  The commission had also taken a rehabilitative and prevention-
oriented outlook towards the drug problem, as it had in other areas of crime policy, 
recommending increased medical and psychiatric services, improved housing, 
employment and welfare benefits, as well as decreases in the enforcement of drug policy 
as solutions (Gest, 2001).  
Winds of War 
When Richard Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” in 1971 (Boyum and Reuter, 
2005, p. 5; Gray, 2001, p. 27)), the phrase would stick, serving as a recruiting slogan 
under which future policy makers would enlist a host of tough, anti-drug policies. While 
Nixon presidential politics would help bring the War on Drugs unto the agenda, the war’s 
decisive turn towards a more punitive stance began during the Reagan years. The greatest 
drug policy changes during the Nixon years occurred in the proposal stream.  
During Nixon’s presidency, illegal drug use among the country’s more educated 
young adults was perceived as an increasing problem.  In 1967, only 5 percent of college 
students said they had tried marijuana, but that number jumped to 51 percent by 1971, 
according to Gallup Polls (Robinson, 2002). Similarly, in 1967 only one percent of 
college students interviewed said they had tried LSD or other hallucinogens, while by 
1971 18 percent of the student body claimed they had tried the drug (Robinson, 2002).   
As drug use increased, scholarly studies and media coverage focused on a 
perceived correlation between student drug use and campus protests, raising the urgency 
of addressing the drug problem because social upheaval among college students had 
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become a top issue (Shulman, 2008). By 1970 a national poll revealed that intensity of 
college protests had increased to one per day (College Protest Rate is One a Day: Poll, 
1970). The issue of social upheaval in general was particular on the public mind due to 
Vietnam protests, campus riots, the civil rights movement and the assassinations of 
President John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X. 
One influential article framing the problem of campus unrest as a drug issue was 
published in The Journal of Health and Social Behavior. Entitled, “the Hang-Loose ethic 
and the Spirit of drug Use (Suchman, 1968),” the article directly correlated drug (mostly 
marijuana) use and the likelihood of students who opposed the “traditional established 
order (Suchman, 1968, p. 146).” Nixon, speaking at South Dakota library dedication in 
1969, expanded upon this sentiment, implying that a link between drugs and social 
upheaval was destroying society’s moral fabric.   
“We live in a deeply troubled and profoundly unsettled time. Drugs and 
crime, campus revolts, racial discord, draft resistance? On every hand we 
have old standards violated, old values discarded, old precepts ignored. A 
vocal minority of our young people are opting out in the process by which 
civilization maintains its continuity: the passing on of values from one 
generation to the next (Nixon, 1969, p. 316).” 
 
In addition to tying drugs to protest, the administration worked the link between 
the drug problem and street crime, which was also of increasing public concern. “Since 
addicts do not ordinarily hold jobs," Nixon said in a speech before Congress, “they often 
turn to shoplifting, mugging, burglary, armed robbery and so on (Epstein, 1977, pp. 178-
179).” A press release from the Nixon office went on to say that the total property costs 
to society that resulted from the need to continue heroin use was about $18 billion 
annually (Epstein, 1977, p. 179). 
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The rhetorical attempts to correlate drugs to campus unrest and crime helped 
merge the political and problem streams related to drug policy. This was because while 
crime and campus unrests were important public opinion issues, drug use, at least in the 
early years of Nixon’s presidency, was not. Americans during Nixon’s first year in office 
had listed social control issues related to the young as the most important problem facing 
the nation (Gallup Polls, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1972a-h). Eventually, when grouped together, 
the social issues of campus protests, drugs, crime and the hippie movement were a far 
higher priority for Americans than Vietnam (Gallup Poll, 1969), an issue that the 
administration hoped to steer the public away from.  Interestingly, a few months later, for 
the first time, “drug problems” made it  to the top 10 concerns, ranking at number 5 
(Gallup Poll, 1970). 
Political factors that would influence the rise of the drug issue to the Nixon 
Administration’s agenda included the Republican strategy of attacking the “criminal-
coddling” elements of  Johnson commission proposals, such as how the commission dealt 
with drug offenders, while calling for laws that would allow police with drug-related 
warrants to enter the premises of suspected offenders without warning. The provisions 
had little chance of making the final bill, but Republicans had successfully pressured 
Democrats to debate them. Because Democrats opposed these Republican wishes, an 
opportunity was created for the GOP to depict the left as soft on drugs (Baum, 1996). 
President Johnson’s decision not to seek a second term would further open political space 
for tougher drug policies, and Nixon would exploit this space.   
Media attention arguably enhanced the concern over drugs. In 1969 the big three 
news networks—ABC, NBC and CBS,  ran 42 weekend national news stories related to 
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drug use; in 1970, 65 stories ran; and in 1971, there were 92 stories related to illegal 
drugs, more than double the number reported two years prior (Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive, 2010). Eventually, television news outlets also began linking drugs to 
crime. In 1969, no news stories during prime time on the big three television networks 
linked illegal drugs to other crimes. By 1971, six such stories ran, keeping a similar pace 
until 1974 when the Watergate scandal took prominence over other issues (Vanderbilt 
Television news Archive, 2010).    
The Nixon administration also strove to keep the drug issue alive by pushing 
media networks to feature drug abuse issues in their non-news programming. To do so, 
the president orchestrated events in which he invited media producers and their clients to 
learn about the damaging effects of drug use, persuaded them to air shows with this 
theme in mind, and coached companies that purchased advertisement space on how they 
could use their leverage to pressure stations into airing anti-drug programming. As a 
result, 20 television programs promised to feature at least one show with an anti-drug 
theme (Johnson et al., 1996).  
Though the problem and political streams merged to open a window to bring new 
policies to the agenda, solutions in the proposal stream to deal with the issues were still 
aligned with the principles of rehabilitation. As discussed on the section on sentencing 
reform, the proposal community had only softened up for get-tough legislation by the mid 
1980s. By President Nixon’s election, the dominant paradigm within criminal justice was 
still rehabilitative, even though proposals along the lines of a get-tough ideology were 
circulating.  
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Nixon-era drug laws thus reflected both a rehabilitative and get-tough mindset. 
For example, the 1970 Drug abuse Prevention and Control Act eliminated mandatory 
minimum sentences for all drug charges as well as reducing maximum sentences for 
some (Peterson, 1985, p. 251). However, along with recommendations for reducing first-
time drug user penalties, the administration recommended harsher sanctions against those 
“engaged in continual criminal enterprises and the dangerous special drug offender 
(Peterson, 1985, p. 251).” One tougher proposal, passed in the 1970 federal crime bill, 
recommended giving police with drug-related search warrants the right to enter a 
suspect’s home without notification so suspects would not have the opportunity to discard 
drug evidence (Baum,1996, p. 6). Nixon also expanded upon Johnson-era policy by 
increasing funds for already existing rehabilitation and treatment programs, while 
including a huge budget increase for police presence and equipment under LEAA (Baum, 
1966).  
Many Nixon-era proposals would not become law until later policy windows 
would open. Among them a was a proposal that would permit law enforcement to 
confiscate the monetary profits of criminal enterprises in the same way they previously 
confiscated illegal contraband (Baum, 1966), while another such proposal favored the use 
of military personnel in the drug war. Both of these proposals would become law during 
the Reagan administration (Baum, 1966). 
In the years prior to Reagan’s election, drug use among young people in the 
United States was steadily rising, particularly among the young.  From 1975 to 1979, the 
number of high-school seniors who said they had used illegal drugs within a one-year 
period climbed from about 45 percent in 1975 to 54 percent by 1979,while hovering 
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above 50 percent during the president’s first two years in office (Johnston, O'Malley and 
Bachman, 1986, p. 47). Cocaine use, in particular, seemed to be escalating, as use among 
high school seniors rose from about five percent in 1975 to approximately 12 percent by 
1980 (Johnston et al., 1986, p. 47). 
While use among youth increased, several high-profile events drew attention to 
the drug issue immediately previous to and during the Reagan administration. These 
included: the 1980 arrest of musician Paul McCartney for marijuana use; the burns 
Richard Pryor suffered after freebasing cocaine in 1982; the 1982 overdose-induced 
death of John Belushi; and recurring drug scandals in football and baseball, including the 
death of NBA-draftee Len Bias. (Jensen, Gerber and Babcock, 1991). The latter, as this 
paper shall discuss, was the most influential in opening a drug policy window Bias’s 
death, however, would not have opened this window were it not for several factors in the 
political stream.        
At first the chances of a political window for new drug policy opening during the 
Reagan years seemed slim, as the GOP presidential campaign focused heavily on 
economic issues and gave little attention to illegal drugs (Kaiser, 1980, p. A1), a trend 
that continued in the administration’s earliest years. Unlike Nixon, Reagan neither 
addressed the drug problem in his 1981 inauguration address nor in his 1981 and 1982 
State of the Union addresses (Reagan, 1981, 1982), while public apathy toward issue 
matched Reagan’s inattention to it. While general polls did not report drug use among the 
nation’s “most important problems” in the years 1980 to 1984 (Gallup 1981, 1982, 1983 
and 1984), a more narrow measure, Gallup’s biggest problem facing public schools, did. 
From 1978 through 1985, drug use was ranked below insufficient discipline as the second 
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most important problem facing public schools, and by 1986 drug use rose to the number 
one issue in public schools (Elam and Brodinsky, 1989, p. 9) and the nation as a whole 
(Hawdon, 2002).  
Several factors led to this change, among them rhetorical attention to the issue 
from Reagan (1981-1983), who increased references to drugs in 1982 and sharply 
increased them in 1983. This increase resulted from debates around the drug issue, 
including the Congressional crime bill debates that had led to the federal sentencing 
reform measures discussed earlier in this chapter. Adding more attention to the drug issue 
was Nancy Reagan’s anti-drug campaign. With knowledge of how important the drug 
issue was to those concerned about public schools, the First Lady's campaign focused on 
youth drug abuse, an area where anti-drug parent groups had begun to organize, attract 
the ear of public policy elites and wield political influence (Baum, 1996).  
These new groups began in small, local, southern-state PTA-type meetings during 
the late 1970s and directed much of their attention toward fighting head shop activities. 
But they would grow into national juggernauts comprised of thousands of members 
during the Reagan years (Baum, 1996). Among the groups were the Parents Resource 
Institute for Drug Education (PRIDE), Families in Action (FIA), and PRIDE offshoot 
National Federation of Parents for a Drug Free America (NFPDFA), which was headed 
by Pat Burch, wife of Republican Party Chairman Dean Burch (Baum, 1996). All of these 
groups were able to gain access to the ears of high-level cabinet members in the areas of 
drug policy. Such influence was seen in the funds these groups garnered by directly 
petitioning cabinet members and the fact that the Reagan Administration appointed 
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IanMcDonald— a physician, PRIDE member and general activist among parent groups— 
as head of the U.S Alcohol Drug Abuse and Mental Health Association (Baum, 1996). 
Meanwhile, some scholars posit, media attention to the drug problem helped 
move the issue along in the political stream and, with popular opinion, helped open a 
window for Reagan’s War on Drugs (Reeves and Campbell, 1994, p. 15). The topic of 
cocaine, in particular, was something towards which television news dedicated more 
time. Between 1961 and 1981, ABC, NBC and CBS dedicated an average of less than 20 
television news stories per year on cocaine issues, despite slight but steady annual 
increases in coverage. By 1982, however, the average jumped to 30, and it increased 
steadily each subsequent year until 1986, in which the networks ran more than 140 news 
stories on cocaine (Reeves and Campbell, 1994). 
Like media coverage, public concern over the drug issue sharply increased during 
the Reagan years. Between 1980 and 1984, economic concerns, not drug issues, were 
most important to Americans, according to Gallup (Sourcebook of criminal justice 
statistics Online, 2011; Gallup Polls, 1980, 1980a-b, 1981, 1981a-b, 1982, 1982a-d, 1983, 
1983a-c, 1984, 1984a-b). By 1985 that changed, as drug abuse made it to Gallup’s (1985) 
top ten national concerns during a Congressional election year, in which both parties 
highlighted the issue in their campaigns. Reagan in particular pushed his weight, 
providing political support to party members seeking Congressional seats by touting their 
records on fighting the drug war (Reeves and Campbell, 1994). 
Thus, by 1985, major factors were at hand that could potentially open a political 
window for drug policy: it was an election year; drugs were the public’s number one 
concern; media attention on the issue was high; and special interest parent groups had 
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organized, increased membership and received the administration’s audience. However, 
news coverage of drugs in 1986 that doubled 1985’s media coverage was largely due to a 
“seismic spike” of drug-related journalism in July, the month of Bias’ death (Reeves and 
Campbell, 1994, p. 163). Correspondingly, in the early months of 1986, drugs had barely 
broken the top ten in “most important issue” in polls, as only about 2 percent of those 
polled ranked it as the nation’s most important problem (Gallup, 1986). But in August, 
weeks after Bias’ death, a New York Times/CBS Poll ranked drugs as among the most 
important issues facing the nation, with 13 percent of the population ranking it as the 
nation’s most important problem (New York Times News Service, 1986)). After, the 
significant increase in public concern over drugs in 1986 following Bias’ death, the trend 
would continue until it peaked in 1989, when 27 percent of those Gallup polled said it 
was the most important issue, way ahead any other national concern (Gallup, 1989).  
In August, weeks after Bias’s death, Reagan “formally” declared his drug war, 
calling for “a national crusade against drugs—a sustained, relentless effort to rid America 
of this scourge— by mobilizing every segment of society against drug abuse (Reagan, 
1986).” That the type of policy he required were those in sync with the get-tough 
paradigm was made clear.  
“The proliferation of drugs has been a part of a crime epidemic that can be 
traced to, among other things, liberal judges who are unwilling to get tough 
with the criminal element in this society. We don't need a bunch of sociology 
majors on the bench. What we need are strong judges who will aggressively 
use their authority to protect our families, communities and way of life; judges 
who understand that punishing wrongdoers is our way of protecting the 
innocent; judges who do not hesitate to put criminals where they belong, 
behind bars (Reagan, 1986, p. A32).” 
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On October 17, the resulting call for proposals from Democrats and Republicans 
alike would result in Congressional passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The 
effect of the sentencing reform movement was clearly seen. The law mandated punitive 
increases in mandatory minimums (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 1986), reflecting a drug war 
trend that would continue to increase time served for drug offenses.  In 1975, the average 
statutory state minimum for a possession conviction was 13 months; by 2002 it was 28 
months; and minimum statutory sentences for sale or trafficking moved from an average 
of 25 months in 1975 to 41 months by 2002 (Stemen et. al., 2006, 105).  The influence of 
parent organizations’ battles against head shops that sold drug paraphernalia were also 
present, as the act expanded the definition of paraphernalia to include bongs and water 
pipes and prohibited their interstate transport (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 1986). In terms of 
the movement towards the forfeiture of assets that had begun during the Nixon 
administration, the act expanded the right of law enforcers to seize all cash, assets, and 
property derived from criminal activity (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 1986) and would provide 
a financial incentive for states and localities to step up their drug war efforts. The act also 
advanced the Nixon task force’s recommendations for military intervention in the drug 
war, funded ‘just-say-no’ type education programs for youth, and provided substantial 
funding for sheriffs and police via the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law 
Enforcement Assistance Program (Baicker and Jacobson, 2007). The new grants replaced the 
LEAA block grants and now mandated that funds be used for the War on Drugs. With 
acknowledgment of the effect such laws would have on incarceration rates, the new law 
allotted $96.5 million for federal prison construction (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 1986).   
However, 1986 was not the final say in the drug war, as drugs would be a central 
theme in George H. Bush’s 1988 political campaign and during his administration. Both 
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the Bush and Clinton administrations would continue the war that Nixon declared and 
Reagan defined, helping to increase incarceration rates.  
Summary of the Drug War.  The case study of the drug war above again 
demonstrates how political and problem stream factors are needed to get proposals on the 
agenda. While, proposals such as asset forfeiture, military use in the drug war and 
increased penalties for drug users were mulled over during the Nixon Administration, it 
took the rise of get tough to the agenda, highly publicized events such as Len Bias’s 
death, and a politically compatible ideology during the Reagan years for the drug war to 
truly arrive. Also of note is a transformation in on-the-table policy alternatives. While 
Nixon era streams were rife with treatment and rehabilitation-styled proposals, they had 
conspicuously declined by the Reagan years, evidencing a true decrease in support for 
Mertonian type solutions in favor of ones based on individual responsibility, deterrence 
and incapacitation.   
Impact of the drug war on incarceration 
Many argue that the drug war has been the most contributing factor to the rise in 
inmates. Much of that rise is due to drug arrests, which between 1980 and 2008 increased 
by 218%, from 581,000 to more than 1.8 million (King, 2008). The means by which studies 
say the drug war has contributed to incarceration increases include: an emphasis on forfeiture 
driven law enforcement, higher chances of conviction per arrest, lengthier sentences for drug 
crimes, and an increase in incarcerated African Americans.  
 Forfeiture reform had influenced the increase in drug arrest rates (Blumenson and 
Nilsen, 1998; Baicker and Jacobson, 2007). As mentioned in Chapter 3, forfeiture reform 
came about with the purpose of discouraging drug crimes by taking away the financial 
incentive of trafficking and sales. The new forfeiture laws would eventually incentivize 
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governments to increase drug arrests in order to fill their coiffeurs (Baicker and Jacobson, 
2007; Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998).  In 1985 the U.S. Justice Department lured local and 
state sheriff and police to participate in federal drug arrests by promising them as much 
as an 80 percent share of forfeited goods. Since then, states and localities have extended 
their definition of forfeiture using the federal definitions as an example (Baicker and 
Jacobson 2007, p. 2113). Because states have implemented their own forfeiture laws and 
participated in federal arrests, their governments have cut funds usually allotted to law 
enforcement with the knowledge that law enforcement can generate their own funds by 
way of forfeitures. The result is a dependence on forfeiture for law enforcement revenue 
and subsequently an increase in drug-related arrests (Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998). 
Higher chances of incarceration per drug arrest also increased the inmate population 
(Blumstein and Beck, 1999).  In 1981, the year Reagan took office, two percent of drug 
arrests resulted in prison time. By 1992, the number was 10 percent.  The increased chance of 
prison time per arrests suggest an influence of drug war sentencing reform measures that 
reduced judicial discretion, requiring  judges to allocate prison sentences instead of probation 
or treatment.  
As mentioned earlier, states have also specifically targeted drug offenders with 
mandatory sentencing and habitual offender laws such as three strikes requirements. The 
effect of these drug-focused, sentencing reforms has been studied by Stemen et al. 
(2006). Controlling for macro-criminological, political and sentencing reform variables, 
the researchers concluded that although increased enforcement (arrests) accounts for most 
of the drug war’s effect on prison populations, statutory changes to drug laws have also 
contributed. Interestingly, although much of the anti-drug rhetoric was aimed at “drug 
pushers,” higher minimum and maximum sentences for possession offences have had a 
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much greater effect on prison populations (Stemen et al., 2006). The numbers suggest a 
complete turn around in viewing drug-addiction as a crime issue as opposed to a medical 
concern.  
The drug war has weighed most heavily on minorities, blacks in particular. While 
between 1976 and 1994 the number of whites arrested for drug crimes increased by 85 
percent, blacks arrested for drug crimes in the U.S. quadrupled. The racial demographics 
of prison populations has led to criticism that the racist roots of drug policies in this 
country are very much present (Spohn, 2000). The results are ironic since liberal backing 
of sentencing reform was aimed at countering the harsher penalties African Americans 
and other minorities weathered in the penal system. To boot, there is considerable 
consensus that the drug war is failing in its ultimate goal of limiting or even reducing the 
inflow and use of drugs (Gray, 2001; Belenko, 2000).  
Impact on Crime 
 The literature on the effects of the drug war on crime differs on the directionality 
of its impact. However, the literature that suggests a negative impact sometimes suggests 
that this effect has been weak and not cost effective.  
 As mentioned earlier, the Nixon administration had argued that a drug war was 
necessary to reduce a spike in property and violent crimes, which addicts were 
committing in epidemic proportions. Some recent studies have set out to test the premise 
that increased incarceration of drug offenders has reduced property and violent crimes. 
One of these studies (Kuzeimko and Levitt, 2004) concludes that there is some evidence 
suggesting that increased drug enforcement since the 1980s has lead to decreased 
property and violent crimes by 1 to 3 percent. These results would imply that the budget-
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breaking drug war, has accounted for a very small percentage of the 50 percent drop in 
crime experienced over the past decade (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010). Similar 
results were gleaned in a social disorganization model study of Miami neighborhood drug 
crimes (Martinez Jr., Rosenfeld, and Mares, 2008). The study’s suggested that by eroding 
social networks and community institutions, increased drug use tended to increase violent 
crime. The authors recommended increased drug enforcement as a means of reducing the 
violence, but suggested that such enforcement measures would only be effective when 
coupled with treatment.    
Other studies find a criminogenic effect. Spohn and Holleran (2002) researched 
1,530 offenders in Kansas City, MS, concluding that drug offenders serving probation 
were far less likely to go back than drug offenders serving prison time. Sollars et al. 
(1994) argued that drug arrests have increased property crimes and Benson, Kim and 
Rasmussen (1998) point to a drug-war-influenced increase in violent and property crime 
rates. These studies conclude that increased enforcement of drug crimes drives the cost of 
illicit drugs upward, pressuring addicts to seek the income that can be acquired through 
property crimes. The studies also contend that increased resources toward drug 
enforcement steers funds and officers away from property and violent crimes, leading to a 
reduced chance of arrest for violent and property offenders and making such crimes a 
better gamble. Shepherd (2006) agrees with these conclusions, but says several other 
factors can contribute to the way increased incarceration of drug offenders can cause 
crime. Shepherd notes that the arrest of higher level trackers leaves behind a vacuum of 
power and enticing higher prices, which create turf wars as competitors try to capture the 
abandoned market. Second, pushing offenders out of the illegal drug trade can drive them 
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to other illegal money-making endeavors. Finally, prison overcrowding due to drug 
arrests pushes out violent and property offenders, who are returned to their communities 
to participate in new criminal activity. Miron and Zwiebel (1995) conclude that the high 
degree of risk (punishment) for distributing and supplying raises the price and street 
value of drugs. As a result, violence and other forms of black market justice become an 
acceptable overhead. Miron and Zwiebel go on to argue that because anti-trust laws do 
not affect trade in illegal drugs, large cartels are likely to monopolize the industry 
unpressured by competition to lower prices. The result is a high profitability that allows 
for all types of illegitimate behavior (crime) to maintain margins.  
It is also plausible that the drive to more intensely enforce drug policy induces 
crime by intruding on harm reduction attempts by users. Cooper, Moore, Gruskin and 
Krieger (2005) conducted a quantitative study of addicts in programs aimed at weaning 
them off heroin and found that police crack downs intruded on this process, thereby 
curtailing beneficial effects. 
More pertinent to this paper’s final chapter, Mears (1998) has used social 
organization theory, which, as mentioned in Chapter 2, influenced institutional anomie 
theory, to argue that the increase in drug enforcement has made communities poor and 
more crime prone, African American communities in particular. Mears notes that high 
arrest rates in such communities deteriorates social organization by taking young black 
men and women from their families so that youth are left unsupervised to engage in 
criminal activity. Furthermore, she argues, incarceration limits the employment prospects 
of offenders, reinforcing the cycle of poverty in which many African American 
communities find themselves. The implication for institutional anomie theory is that drug 
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enforcement, by weakening family structures, can prevent the ability of those social 
institutions to ward off the criminogenic effects of the American dream. 
Summary of Drug War Impact.  The impact of the drug war, some contend, has 
led to reductions in crime, but those reductions have been rather small, hardly worth the 
cost of enforcement, or should be mitigated with treatment to reduce crime associated 
with drug use.  Meanwhile, the possibility that the war may be indeed criminogenic, 
given recent research, seems plausible. Also plausible are damaging effects caused by 
taking mothers and fathers from their families in already impoverished communities. The 
effect on informal social institutions suggest that that drug war policies could be used as 
variable in research that employs institutional anomie theory, an issue which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER 5 
Collateral Consequences 
The previous chapters used Kingdon’s model of streams and windows as a lens 
through which to examine the problems, proposals and politics that landed get tough 
policies onto the agenda. Chapter 3 specifically focused on sentencing reform measures 
such as presumptive and mandatory sentencing, three strikes legislation, Truth in 
Sentencing, and the impact of these reforms. Chapter 4 focused on the agenda setting 
processes behind the War on Drugs, and the impacts of drug war policies. This chapter 
shall conduct a similar streams and windows analysis of collateral consequences. 
However, since there is yet any extensive empirical research on the impacts of collateral 
consequences, this chapter will employ a change in method. In the absence of existing 
studies, this chapter shall conduct its own regression analysis on collateral consequences 
effects on crime, using a model partly influenced by institutional anomie theory.  
Collateral consequence policies had long existed before the Johnson 
Administration. For example, the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution explicitly 
gives states the right to deny franchise to persons who commit treason or other crimes. 
And states have long barred offenders from public office, certain contracts and benefits. 
Many states have also granted employers the right to deny offenders employment based 
on arrest or conviction records (Travis, 2002). 
However, during the Johnson Administration, the attitudes of policy makers and 
criminal justice practitioners toward collateral consequences began to change, as a call to 
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bring such practices in line with rehabilitative aims began. Legislators, interest groups as 
well as state and national bar associations criticized policies that denied civil rights, 
employment and welfare access to offenders. Along with these criticisms came various 
recommendations. For example, the National Conference on Parole recommended 
ensuring a process for offenders to expunge their criminal records so that they may be 
ensured the rights granted other citizens (Pinard, 2002). During the Johnson 
administration, the President’s Crime Commission suggested reevaluating various post-
incarceration policies offenders face; and, during Gerald Ford’s presidency, the National 
Advisory Commission on Corrections suggested eliminating the voter disqualification of 
felons in certain states. In step with this trend, many states began adopting legislation 
restoring civil rights to offenders upon completion of their sentences (Pinard, 2002).  An 
intersection of politics and problems, however, would help bring a proposal paradigm 
from a tougher mindset, and these proposals would exponentially increase the nation’s 
use of collateral consequences for more than three decades (Pinard, 2002). 
The trend toward increases in such policies began after 1985 (Pinard, 2002). 
Several themes to be discussed in the following case studies provide insight into how 
these laws passed. They include a federalization of sex offender laws and a conservative 
ideological link between welfare reform, the drug war, and crime. Though the case 
studies do not provide a comprehensive view of the revitalization of collateral 
consequence policies as a form of punishment, analysis of the political, problem and 
proposal streams involved in these cases leads to a plausible narrative.  
In deciphering how the get tough movement and the War on Drugs linked with 
welfare reform, we shall first examine welfare reform, for which a policy window opened 
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due to economic problems the nation was weathering throughout much of the 1970s. 
These problems came to a head in 1980, a presidential campaign year, when the GNP 
dropped by .2 percent; unemployment rose 7 to 9 percent; inflation increased from 6.9 
percent to 10 percent; and the nation incurred its largest budget deficit in peacetime 
history by jumping 38 percent in four years (May, 1993). As a result, in 1980 the 
economy continued to be the dominant presidential campaign issue (May, 1993, p. 700). 
The political importance of economic problems in the 1970s had given rise to concern 
about how much the government was spending on welfare. Consequently, by 1976 a 
reported 62 percent of Americans believed the government spent too much on welfare, a 
20 percent jump from 1974 (Davis and Smith, 1986).  Backed by such polls, during his 
1976 campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, Ronald Reagan focused on 
welfare reform, as did the media. In 1976 ABC, CBS and NBC ran 30 stories on welfare 
reform and increased their coverage to 38 news stories in 1977 (Vanderbilt Television 
Archives, 2010), Jimmy Carter’s first year in office. Eventually, a perceived failure of the 
Carter administration to deal with the economy helped conservative alternatives based on 
trimming budgetary costs and welfare spending proliferate in the proposal stream. The 
increase in news coverage partly resulted from standard coverage of Congress, which was 
rampant with welfare reform bills (Congressional Budget Office, 1977). The fraud case 
of a Chicago “welfare queen” also generated coverage of the issue  (Vanderbilt 
Television news Archives, 2010),” and politicians such as Reagan used the welfare queen 
image to push the idea that welfare created a criminogenic sense of dependency and 
entitlement.  Due to pressure from Congress, public opinion and oppositional rhetoric, 
President Carter was made to address the issue by submitting proposals that cut some of 
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the “laggards” from Assistance to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamp 
programs (Zald, 1985). The trend of policy attempts to reign in the costs associated with 
an expanding welfare state had begun.   
With the economy an even more pressing issue in 1980 and public disfavor 
toward welfare overspending hovering close its 1977 peak (Davis and Smith 1986), 
Reagan made welfare reform part of his regular stump speech in his campaign against 
Carter in 1979 and 1980 (Clymer, 1979, p. SM6; Raines, 1980, p. 1; Raines, 1980A, p. 1; 
Lindsey, 1979). Once elected, Reagan kept the issue alive by mentioning it in almost 
everyone of his State of the Union addresses (1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988).  
Eventually a policy window opened for welfare reform, resulting in passage of welfare 
retraction acts that, despite a lack of drastic cuts in federal spending, made strides toward 
reducing the rate at which welfare expenditures had been expanding. Furthermore, the 
rise of welfare reform to the agenda would inspire a new wave of right-winged 
Congressional leaders who hoped to do way with many Johnson-era Great Society 
policies (Zuckerman, 2000, p. 588).  
Because welfare had already been on the agenda by the time Reagan became 
president, the opening of crime policy windows in the 1980s (see section on sentencing 
reform and drug war above) paved the way for collateral consequence proposals at the 
nexus of get-tough crime policy and welfare reform. Such proposals helped create the 
perception that policy makers were helping to reduce budgetary spending (denying 
welfare benefits to drug offenders cost little to enforce and could be seen as reducing 
welfare rolls) while addressing three areas of public concern: drugs, crime and welfare 
expansion. Furthermore, the proposals were ideologically compatible with the Reagan 
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administration’s decision to address the demand side (users) in the drug war and attack 
the criminogenic elements of welfare policy trough deterrent-minded solutions. Finally, 
civic penalties were construed as a get-tough alternative to incarceration for drug users 
that during an era of high deficits would neither increase the budget for prison expansion 
nor treatment centers. In short, a bridge dug policy, welfare retraction, and get-tough had 
begun to take shape. This sentiment is echoed by the following quote from Sen. Phil 
Gramm R(TX). 
“The real drug ‘kingpin’ is the user. It is the casual users who create the profits. 
But we can’t put them all in prison; there isn’t any room in the jails. We have to 
use disincentives such as the civil penalties already in the House bill (Mohr, 
1988a).” 
 
With these political factors affecting the sort of alternatives  brought toward the 
floor, House proposals in 1986, 1987 and 1988 included: the eviction of public housing 
tenants convicted of drug crimes; the forfeiture of leases belonging to public housing 
tenants suspected of drug crimes; the denial of AFDC benefits to those with drug 
convictions; the revocation of federal student aid for applicants convicted of drug crimes; 
and the denial of drivers licenses to persons convicted of drug crimes (Wicker, 1988, 
Mohr, 1988b, ). Though all of these proposals would not pass during the Reagan 
administration they would circulate in proposal streams long enough to resurface in later 
years.   
Helping to keep the issue of collateral consequence for drug offenders alive was 
Jack Kemp, who after a failed bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1988 
was appointed secretary of Housing and Urban Development. As Housing Secretary, 
Kemp pushed to expand the definition of public housing, from which drug offenders now 
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could be evicted or denied admission, to include private housing that fell under the 
Section 8 subsidies program (Berke, 1989).  Kemp also pushed to evict tenants who were 
arrested or suspected of drug crimes regardless of whether they were convicted (Johnson, 
1989). Kemp’s media-covered public housing activities would help keep public attention 
on the link between welfare issues and crime policy alive long enough for the issues to be 
relevant in the next presidential election, ideologically merging in a way that would open 
a window for increased collateral consequences. A look at the Clinton campaign’s 
emphasis on crime and welfare and his presidential rhetoric concerning both provides 
some understanding of how this window opened.  
Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign attempted to redefine the Democratic 
platform so as to steal certain bread and butter issues from the Republicans (Riker, 1984). 
Polsky (1997) has convincingly argued that this was a necessary maneuver because the 
Reagan administration had created a new dominant “political regime” based on a 
narrative of get-tough policy and small government ideals.  For the most part, the public 
believed this narrative and political challengers would have to adapt their platforms to fit 
it (Polsky, 1997, pp. 153-166). This was evident in the issues of welfare, drugs and crime. 
Whereas public opinion polls had long viewed Republicans as more capable of dealing 
with crime, Clinton showed Democratic “toughness” and made strides toward 
neutralizing the GOP advantage on the issue when he temporarily bypassed a campaign 
stop in New Hampshire to attend an Arkansas execution of a brain-damaged man 
convicted of murdering a police officer (Holan, 2004). The move highlighted Clinton’s 
support for the death penalty and certified his tough-on-crime credentials (Marion, 1997). 
Support for the death penalty had been increasing since 1977, and by 1992 the vast 
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majority of Americans, 77 percent, supported it (Gallup, 2010). The GOP’s support for 
the death penalty was consequently a Republican strength, particularly in the previous 
election, in which George H. Bush was able to brand Massachusetts Gov. Michael 
Dukakis’ anti-capital punishment stance as “soft on crime (Holan, 2004, p. 96).” Once 
Clinton stole Republican thunder and won the election, he maintained his get-tough 
credibility through support for such policies as the federal three strikes law, Truth in 
Sentencing, the death penalty for homicides involving drugs or the slaying of police 
officers, and increased police presence (Marion, 1997).    
Clinton also moved to the right in his rhetoric on welfare reform, calling for the 
“end of welfare as we know it (Polsky, 1997, p. 158).” Meanwhile, public opinion polls 
showed high-level support for proposals aimed at decreasing dependency by transitioning 
welfare recipients to work or some sort of vocational training (Zuckerman, 2000, 589). 
When a window opened for welfare reform, Congress, now dominated by Contract-with-
America Republicans, pushed the administration more to the right in debates over the 
issue. Among the proposals that would pass in the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act  (PRWORA) were those that the Senate had brought up 
during the Reagan administration, including measures favored by Sen. Gramm to deny 
Food Stamp and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families aid to those with felony drug 
possession, use, or distribution convictions (Mohr, 1988). States were allowed to modify 
or revoke the TANF ban; but by 2002, 27 states had implemented it. Clinton also linked 
crime to welfare reform that year by proposing a “one-strike-your out policy” for people 
found to have drugs in public housing (Pollack, Danziger, Sefeldt and Jayakody, 2002, 
pp. 1-7).  
 82 
 
While the war on drugs, the get tough movement and a move for welfare reform 
would create punitive policies addressing offenders outside of prison walls, a series of 
post-incarceration policies directed at sex offenders would cast a wider net of restrictions. 
Much like the move of three strikes toward the national agenda, the spread of collateral 
consequence sex offender laws was triggered by sensational crimes that galvanized 
policy entrepreneurs to push for laws in certain states that found their way to the U.S. 
Congress and launched legislative changes throughout the nation. 
The crimes that would place the issue in the national spotlight occurred in 
Washington State and Minnesota. The Washington case occurred in 1989, when 
recidivist sex offender Earl Shriner kidnapped and sexually abused a six year-old child, 
whose name authorities never released. In the same year in Minnesota, an anonymous 
man kidnapped 11-year-old Jacob Wetterling, whose parents founded the Jacob 
Wetterling foundation, a child kidnapping and sex abuse policy interest group (Logan, 
2003, p. 1287). In Minnesota, the Wetterling Foundation helped propose and push for sex 
offenders to be registered on a law enforcement database after their terms were served; 
and a law based on this proposal was passed in 1990, a gubernatorial campaign year 
(Logan, 2003). Similar legislation passed in Washington State, where the use of sex 
offender registration was nothing new. Like in Washington State, localities in California 
had passed laws requiring sex offenders to register with law enforcement since the 1920s, 
and several other states and localities had followed suit. But before the Minnesota and 
Washington cases, the vast majority of states had no such laws (Logan, 2008).  
U.S. Representative Davis Duremberger (R-Min), riding the wave of media 
attention directed toward events in Minnesota, launched the movement to enact such 
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legislation on a national scale by proposing a law that would create an interstate 
registration database for sex offenders. Duremberger’s proposal initially failed, but he 
kept trying. In 1993 he received backing from his House counterpart Rep. Jim Ranstand 
(R-Min), who proposed similar legislation and received support from the Jacob 
Wetterling foundation (Associated Press, 1991). As both houses debated the bills, 
Washington State legislators in the U.S. House and Senate proposed expanding the bill to 
include a provision that communities be notified when sex offenders lived close. The 
community notification amendment was modeled after the Washington law that had 
passed in 1990. Though the House passed the community notification proposal the Senate 
did not, requiring a joint House committee to deliberate the notification issue. The joint 
committee omitted the notification requirement, but pressure to pass it came quickly in 
1994, when problem and political streams opened a window for passage of both the 
notification and registration laws (Logan, 2008).  
The most pressing of these factors occurred after the joint committee opted not to 
support the registration provision when a recidivist sex offender neighbor murdered 
seven-year-old Meghan Kanka in New Jersey. The Kanka murder drew instant national 
press coverage the year after Polly Klaas’ murder and the search for her body had drawn 
international attention (Logan, 2002). Meanwhile, the law was also affected by the same 
stream factors that had opened a window for passage of three strikes reform and Truth in 
Sentencing, including: a president who had campaigned on being tough on crime and 
lobbied in support of the bill; a violent crime rate that had been on the rise; 
unprecedented media attention to crime; and a nationwide platform change by 
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Democrats, who strove to show they could be just as tough on crime as Republicans (See 
section on three strikes in Chapter 3).  
As a result of these factors, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act in 1994. The act required states 
to adopt its tenets if they wished to avoid a ten percent loss of Byrne Formula grants. The 
bill’s provisions subjected violent sex offenders to life time registration, mandated 
persons convicted of other sex offense categories to register for 10 years registration, and 
encouraged participating states to develop a means by which their communities could 
notify residents when sex offenders lived close (Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 1994). The community notification provision 
of the act was voluntary until 1996, when Meghan’s Law mandated it (Wood, 2005). In 
later years, Congress broadened the category of offenders requiring lifetime registration, 
created a national FBI database of registered sex offenders, and made the national 
registry available to the public via the internet.   
The move to deny drug offenders welfare benefits and to require sex offender 
registration set post-incarceration standards for subsequent years. The rise to the agenda 
of welfare reform collateral sanctions in the 1980s would end the trend toward proposals 
that aimed to roll back some of the damages collateral sanctions caused (Travis, 2002, p. 
18).  Following the example of Congress, states began to increase their collateral 
sanctions, barring many offenders from teaching, child care, medical work, law 
enforcement, care for the elderly, bar associations and other positions. A study comparing 
state increases in statutory collateral consequences between 1986 and 1996 found that by 
1996: three more states added restrictions of the right of felons to vote; three more states 
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restricted the parental rights of felons; one more state added a felony conviction as 
grounds for divorce; and two more states restricted felons’ rights to public office 
(Olivares and Burton, 1996). While the same study conducted in 1986 concluded that 
collateral consequences were generally decreasing, the 1996 follow-up noted that many 
states had increased collateral consequences during the ten-year gap, and no state had 
reduced them (Olivares and Burton, 1996).  
Making criminal histories of sex offenders available on the internet had spillover 
effect in other areas of criminal policy. These laws began a trend to help create a cyber 
infrastructure to access the backgrounds of all persons with criminal records, not merely 
sex offenders. Advances in cyber technology, which made databases on criminal records 
far more expansive and easier to access, greatly facilitated the trend. Accompanying this 
technological transformation were Congressional policies that funded state development 
of criminal records databases. The Brady Gun Bill, for example, funded creation of a 
national criminal records database so that gun retailers could request background checks 
on potential customers (Katel, 2009). And in 2000, Congress provided additional funding 
so that states could upload records of serious felonies, mental disability and domestic 
violence into the FBI database (Stern, 2007). The rise of these databases has spawned 
thousands of private vendors that specialize in uncovering personal information, criminal 
history data included. Most employers, it has been estimated use a vendor of this sort to 
conduct employment background checks (SEARCH 2005, pp. 7-8).   
Congress expanded the extent of information available to such vendors in 1998, 
by amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The act regulates what information 
the vendors can access and the procedures they can use to attain it. Previous to 1999, the 
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FCRA limited such companies to credit and criminal arrest and conviction information 
dating back seven years. In 1998, however, Congress amended the FCRA to exclude 
arrests leading to convictions from the seven-year limit. In other words, credit 
information vendors could henceforth potentially access an offender’s criminal history 
information for the rest of his/her life (Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1998). The FCRA 
standards have been adopted by most states with the exception of a few, California for 
example, that have opted to keep the seven-year limitation on conviction record access 
(Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, 2002).  Coupled with increased access 
to affordable online computers, the act facilitated the ability to employers to implement 
collateral consequences against job seekers with criminal records.   
The number of background checks being conducted for employment purposes has 
also increased due to case rulings enforcing the concept of negligent hiring and to 
transformative events like the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001, which lead to 
policies barring persons with certain criminal histories from working in the transportation 
sector.  States have also made it more prohibitive for person’s with criminal records to 
find jobs, by barring them from certain sectors. Ohio, for example prohibits persons with 
criminal records from licensure in the following fields: 
“accountants, architects, athletic trainers,  audiologists, barbers, motor 
vehicle dealers, chiropractors, counselors,  credit service organizations, 
dentists and dental hygienists, dietitians, emergency medical service workers, 
engineers and surveyors, fireworks exhibitors, hearing aid dealers, horse race 
workers, insurance administrators, insurance agents, livestock 
brokers/dealers, liquor license, lottery sales agents, therapists, salvage 
dealers,  nurses, occupational therapists,  opticians, optometrists, 
pharmacists, physical therapists, physicians,  physician assistants, precious 
metal dealers, private investigators, real estate appraisers, real estate 
brokers, respiratory care professionals,  school employees, security guards, 
social workers, speech pathologists,  telephone solicitors, and veterinarians. 
(Freisthler and Godsey 2004, p. 537) ” 
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Summary of Collateral Consequences.   
The advent of collateral consequence polices to the agenda is reflected in case 
studies involving the linkage of welfare reform, drug war and get tough ideology as well 
as the emphasis on post-incarceration sanctions triggered by the spread of sex offender 
laws. In the first case, a conservative push to retract Johnson’s Great Society programs 
stirred in the proposal stream during the Cater administration. Headway for welfare 
retraction was made viable in the problem stream by serious economic issues during the 
Carter years, including a drop in GNP, inflation and rising unemployment rates. The 
media focused on this problem and played particular attention to welfare reform 
proposals. In the political stream, public opinion polls showed support for welfare 
reform, and Ronald Reagan focused on the issue both during his failed bid for the 
Republican presidential nomination in 1976 as well as his successful campaign against 
Carter in 1980. With a Republican platform based on shrinking government, and a 
window for get tough measures and the drug war opening, existent proposals to deny 
welfare benefits to drug offenders were able to slip through, as they were perceived as 
shrinking welfare expenses, while still fighting crime and drugs.  
The rise of new sex offender laws to the agenda followed a similar pattern to three 
strikes legislation in California. In the case of sex offender legislation, sensational 
murders in two states galvanized interest groups to support registration and notification 
proposals during political campaign years. Such proposals had existed in other states, but 
they spread nationally when Congressional representatives from both Washington and 
Minnesota used the public attention to the crimes in both states, as well as the murders of 
Polly Klaas in California and Meghan Kanka in New Jersey, to pass proposals that had 
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failed in previous years. Factors in the problem stream that helped open a window 
included the murders and abductions discussed above, and an increase in violent crime 
rates, and unprecedented media coverage of child sex crimes.  A window opened when 
these problems merged with political stream factors, which included the move of 
Democrats to the right on crime policy, candidate Clinton’s get tough campaign, and 
President Clintons lobbying for the law. The rise of both these types of collateral sanction 
policies would eventually lead to a spillover of collateral sanctions on federal and state 
levels. 
More pertinent to this chapter, the collateral consequence policies marked an 
about-face from the Mertonian ideal of strengthening ties to society by way of welfare 
and economic support. By internally ostracizing those with conviction records from 
certain social opportunities, collateral sanctions and the get tough principle as a whole did 
away with Mertonian crime policy. However, the overarching aim of these collateral 
consequence policies was to reduce crime and increase public safety. The following 
section attempts to see whether they in fact did that. 
Impact of Collateral Consequences 
About 630,000 Americans, 95 percent of the prison population, are to be released 
each year (Petersillia, 2003). Collateral consequence barring access to an array of 
opportunities, including welfare, employment and housing, will affect a large portion of 
these offenders as well as the many other Americans with criminal records. There is 
currently no extant research on the effect of state collateral consequences on crime. As 
such, this paper shall have to conduct its own research to test for effects. As discussed in 
the introductory chapter the theory influencing this research will be institutional anomie 
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theory (IAT). IAT will be employed for several reasons. First, the logic behind IAT 
would seem to justify collateral consequences as a variable that causes crime. Second, 
while other fields of macro-criminology, social organization theory, for example, could 
also justify collateral consequences as a criminogenic variable, IAT has never guided 
public policy. A well structured study on collateral consequences could arguably help 
send fresh ideas into the proposal stream. Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) suggest the 
freshness of their approach when they contend that policy implications of IAT would 
involve taking from both conservative and liberal ideologies. While Mertonian polices of 
the Johnson and Kennedy era have fought crime by trying to expand opportunities 
available to the poor, IAT introduces the caveat that providing such opportunity can be 
criminogenic if family, polity, churches and schools are not stable enough to mitigate 
against the effects of the American Dream. While Republican rhetoric has often focused 
on the importance of family and churches as instillers of morality, strengthening of such 
informal institutions has not been a weapon in the conservative crime-fighting arsenal for 
the past 30 years. In short, IAT-based policy could plausibly bridge conservative and 
liberal ideologies—a welcome policy opportunity in an era of partisanship and political 
gridlock. We shall begin our research by briefly reintroducing some of the key 
components of IAT reviewed in Chapter 2, followed by a literature review of empirical 
IAT literature, a discussion of how IAT relates to collateral consequences and a 
formulation of a general hypothesis. Following that, we shall examine key variables, 
describe how these variables shall be measured and conduct an OLS regression analysis 
that tests for the relationship between collateral consequences and crime.  
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Key components of Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) 
The American Dream can be described as an ideal that encourages rugged 
individual competition for limited resources in order to achieve monetary success. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, IAT focuses on the pressures the American Dream can exert to 
create a “get it by any means” attitude on citizenry that can lead to crime.  The American 
Dream exerts pressure through a market ideology that can penetrate all aspects of life 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 2001, p. 70). Informal institutions mitigate this pressure by 
functioning as instillers of means values. For example, families can shelter members from 
the pressures of the American Dream, while participating in the polity through civic 
duties can reemphasize the notion that one is part of a community greater than oneself. 
Finally, educational institutions can indoctrinate students in a wide array of moral 
values— loyalty to the country, team work, the importance of not cheating, and so forth 
(2001, p. 70). Messner and Rosenfeld, note however, that economic logic of the market 
can, via processes of “accommodation, devaluation and penetration,” weaken the value-
instilling functions of these institutions, thereby hindering their ability to reduce crime 
(2001, p. 70). When the economy dominates these institutions, they cease to regulate 
desires and instead become re-enforcers of ideology based on rugged individualism and 
attainment of success by any means. In studying causes for crime, IAT focuses on a 
balance of power between informal social institutions and the market. The ideal 
conditions for reducing crime, therefore, are when social institutions and the economy are 
strong. However, a strong economy and weak social institutions can lead to high crime 
rates, as it could symbolize a dominance of the economic logic over social institutions 
(2001, pp. 103-108). This economic logic, without value enhancement, could lead to an 
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end-justifies-the-means attitude; and this logic can be applied to all types of wants, not 
just monetary. Subsequently the anomic pressures of the American dream can be applied 
to both property and violent crimes (2001, p. 78).   
IAT Literature   
The empirical literature on IAT is not prolific, but is steadily growing through 
studies that have focused on property and violent crimes (Bejjeregard and Cochran, 2008; 
Shoepfer and Piquero, 2004; Maume & Lee, 2003; Pratt and Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 
2000; Piquero and Leeper-Piquero, 1998; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Hannon and 
Defronzo, 1998; Chamlin and Cochran, 1995).  
Chamlin and Cochran (1995) were the first to conduct an empirical test of IAT. 
The authors tested for IAT effects by hypothesizing that a strong economy could only 
reduce profit –motivated state crime when social institutions were also strengthened 
(1995, p. 415). The study used the percentage of families below the poverty level as 
measure of the economy. In measures of social institutions, the authors used the ratio of 
state divorce to marriage rates as a measure of family; church membership rates; and 
percentage of voters in Congressional contests as measure of polity (1995, p. 415). To 
measure the interplay between the economy and social institutions, the authors multiplied 
the measurement of poverty by the measure of each social institutional variable. 
Subsequently, interaction variables included poverty rate X state divorce rates; poverty 
rates X church membership rates and poverty rates X state congressional voter rates. The 
results of their analysis suggested that the effects of poverty on property crime depended 
on the ability of social institutions to mitigate  the criminogenic impact of poverty.  
Building on Chamlin and Cochran’s work, Piquero and Lee-Piquero (1998) also used 
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interactive terms to test the multiplicative effects of poverty and social institution strength 
on property crimes. Their results varied according to their measures of education and 
whether the dependent variable was property or violent crime.  
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) would conduct their own test of IAT on a cross-
national level to test for effects on homicide rates. To measure the effect of the economy 
on social institutions, the authors employed a “decommodification index,” which 
accounts for the relative level of funds nations spend on entitlements such a welfare and 
social security. Decommodification spending, the authors contend, shifts time that a 
nation’s populace would otherwise use on economic concerns to non-economic concerns 
like family, church, schools and polity The decommodification index, Messner and 
Rosenfeld add, measures the willingness of nations to mitigate against the effects of the 
economy on social institutions, ensuring the somewhat equitable balance between 
economic and non-economic institutions needed to reduce crime. The results of their 
analysis imply a negative relationship between social support spending and crime (1997, 
pp. 104-108).  
Savolainen (2000) tried to combine the interactive effects of Chamlin and 
Cochran’s model while testing for cross-sectional homicide rates as Messner and 
Rosenfeld had. Savolainen saw value in studying nation states as opposed to U.S. states 
because nation states have more distinct cultures and provide more variance in levels of 
anomie (1997, pp. 1024-1026). Maume and Lee (2003) expand on IAT homicide research 
by testing for the effect of income inequality on the ability of social institutions to 
mitigate against county homicide rates. Their results suggested that weak social 
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institutions do mitigate income inequality’s positive effect on homicide and instrumental 
homicide (2003, p. 1137).  
In summary, IAT empirical studies have employed national and state levels of 
analysis while testing for both property and violent crimes. Measures of balance of power 
between economic and non-economic institutions have included a decommodification 
index (essential a measure of relative budgetary levels of welfare and social security 
spending) and interaction variables comprised of poverty levels and proxies for social 
institution strength. We shall now discuss how collateral consequences could be deemed 
a viable variable in the IAT model. 
Collateral Consequences and IAT 
As mentioned earlier, collateral consequences are civil penalties that can 
negatively affect the re-entry of those with criminal records. Collateral consequences bar 
or limit offender access to employment, trade licensing, education, housing and other 
welfare benefits. In short, they bar access to legitimate economic opportunity. Though no 
research has pointed toward a significant positive relationship between collateral 
consequences and crime, the logic behind IAT would seem to imply a correlation. As 
discussed in chapter 2, it is this paper’s contention that collateral consequences can erode 
some informal social institutions. For example, parents who are barred from gainful 
employment may have to work multiple jobs to make ends meet for their children. 
Having to work so many hours arguably creates a state of underemployment, which in 
turn allows such parents less time to instill means values in their children who become 
more susceptible to a get-it-by-any means cultural ethos. Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) 
note that the institutions of family and education are closely related. For example if a 
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family is denied access to welfare benefits such as food stamps due to a drug conviction, 
parents may spend more time away from home in pursuit of money. With parents away, 
children can become truants, eroding the ability of schools to instill means values in 
them. Those same parents, being occupied with concerns about money, may work seven 
days per week and have less time to take their children to church, reducing the ability of 
another means value institution to ward against criminogenic effects. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the implication here is that collateral consequences can lead to overall 
increases in crime, not simply recidivism, as families, and by extension, communities, 
can be affected.  
This paper contends that, according to Messner and Rosenfeld’s reasoning, 
collateral consequences would also reflect a general domination of the economy at all 
levels of society. Messner and Rosenfeld suggest this in their discussion of 
decommodification and mass incarceration.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3’s impact section, Messner and Rosenfeld (2009) 
suggest mass incarceration exists in societies where there is less collective interest in 
maintaining individual interests.  They conclude, therefore, that incarceration-increasing 
policies result from increased market permeation of everyday life and high states of 
anomie, which are both criminogenic. Collateral consequences, which according to 
Foucault could be perceived as an extension of the “technologies of punishment” beyond 
the walls of the prison system, are in many ways a form of externalized incarceration, 
with barriers to reentry that function like “invisible” prison bars (Travis, 2005).  If 
collateral consequences are en extension of the mass incarceration system, then according 
to Messner and Rosenfeld’s logic, much like mass incarceration, collateral consequences 
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would suggest less state interest over individual interest, higher states of anomie and 
permeation of the economy in everyday life.   
As noted, Messner and Rosenfeld argue that decommodification, measured by the 
percentage of budget a state dedicates to welfare spending, indicates that state’s 
willingness to subsidize citizenry participation in non-economic endeavors. It could then  
be argued that high levels of collateral consequences that bar access to welfare benefits 
occur in nations that do not display such interest in the individual’s need to engage in 
non-economic activity because the drive for bare subsistence and economic needs 
regulates most behavior. How behavior is regulated will of course depend on the type of 
collateral consequence, and this model will implement those collateral consequences that 
bar access to employment or welfare. A review of the relationship between welfare, 
employment, and crime should therefore prove helpful.   
Employment.  The link between employment and crime has been thoroughly 
explored. Steven Raphael and Rudolph Winter-Ebmer (2001) employ OLS regression to 
conclude that a positive relationship between unemployment and property crime rates 
exists. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer root their theory in a rational choice model, arguing 
that in an economic climate where the access to resources from legal employment is 
scarce, actors make due by choosing a life of “illegal employment (2001, p. 262).”  Like 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer’s study, Jeffrey Grogger (1998) also applies a rational choice 
model to study the effects of employment on crime. In Grogger’s model, agents, valuing 
leisure and consumption, make choices based on whether employment or crime 
maximizes these values (1998, p. 750). Grogger notes that lower wage jobs, which 
provide little leeway for consuming and leisure, are the most likely sources of legal 
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employment for the young and contribute towards higher youth crime rates (1998, p. 
787). Another study by Grogger (1995) explores the relationship between arrest records 
and unemployment. He finds that men with arrest records generally earn less than those 
without arrest records (Grogger, 1995, p. 51). If Winter Ebmer’s contention that those 
with insufficient income seek illegitimate income is true, the lower income among those 
with arrest records may explain high recidivism rates.  
Anomie-based studies have also observed a strong link between employment, or 
underemployment, and crime. Agreeing with Merton’s, Lance Hannon and James 
Defronzo, conclude that the nation’s emphasis on economic success and rugged 
individualism encourages a “get it by any means” attitude among those with lower 
incomes (1998, p. 370). Subsequently, feeling underemployed can create a sense of 
anomie and can be criminogenic. Like Merton, Hannon and Defronzo propose reducing 
economic plight through welfare benefits to prevent crime (1998, p. 384). 
 As works from variety of criminological fields show ties to a negative relationship 
between crime and unemployment or underemployment, one could infer that public 
policies barring access to employment can be criminogenic.  Bushway et al. (2007) have 
explored this association, claiming a positive relationship between decreased access to 
employment among those with criminal records and a return to crime. It is this study’s 
contention that similar results could also be expected of policies that indirectly bar access 
to employment— laws restricting the use of a vehicle to go to work or policies that deny 
trade licenses, for example. 
 Again, the logic of the IAT model suggests the impact of collateral consequences 
barring access to employment would spread further than the recidivism of those who are 
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denied access. A lack of income among traditional bread winners could mean a turn 
toward illegitimate means of income, which in turn could weaken a family’s ability to 
model legitimate means behavior. Furthermore the incarceration of parents who commit 
crimes as a way to earn income when jobs are unattainable could mean a lack of 
supervision for children, which can spread criminal behavior in communities prone to 
high incarceration rates.  
Welfare.  The literature linking low levels of welfare and crime is vast, but there 
is debate about whether the relationship is positive or negative. Much of the 
microeconomic literature has suggested that increases in welfare benefits actually 
increase crime rates. As mentioned in earlier chapters, Wilson (1995) was among the 
most influential of such thinkers, arguing that welfare dependency discourages 
individuals from seeking legitimate employment, thereby encouraging illegitimate 
employment as a means for income.  Katz (1994) adds that because welfare recipients 
will not attain free welfare services once income reaches a certain level, they will seek 
illegitimate forms of employment, ones hidden from official income measures, to boost 
income levels while maintaining benefits. And Rothard (1978, p. 154), in a Malthusian 
fashion, concludes that welfare support for children born out of wedlock encourages teen 
pregnancy and discourages marriage, two criminogenic impediments to escaping poverty.      
However, the microeconomic perspective that welfare benefits increase crime is 
also contradicted by the numerous studies contending the opposite is true (DeFronzo, 
1983,  Devine, Sheley, and Smith, 1988; Fiala and LaFree, 1988; Grant and Martinez, 
1997;; Messner, 1986; Rosenfeld, 1986; and Zhang, 1997).  There is certainly less debate 
over the issue within the Durkhemian camps. The Durkheim-influenced social 
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disorganization perspective argues that welfare benefits can preserve family and 
community social controls and norms, while pulling such benefits can lead to the 
disruption of family and culture that can trigger crime. This theory was backed by a study 
of 406 large urbanized counties that tested whether the affects of changes in AFDC 
benefits were related to crime rates. According to the study, increases in AFDC benefits 
did indeed have that effect (Hannon and Defronzo, 1998).  
 From the IAT and Mertonian (strain) perspectives, social spending on welfare is 
repeatedly used as a variable that leads to decreases in crime. From the strain perspective, 
welfare creates opportunity structures for the poor to achieve the American Dream, 
thereby closing the anomic gap between our cultural penchant for material success and 
our ability to achieve them (Merton, 1938). From an IAT perspective, the percentage of a 
government’s budget spent on welfare defines that government’s commitment to provide 
its citizenry time they can commit to non-economic institutions like family, education 
and polity (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2006).  Subsequently, as in the case of education and 
employment, it can be argued from a plurality of criminological theoretical perspectives 
that policies that bar access to welfare benefits can be criminogenic. Intuition suggests a 
negative relationship between policies that bar access to certain economic benefits and 
recidivism. In other words, if an offender is blocked from legitimate employment or 
welfare opportunities, he may seek illegitimate means of attaining it. However, the 
question asked at the beginning of this chapter is broader in focus. The question is 
whether policies barring offenders from privileges and needs such as employment, 
housing, education and welfare, can contribute to “crime,” not merely recidivism. 
Though the dependent variable may indeed include crimes committed by recidivists, 
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crimes from many other offenders may also be included— including those affected by the 
erosion of non-economic institutions. 
 Some research outside of the IAT canon supports this notion. Gaynes (2005), for 
example, has done important research on the effect incarceration can have on the children 
of inmates. About 1.5 million prison inmates have children under age 18 and more than 
10 million children have had a parent who has been incarcerated. Having an incarcerated 
parent significantly increases a child’s chance of juvenile delinquency and, subsequently, 
adulthood crimes (Mukamal, 2007). Deducing from these studies, one can also 
hypothesize those collateral consequence policies that trigger recidivism can also trigger 
crime among the children of recidivists, leading to overall increases in crime.  
 Other scholars contend that the criminogenic affect of arrest and convictions 
spread far beyond the families of offenders. Clear (2008) concludes that incarceration 
triggers crime throughout the communities of offenders by negatively impacting the 
“ability of families to function, labor markets and political and economic infrastructures.” 
Clear’s points seem particularly pertinent to IAT, as the deterioration of families and 
polity institutions are key IAT variables.  
 Reviewing the sections above, the literature suggests several IAT and collateral 
consequence variables should correlate with violent and property crimes. IAT variables 
can include proxies for social institutions such as schools, churches and families; while 
collateral consequence variables can include polices that bar access to welfare and 
employment. Furthermore, the literature review above suggests that overall state 
unemployment and welfare rates are important variables, as well. Other control variables 
associated with the literature, however, will be needed to improve model strength.  
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 Control Variables.  Several control variables consistent with IAT literature will 
be added. These will include: a measure of decommodification (Messner and Rosenfeld, 
2006), population, age, relative poverty, black population (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995), 
personal income, and urban density. We shall discuss each of these variables. 
As mentioned above, Messner and Rosenfeld’s measure of decommodification 
focused on the budgetary percentage nations committed to welfare spending. This study 
shall therefore employ a welfare spending variable as a proxy for decommodification. As 
Messner and Rosenfeld measured decommodifation by looking at the commitment nation 
states made to its population in terms of budget percentage dedicated to welfare, this 
study shall look at the percentage of state budgets dedicated to welfare spending.   
Some debate exists over whether relative or absolute poverty is more powerful a 
predictor. Those who argue that relative poverty is a stronger predictive variable employ 
measures of income inequality as independent variables and justify their use through 
theories associated with relative deprivation. The gist of the argument here is that more 
profound contrasts in material wealth between haves and have-nots makes the 
predicament of the poor shine forth more brightly, leading to frustration which in turn 
leads to the aggression associated with violent crime. Others who employ income 
inequality as a variable use an anomie-based model supporting the notion that crime is 
more determined by the increasing gap between rich and poor than it is by weak 
purchasing power. Some argue that such disruptions of social cohesion expand gaps 
between haves and have-nots and that this disruption leads to criminogenic anomie 
(Kennedy, Kawachi, Prothrow-Stith, Lochner and Gupta, 1998). As such, relative 
deprivation shall be used. However, there is also the suggestion in IAT that general 
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improvements in overall income can help reduce crime rates. It is for this reason that 
Merton, Messner and Rosenfeld have recommended welfare increases as a means of 
reducing crime. Higher per capita incomes, particularly when coupled with stronger 
informal institutions, should also make a good control variable.  
Structural independent variables such as age are of import, too. Though there is 
some spirited debate (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1985; Greenberg, 1983) over why teens 
and young adults are more likely to engage in crime than those who are older, the notion 
that age is one of the strongest variables related to crime is generally agreed on in 
criminology (Freeman, 1996; Shavit and Rattner, 1988; Farrington, 1986). Backing up 
the theoretical evidence is a 15-state, FBI study of prisoners released in 1994 (Langan 
and Levin, 2002a, p. 7). The study records age as a significant factor in determining 
whether prisoners would be rearrested within a three-year period. Released prisoners 
under age 18 were 80 percent more likely to be rearrested. Comparatively, those 45 and 
older had a 45 percent chance of rearrest (Langan and Levin, 2002a, p. 7). One seeking a 
theoretical explanation for the high prevalence of crime among younger people can look 
as far back as the 17th century writings of Thomas Hobbes (1957, 195), who argued that 
younger people are more susceptible to crime because they are less likely to have 
undergone the full process of socialization prevalent among their older counterparts. This 
may partly explain the higher crime rates among society’s younger folk, but, as 
mentioned above, the youth argument can also follow an economic model. Thus, in an 
approach similar to Grogger’s, Richard B. Freeman (1996, p. 40)  argues that youth are 
highly represented among unskilled workers, who in turn have increasingly undergone a 
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decline in real wages and are therefore more susceptible to criminal activity. Table 5.1, 
below, provides insight into the relationship between age and crime.  
 
Table 5.1. Rate of recidivism within a three-year period of prisoners from 15 states* 
released in 1999 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (Langan and Lavin, 2002a). 
  Percent of released prisoners who, within 3 years, were - 
Prisoner 
Characteristic 
Percent of 
all released 
prisoners 
Re-arrested Reconvicteda Returned to 
prison with 
a new 
prison 
sentenceb 
Returned to 
prison with 
or without a 
new prison 
sentencec 
Age at Release      
14-17 0.3 82.1 55.7 38.6 56.6 
18-24 21.0 75.4 52.0 30.2 52.0 
25-29 22.8 70.5 50.1 26.9 52.5 
30-34 22.7 68.8 48.8 25.9 54.8 
35-39 16.2 66.2 46.3 24.0 52.0 
40-44 9.4 58.4 38.0 18.3 50.0 
45 or older 7.6 45.3 29.7 16.9 40.9 
      
No. of 
released 
prisoners 
272,111 272,111 260,226 254,720 227,788 
a Because of missing data Ohio was excluded form these figures  
bBecause of missing data, Ohio and Virginia were excluded  
cBecause of missing data, Arizona, Virginia, Delaware, Maryland New Jersey, Ohio were 
excluded.  
* States in the study are Arizona, Delaware, California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia.  
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 As a young age tends to be a common trait among prisoners, so is being black 
(Figure 5.1). Three percent of the U.S. black population was incarcerated at the end of 
2004, compared to less than one-half percent of the white population (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 2005a).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. U.S. high school graduation rates by race (Statistics compiled by Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research (2003)). 
  
The use of race as an independent variable affecting crime poses considerable 
empirical and normative concerns. There is the danger of implying that particular races or 
ethnic groups are intrinsically more prone to crime. Furthermore, using race as a variable 
may lead to ignoring the various ways in which structure, dominant culture, subculture, 
identity and other factors contribute to the high prevalence of crime among blacks.  Also, 
it is argued that the higher crime rate among minorities suggested by the high prison 
population of blacks are not a true representation of how much more total crime blacks 
commit than other ethnic and racial groups, but rather the types of crimes they commit. 
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After all, African Americans are more affected by policies that direct large amount of 
resources to stopping certain types of crimes, such as the War on Drugs (Sampson and 
Lauritsen, 1997, p. 311). Perhaps shedding more light on the relationship between race 
and crime, as Robert J. Sampson and Janet L. Lauritsen point out, is the fact that blacks, 
due to structural reasons, are more likely to be poor (1997, p. 332). Furthermore, a study 
of high school dropout rates in 1998 defined the graduation rate among blacks to be 58%. 
compared to a graduation rate for whites of 78%. As discussed above, there is a 
relationship between education and wage levels, which increase the likelihood of crime. 
Therefore, the connection between race and crime may arguably be due in part to the fact 
that blacks are overrepresented among lower wage earners and high school dropouts.  
 There is another compelling theory among those who use ethnicity or race as an 
independent variable leading to crime. This is the notion that nation states have difficulty 
dealing with diversity issues. For example, Hamman and Quigley (1982, pp. 206-207), in 
a comparison of nation states, conclude that there is a significant, positive relationship 
between ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity and homicide rates. The authors note that 
criminal activity is far less concentrated between groups of different ethnicities and 
culture but within these groups. The authors posit two theoretical reasons for this fact. 
The first is the psychosocial explanation of displaced aggression. Members of minority 
groups become frustrated with their status in society relative to dominant culture groups 
and begin to act it out within their own group. The theory can be compared to parents 
who deal harshly with their children after a rough day at the office. The second theory is 
that assimilation of minority cultures into dominant national cultures often results in the 
deterioration of traditional means of ensuring order within a community, leading to 
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higher intra-group crime. Under both perspectives, theories of diversity seem to have a 
stronger theoretical base than those that directly associate crime with the intrinsic nature 
of particular racial groups.  
 Another variable common to macro-social studies that employ anomie-type 
theories of crime such as social disorganization and strain theory is urban density (Li and 
Rainwater 2005, Wirth, 1938; Agnew, 1992, 1999). This body of literature argues that 
population density either due the strain it causes informal institutions to regulate deviant 
behavior, the ability of law enforcement to control such a large population, or the chances 
that deviants can collectivize around peers with similar values generally have a positive 
impact on crime rates (Pratt, 2005). 
In summary, the literature points to several variables related to crime. These 
include government, welfare support, age, population black, informal social institutional 
strength, per-capita income, urban density and this paper’s introductory variable, policies 
that bar economic (employment and/or welfare reentry). 
However, literature reviews on the effects of get-tough polices in Chapters 3 and 
4 also imply a relationship between get tough policies and crime. Subsequently proxies 
for the effect of get-tough ideology and intensity should also be employed in the study. 
Hypotheses  
Main Hypothesis.  There is a positive relationship between state public policies 
that bar the legal, economic reintegration of persons with criminal records and state crime 
rates. As these public policy barriers increase state crime rates increase. 
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Other Hypotheses.  From a review of the literature, I also expect the following to 
be true of the relationship between my independent control variables and the dependent 
variable state crime rates. 
a. There is a negative relationship between the percentage of young people in a 
state population and state crime rates. As the age of a population decreases, crime 
increases. 
 b. There is a positive relationship between population black and crime. As each 
state’s black population increases, crime increases. 
 d. There is a negative relationship between education rates and crime. As a state’s 
education rate increases, state crime decreases. 
 e. There is a positive relationship between get tough policies and crime. As state 
get tough policies increase, crime increases. 
 f. There is a positive relationship between get-tough political ideology and crime. 
As get-tough political ideology intensifies, so does crime.  
 g. There is a negative relationship between decommodification and crime. As 
state welfare benefits increase, crime decreases.  
 h. There is a positive relationship between economic inequality and crime. As a 
states level of income inequality decreases, crime decreases.  
 i. There is a positive relationship between urban density and crime. As urban 
density increases, so does crime. 
 j. There is a negative relationship between personal income and crime. As 
personal income increases, crime decreases. 
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  k. There is a negative relationship between the strength of informal social 
institutions and crime. As families, schools, and churches get stronger, crime decreases. 
 l. There is a positive relationship between underemployment and crime. As 
underemployment increases, crime does, too. 
Dependent variable measurement 
The measure for the dependent variable state crime rates will be the those 
statistics on violent and property crime rates/per 100,000 population in each of the 50 
states compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in their 2007 Uniform Crime 
Report. The FBI defines violent crime as the offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault. Property crimes are offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor 
vehicle theft. Offense totals are based on all data received from reporting agencies and 
estimates for unreported areas (FBI, 2008). Use of the 2007 date would allow for at least 
a four-year lag time between all independent variables and the dependent variable. The 
decision to employ a four-year lag, concerns with the UCR crime rate measurement, and 
issues surrounding ecological fallacy are problems with the dependent variable that 
deserve more attention. 
The use of time lags and the appropriate length of lagged time between 
independent and dependent variables should be addressed. Lagged dependent variables 
are often used to make certain that the dependent variable result from the independent 
variables, and, therefore occurs after them. For example, if a person’s underemployment 
is to lead to a crime, then it would be assumed that the crime occurred after that person 
became unemployed and not before. Therefore, to ensure that the crimes measured 
occurred after the independent variables and not before, dependent variables of crime are 
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often measured using data of crime rates at least one year after the independent variables 
(Wadsworth 2005, 356).   
A four-year lag has been used by studies employing models of a similar 
theoretical logic to this one. Markowitz, Bellair and Liska and Liui (2001) have 
conducted a test of social disorganization theory, a theory that employs the strength of 
non-economic institutions as variables, to test for the effects of neighborhood cohesion 
on crime in various British neighborhoods. The results suggest that social disorder leads 
to fear and then crime, and that the links in this process can take time-- as the dependent 
variable was measured with a four-year lag. Similarly, a study on the effects of scholastic 
underachievement in crime rates in France, concluded that high school students would 
begin engaging in violent crimes resulting form their lack of educational skills about four 
years later. The study argued this time period marked the transition of the youth in the 
study to young adulthood, a life stage when their low skill set would marginalize them to 
low-income employment sectors and make them more crime prone (Gillis 2004, 1314-
1315).  Because this study assumes that collateral consequences can have an effect on 
eventual crime committed by children of offenders, then a similar time lag seems 
appropriate. 
This study sees several other reasons for employing at least a four-year time lag. 
If collateral consequences are to have an impact on crime rates, they could do so in many 
ways, but this study posits two major pathways are likely. The first pathway acts directly 
on the offender who, being barred from reentry through roadblocks to work, welfare and 
so forth, recidivates. Studies show that most recidivism, measured as a self-reported 
arrest for a new crime, occurs within 3 years of the release date from prison (Uggen, 
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2000). The second pathway would include the effect of collateral-consequence-induced 
recidivism or mere social marginalization on the families, communities and states of 
which such persons with criminal records are members. These ripple effects would 
arguably take time, and a four-year lag therefore seems plausible. 
The next area of concern in the dependent variable is related to the UCR data 
collection methods. UCR violent and property crimes account for those that are reported 
to police, and therefore do not account for those crimes that are not reported to law 
enforcement (Jargowsky and Park, 2009). Furthermore, the reporting of crime data to the 
FBI is voluntary, meaning that police underreporting can compromise the data (Maltz and 
Tagonski, 2002). Nonetheless, UCR data is one of the most widely used in criminology, 
and this study will be no exception.  
The final area of concern regards the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. This is the issue of “ecological fallacy,” which 
occurs when individual level phenomena, crimes for example, are explained through 
aggregate data (King, 1997).  It is important therefore, when analyzing these results to 
only assume an explanation of the relationship between the aggregate independent 
variables and aggregate crime rates. In other words, if states with high underemployment 
rates, low welfare rates, and high levels of collateral consequences generally have higher 
crime rates, it does not mean that individuals in those states have a higher chance of 
committing crime.    
Independent variable measurements 
a. For the measure of get-tough policy intensity used each state drug arrest rates 
per 100,000 population for the year 2000 as established by the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
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Report (2001) and each state’s corrections budget spending for 2000, as established by 
the National Association of State Budget Officers (2001).  I employed the drug arrests in 
each state as listed by the FBI Uniform Crime Report and each state’s population as 
determined by 2000 U.S. Census (2001) to arrive at a drug arrest per-thousand ratio. The 
use of drug arrest rates as measure of Get Tough intensity is implied in Chapter 4, which 
noted the significant affect drug arrests have had had on rising incarceration rates and 
perhaps crime. As the previous chapter’s have suggested, get-tough policy seems to be 
correlated with political ideology. Our third get-tough measure is subsequently 
percentage of Republicans in each state’s House of Representatives, which was 
determined by looking at House membership of Republicans as stated by the 2000 US 
Census (2001 a) 
b. For the measure of racial diversity, I shall use the 2000 U.S. Census (2001b) 
measure of the percentage of black residents in each state.  
c. For a measurement of youth, I shall use the each state’s age 15-24 population 
gathered by the 2000 US Census (2001c).  
d. As a measure of decommodification, I used the percentage of each state’s 
budget spent on welfare as determined by the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2001d) Annual 
Survey of Government Finances.  
 e. The study measured absolute income and relative income inequality. To 
measure income inequality in each of the 50 states I employed the widely used Gini index 
as calculated by the 2000 US Census (2001e). A Gini index score of ‘zero’ measures 
perfect equality (all persons having equal income), while a score of ‘1’ measures perfect 
inequality (where one person posses all the income and the rest of the population zero. As 
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measure of absolute income I used the 2000 U.S. Census’ measurement of personal 
income per capita (2001f).      
f. The non-economic institutions used in this study will include schools, churches 
and families. As a measure of schools, I used the 2000 state high school graduation rate 
as documented by the National Center for Labor Statistics (2001). To measure church 
strength, I employed the Glenmary statistics (Jones et al., 2001) on state church 
attendance rates in the year 2000. As a measure of family strength, I used the percentage 
of family’s headed by married couples, as documented in the 2000 U.S. Census (2001g).     
g. The independent variable of the main hypothesis is state public policy barriers 
to economic reentry. To measure this variable I shall use the Legal Action Center’s 
Report Card (2002) for public policy roadblocks to the reintegration of those with 
criminal records. Looking at laws on the books in 2000, the LAC hired a team of policy 
analysts and legal and statistical experts to examine laws that serve as “’roadblocks,’ 
unfair or counterproductive barriers— in the areas of employment, public assistance and 
food stamps, access to criminal records, voting, public housing, adoptive and foster 
parenting, and drivers’ licenses.” The team then ranked state public policies that 
addressed each category using a range of zero to ten. In this case, zero represents policies 
that create the most roadblocks to reentry and ten the most. To focus solely on economic 
roadblocks, I only included roadblocks related to income. I created too different indexes 
after. One of these indexes only focuses such on barriers to employment (hiring, 
employer access to criminal records, trade licenses and driver’s licenses). The second 
index included all those variables in the first, but also included roadblocks to TANF and 
housing benefits.     
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h. As a measure of urban density I used the 2000 U.S Census’ total urban 
population per state in tens of thousands (2001h). 
i. For the measure of underemployment I shall employ the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics U-6 figures (2003). 2003 was the earliest year available such data on the state 
level, but it allows for at least a four year lag with the dependent variable. The U-6 
statistics measures each state’s total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, 
plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor 
force plus all marginally attached workers. 
Methodology 
I employ cross-sectional OLS regression analyses to test the cumulative and, for 
non-economic institution variables, interactive effects of the independent variables on 
state crime rates. The model is not a full test of IAT because there is no direct measure of 
anomie or the degree to which the logic of the economy has dominated all levels of 
society. For this reason, scholars employing IAT theory models have claimed that their 
works have only been “partial” tests of the theory (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; 
Savoleinen 2000). The lack of a direct measurement for anomie can weaken the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables, while the sample sixe (50 
U.S. states) is small.  Some statistical literature recommend a somewhat looser standard 
for significance (the .10 level) when sample sizes are small and effects are weak 
(Sotirovic, 2003; Agresti, 1990, Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; McClave, Dietrich and 
Sincich, 1997). Therefore, the models in this study will employ the .10 level of 
significance.  
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Before each independent variable is to make it to the final OLS regression model, 
however, it must be tested for multicollinearity. Two independent variables are said to be 
multicollinear if they have a Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient that approaches 1.0, which 
means the two variables have a perfect relationship, or, in other words, measures the 
same thing. Using variables that are multicollinear are a violation of OLS regression 
because it leads to weighing in too heavily on one measure. In this study, those variables 
containing a PCC of .7 or more will be deemed multicollinear.  
Diagnostics and Results  
Multicollinearity. When conducting bivariate correlation analysis on the 
independent variables, no pair of variables exhibited multicollinearity (See Appendix b.). 
Some, however, came closer to our .7 standard of multicollinearity than others. Our 
measures of urban density and per capita income had a Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
of .658, a testament to the wealth generated in urban areas when compared to rural areas. 
However, because none of these variables exceed the .7 standard, they were all used in 
the regression.  
 
Table 5.2.  Regression model testing effects of collateral consequences and other control 
variables on crime rates.  
  Coefficientsa     
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
  B 
Std. 
Error       Beta t Signif. 
(Constant) 4390.022 3497.440  1.255 0.218 
Underemployment rates 11855.541 5912.925 0.190 2.005 0.053*** 
Drug war -.341 0.182 -.176 -1.879 0.069*** 
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(Table 5.2 continued) 
 
Black population  28.262 11.847 .305 2.386   0.023** 
Urban density  43.251 9.539 .729 4.534 
     
0.000* 
Gini index  819.085 3892.573 .022 .210         .835 
Percentage married  76.00 45.762 .220 1.661         .106 
Personal income per 
capita -.114 .033 -.520 -3.414    0.002* 
 GOP in State House -10.511 6.653 -.182 -1.580   0.123 
Employment roadblocks 42.102 117.334 .281 2.429 
      
0.021** 
High school graduation   -2969.366 1303.080 -.281 -2.279 
       
 0.029** 
State corrections budget -243.731 105.713 -.274 -2.306   0.027** 
Decommodification -39.407 19.445 -.207 -2.027 
 
0.051*** 
Young population -10641.66 9986.259 -.153 -1.066   0.294 
Church attendance  -1.772 .778 -.265 -2.276   0.029** 
*Significant at the .01 level  
** Significant at the .05 level  
*** Significant at the .1 level 
a Dependent variable: total violent plus property crime in 2007.  
 
Table 5.2, includes all control variables and a collateral consequence variable that 
only counted roadblock policies directly related to employment. After subtracting those 
policy barriers scored that were not highly related to employment (franchise, public 
housing, and right to adopt, for example), but including those policies that hindered 
offender hiring  (permitting employer access to criminal records, allowing employers to 
deny jobs based on arrest or criminal records, allowing easy public access to criminal 
records, and barring offenders from trade licenses and drivers licenses), the barriers were 
significant and lead to a relatively strong model, explaining almost 70 percent of the 
variance between the independent variable and state violent and property crime rates 
(Table 5.3). Ten out of the 13 control variables were significant in the model. The 
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measures for non-economic institutions were partly significant, with church attendance 
and high school graduation rates showing significance at the .05 level (Table 5.2). The 
study’s measure of family approached significance at the .1 level, but was short of the 
proverbial mark. The measures of get tough climate, also showed mixed results, with 
state correction spending showing significance at the .05 level, drug arrest rates showing 
significance at the .1 level, but Republicans in the State House (our proxy for 
conservative ideology) falling shy of significance at the .1 level. 
 
Table 5.3. Model Summary (includes employment barriers to reentry). 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard of 
Error of the 
Estimate 
0.885 0.784 .695 493.51669 
 
The model was tested again employing a collateral consequence variable that also 
included roadblocks to welfare acquisition. This resulted in a slightly weaker model (see 
Table 5.4) without significant results for the collateral consequences variable. However,  
underemployment, the drug war, black population, urban density, per capita income, the 
percentage of population black, high school graduation rate, church attendance, and the 
percentage of state budgets spent on corrections were all significant (Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.4. Model Summary (includes employment and welfare barriers to reentry). 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard of 
Error of the 
Estimate 
0.874 0.764 .666 516.08590 
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Table 5.5.  Additive relationship between control variables, including roadblocks to 
employment and welfare, and the dependent variable state violent plus property crime 
rates. 
  Coefficientsa     
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
  B Std. Error Beta T Signif. 
(Constant) 5689.763 3585.113  1.587 0.122 
Underemployment rates 11562.073 6191.015 0.185 1.868 0.070*** 
Drug war -0.371 0.190 -0.191 -1.956 0.059** 
Black population  27.233 12.430 0.294 2.191 0.035** 
Urban density  38.008 9.490 0.640 4.005.00   .000* 
Gini index  1143.000 4091.568 0.031 0.279   0.782  
Percentage married  53.121 46.933 .154 1.132 0.266 
Personal income per capita -0.120 0.035 -0.546 -3.429 0.002* 
GOP in state House -7.766 6.776 -0.134 -1.146 0.260 
Employment and welfare 
barriers to reentry 18.712 11.868 0.171 1.577 0.124 
 High school graduation  -3017.455 1364.150 -0.285 -2.212 0.034** 
Decommodification  -38.067 20.372 -0.200 -1.869 0.070*** 
Young population -9421.139 
 
10561.802 -0.136 -0.892 0.379 
State corrections budget  -178.841 103.798 -0.201 -1.723 0.094*** 
Church attendance  -1.805 0.817 -0.270 -2.211 0.034** 
* Significance at the .01 level 
** Significance at the .05 level 
*** Significance at the .1 level 
 
This study also tested multicollinearity in the final regression (Table 5.6). This time, 
the study employed tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values to measure 
multicollinearity in each independent variable. The tolerance measures the percentage of 
the variable that cannot be explained by other predictors. Therefore, the smaller the 
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tolerance the greater chance of multicollinearity. Any tolerance less than .10 is suspect of 
multicollinearity. The VIF, on the other hand, measures an inverse of the tolerance. 
Therefore, VIF’s with values greater than 10 are suspect. A reading of table 5.5 suggests 
that none of the variables, by VIF and tolerance standards, are multicollinear (UCLA).   
 
Table 5.6. OLS regression unstandardized coefficients, beta and significance for 50 
states. 
 
 
*
 See Codebook in Appendix A. for descriptions of each variable 
  
Model 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 Underemployment 
rates* .711 1.40 
 
Drug war  .724 1.38 
 
Black population .389 2.57 
 
Urban density  .246 4.06 
 Gini index  .587 1.70 
 Percentage married  .361 2.74 
 
Personal income 
per capita .274 3.75 
 
Employment 
roadblocks .475 2.10 
 High school 
graduation .419     2.38 
 
Decommodification .607 1.64 
  
 
Young population .307 3.25 
 
 
Church attendance .469 2.13 
  
State Corrections 
budget .449 2.22 
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Looking once again at Table 5.2, one can see the following relationships between 
the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
• For every one-unit increase in the independent variable underemployment 
(measured by the Department of Labor’s U-6 statistic), crime increases by 11,855 units. 
Thus, as underemployment increases, so does crime. 
• For every one unity of increase in drug arrest rates, crime decreased by .341 units. 
Thus, as drug arrest increase crime decreases.  
• For every one unit increase in a state’s black population, crime increases by 28.6 
units. Thus the number of blacks in a state’s population has a positive impact on crime 
rates.  
• For every one unit increase in urban density, crime increases by 43.251 units. 
Thus as a state gets more densely populated, it tends to get more crime.  
• For every one-unit increase in the Gini index independent variable per, crime 
increases by 819.09 units. Thus, as income inequality increases, crime increases. 
• For every one unit increase in married households, crime increases by 76 units, 
suggesting a curiously positive albeit non-significant relationship between marriage rates 
and crime.  
• For every one increase in the independent variable, state per capita income,   the 
dependent variable decreases by .114 units. Thus, as per capita income increases, crime 
decreases.  
• For every one unit increase in state House of Representatives+ Republicans, crime 
decreases by 10.5 units. Thus, as a state gets more conservative, it’s crime rates tend to 
decrease.  
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• For very one unit increase in the independent variable, employment policy 
roadblocks to reentry, crime increases by 42 units. Thus, as collateral consequences 
affecting the employment accessibility to offenders increase, crime increases as well. 
• For every one unit of increase in the independent variable, percentage of students 
graduated from high school, the dependent variable decreases by almost 3,000  units. 
Thus, as high school graduation rates increase crime rates decrease. 
• For every unit increase in the percentage of a state’s corrections spending relative 
to its other expenditures, crime decreases by 243.7 units, meaning that as state corrections 
spending increases, crime decreases. 
• As the percentage of a state’s welfare expenditures compared to its other 
expenditures increases by one unit, crime decreases by 39.4 units. Thus, as corrections 
spending increases, crime decreases. 
• For every unit increase in young population, crime decreases by 10,641 units, 
suggesting, strangely albeit without significance, that as youthful populations increase 
crime decreases. 
• For every one unit increase in church attendance, crime decreases by 1.78 units. 
Thus as church attendance increases, crime decreases. 
The relationships just stated do not represent comparable measurements of the 
relationship strength between each of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable crime. A measure of strength difference can be found by measuring the absolute 
value of the beta, which functions as a standard deviation. The closer the absolute value 
of the beta approaches 1.0, the stronger it is.  
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Therefore, among those relationships that were significant, Table 5.2 shows that 
the strongest relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable is 
.729, which measures the strength of the relationship between urban density and crime.  
For every one standard deviation unit in urban density, crime increases by .729 standard 
deviation units.  The second strongest relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables was between per capita income and crime. For every unit of the 
standard deviation unit increase in per capita income, crime decreases by .520 standard 
deviation units. Population black had a beta of .305, while the independent variable of 
most concern to this inquiry, employment roadblocks to reentry, had the fourth strongest 
affect on crime rates in this model. For every one standard deviation unit in employment 
roadblocks to reentry, crime increased by .281 standard deviation units. This was the 
same level of strength, albeit a different directionality, as the relationship between high 
school graduation rates and crime.  The significant measures for non-economic 
institutions and collateral consequences were of similar strength to corrections spending 
on their impact on crime, while the drug war elicited a relatively weak impact.  
 The weakest relationships between single independent variables and the 
dependent variable stemmed from measures of income inequality (Gini index) and 
youthful population. For every one standard deviation unit increase in income inequality, 
crime increased by .022 standard deviation units; while for every standard deviation unit 
increase in youthful population, crime decreased by .153 standard deviation units. Not 
only was the relationship comparatively weak, it was also not statistically significant and 
strangely in a different direction than this study had hypothesized. A review of the youth 
population data in each state suggest that lack of strength may result from lack of 
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variation, as the population percentages were similar for most states. The directionality 
may therefore be heavily influenced by other independent variables in the model.  
 Conversely, in support of earlier hypotheses, Model 5.2 suggests that two of the 
non-economic institution variables this paper associates with IAT (education levels and 
church attendance) help reduce crime rates. However, since the model is additive and 
does not test for interactive terms, it does not necessarily support IAT. To be more 
precise, a partial test of IAT theory as it relates to collateral consequences, would 
hypothesize that collateral consequence policies are criminogenic because they weaken 
the ability of non-economic institutions to ward off the criminogenic impacts of the 
American Dream. Subsequently, any model testing such a hypothesis would have to look 
at the manner that collateral consequence policies interact with non-economic 
institutions. To do this, I added multiplicative interactive terms to the previous model to 
see whether employment barriers X family, employment barriers X church, or 
employment barriers X education were of significance and increased the overall strength 
of the model.  
Before creating the interactive terms, I centered variables that were to be included 
in the interactive model by subtracting their means from each variable. This method 
reduces chances of collinearity resulting from the weight of the interactive terms when 
combined with the independent variables of which they are comprised (Cohen, Cohen, 
West and Aiken, 2003). After adding all of the interactive terms to the model, I then 
tested for the effects of each. As shown in Table 5.7, in neither of the interactive models 
were  interaction terms significant; and model strength, when compared to the additive 
model that included employment roadblocks, was reduced.  
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The results suggest that if collateral consequences do help reduce crime it is not 
necessarily due the way that they erode the strength of non-economic institutions. It is 
plausible that this paper’s assumption that collateral consequences reflected the lack of 
collective interest in the individual, and therefore high anomic states and permeation of 
the economy in everyday life, may be false. Rather, collateral consequences may 
represent both a lack of caring for individual offenders and a simultaneous willingness to 
protect the general public. Barring a drug or violent offender from workplaces, it could be 
argued, protects employees from violence or negligence due to drug abuse. The results of 
the interactive terms model also lead one to ponder the way that the recidivism of 
offenders, due to collateral consequences, may strengthen non-economic institutions as 
opposed to weakening them. A family with a parent who is a violent substance abuser 
may actually benefit from the los of that parent due to incarceration. These varied 
possible outcomes for the interaction of collateral consequences with non-economic 
institutions may explain the results documented in Table 5.7 (see end of chapter). 
Summary of Collateral Consequence Impact 
 
Beta analysis points towards a positive significant relationship between barriers to 
reentry and crime, specifically those laws that bar offenders from attaining employment. 
As the nation contends with the huge swath of released American offenders, the results 
are of importance to policy makers seeking to reduce the ballooning costs of 
incarceration.  
 The tests also show strength for some of the variables derived from IAT, 
particularly for the non-economic institutions of schools and churches. However, the tests 
do not show support for collateral consequences as an IAT variable, because our variable 
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for barriers to reentry, when used in interactive terms with our non-economic institution 
variables, showed no significance. It is curious, however, that an increase in model 
strength was found when isolating the interactive terms for collateral consequences and 
family. Also curious was the unexpected direction of the relationship between increased 
state marriage rates and crime, as our model suggested the crime rate rise when married 
couples increase. This does not only seem to go against a major premise of IAT, but 
against the posited directionality of an established variable in criminology. Marriage is a 
key variable in studies that examine crime as a response to the life course (Sampson, 
Laub and Wimer, 2006). The best explanation this study can give for the odd results is 
that state marriage rates are correlated with divorce rates (Jensen, 2002, 63), which are 
associated with rises in crime. It is perhaps for this reason that Chamlin and Cochran 
(1995), in their partial test of IAT, employed ratio of marriage to divorce, not marriage, 
as their measure of family strength. Any future attempts to duplicate this study should 
therefore employ Chamlin and Cochran’s measure.  
 Still, because the collateral consequence variables proved strong in various 
OLS regression tests, there is support for further empirical research on the effect of 
policies that bar the economic reentry of person’s with criminal records in society. If 
collateral consequences are indeed associated with increased crime, then they can only 
contribute to budget-breaking incarceration rates. The results also suggest that although 
get-tough measures (high drug arrest rates and heavy spending on corrections) can help 
reduce crime, punishing offenders after they have served their sentence has the 
opposite impact. As an increasing number of Americans are released from prison each 
year, policy makers may want to consider reducing their barriers to reentry in an effort 
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to improve public safety, and hopefully, reduce the crime that can lead to financially 
costly incarceration rates. 
 
Table 5.7. Model test for collateral consequence and non-economic institution interactive 
terms. 
 Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Underemployment rates2000   ***.084  ***.076  ***.070 ***.070 
Drug war       .306        .283       .284       .299 
Black population    **.046    **.042   **.034   **.032 
Urban density     *.000      *.000     *.000     *.000 
Gini index       .841        .767       .769       .811 
Percentage married        .179        .176       .145       .155 
Personal income per capita   **.037    **.018   **.031   **.017 
Percent GOP in State House       .180        .176       .187       .164 
Employment roadblocks    **.010    **.008                                               ** .007 ** .008
High school graduation    **.048    **.033   **.021       .019 
State corrections budget   **.018    **.015   **.016   **.014 
Decommodification   ***.073 *** .063 ***.071 *** .058 
Young population        .629       .557       .553        .578 
Church attendance  ***.067 ***.062       .065 *** .055 
Church attendance X Employment 
roadblocks        .758        .821  
High school graduation X Employment 
roadblocks        .805       .941   
% married X employment roadblocks        .680          .725 
Adjusted R square        .647       .665    .666        .666 
* Significant at the .01 level  
** Significant at the .05 level  
*** Significant at the .1 level. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the problems, politics, and proposals associated with the 
rise of get-tough policies and examined the impact these policies have had on crime and 
incarceration rates. When reviewing the agenda setting process involved in the rise of 
sentencing reform and the War on Drugs, several of Kingdon’s themes remained 
consistent.  
First among these is Kingdon’s notion that new proposals are not created to 
respond to new problems. Rather, proposals that have been circulating for some time are 
brought to the agenda when politics and problems merge to open a space. This was 
evident in the case study of early sentencing reform, during which high crime rates, 
interest group pressure, public pressure to change sentencing structure, and presidential 
politics merged to open a window for reform policies that had been circulating since the 
early 1970s. Similarly, in another case study, a three strikes proposal born in 1988 did not 
arrive to the agenda until 1994, when a problem stream (catalyzed by the murder of the 
child Polly Klaas) merged with the political stream (comprised of factors such as the 
organization of policy entrepreneur Michael Reynolds , the mobilization of interest 
groups such as the  National Rifle Association, public opinion, and gubernatorial as well 
as presidential elections) to open a window. The theme continued with the asset 
forfeiture, which was proposed during the Nixon era, but leaped onto the national agenda 
when a drug war window opened in the Reagan years.  
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Kingdon’s contention that ideology wields significant impact in the proposal 
stream also holds true. Though early sentencing reform had bipartisan support, the crime 
policies of the past 30 years have been increasingly more right-winged. And while 
Democrats have joined in the get tough rhetoric, their support is indicative of a right-
winged shift in their political platform. This fact was particularly evident during the 
Clinton era, when, as the sections on three strikes and collateral consequences have 
shown, Democrats supported policies aimed at welfare recalcitrance and getting tough on 
crime in order to steal Republican thunder on those issues.  The ideology that guided the 
get-tough movement was rooted in conservative visions of rugged individualism and 
personal responsibility. It was therefore not a stretch for policy makers to embrace 
individual-level crime theories that focused on deterrence to stop individual-level 
decisions to commit crime. This shift from macro-social to micro-economic views of 
crime was echoed in President Reagan’s speeches when he described the need to do away 
with “sociology majors on the bench (1986).” Finally, as suggested in Chapter 5, the 
proliferation of collateral consequence policies in the 1990s can be viewed as 
ideologically driven by conservative values based on punitive crime policies and welfare 
state shrinkage.  
Kingdon’s belief that problems rise to government’s agenda by way of sensational 
events is another recurrent theme in the agenda setting case studies. The murders of Polly 
Klaas, Meghan Kanka as well as the politicization of Willie Horton’s murder and Len 
Bias’s overdose were all symbolic events that helped pave the path for the journey of get 
tough policies to the agenda. 
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However, the case studies do not support Kingdon’s notion that the media has a 
relatively low impact on agenda setting. Instead the opposite seemed to be true. In the 
preceding chapters’ case studies, the arrival of sentencing reform, the drug war and 
collateral consequences to the agenda were all marked by spikes in media coverage of 
those issues. It is uncertain from the studies, however, whether public opinion and policy 
makers drove media coverage or vise versa. The directional effects of media on the 
agenda setting process is indeed ripe for further research, particularly when considering 
the increasingly politicized communications atmosphere, which may affect streams and 
window dynamics in a far different way than they did at the time of Kingdon’s seminal 
work.  
Kingdon (2001) has argued that policy makers tend to have more impact on the 
media than the media does on politicians.  But the recent politicization of news may grant 
political blogs or networks such as Fox or MSNBC more leverage to pressure policy 
makers into taking certain courses of action (Sweetser, Golan and Wanta, 2008). Such 
leverage may also be affected by the relationship between politicized media and their 
audience. The politicization of the media has resulted in publics that seek out news 
markets with which they feel ideologically compatible (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008). As 
the media has become more politicized, so has public perception of media bias (Coe et 
al., 2010), a factor that could arguably tilt the balance of power in favor of candidates or 
policy makers. The events following a New York Times front page story of an extra-
marital affair involving then presidential candidate, Sen. John McCain (Ruttenberg et. al, 
2008), illustrates this point. McCain’s campaign was able to portray the senator as the 
victim of slanted, liberal, media attacks and leverage the story on his affair toward 
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increased campaign contributions (Bumiller, 2008).  On other hand, some posit that the 
ability of public officials to manipulate constituents though the media may be thwarted 
because an increasing number of Americans ignore the news due to perceptions of bias 
(Bennet and Yengar, 2008). Consequently, many Americans ignore relevant issues 
whether the news coverage of it is political or not (Bennet and Iyengar, 2008). The 
question of whether today’s media plays less or more of a role in agenda setting is thus 
still up for debate. 
    While the case studies lend support to Kingdon’s streams and windows model, 
our review of the impacts get tough polices have had on crime and incarceration yielded 
some consistent results. A review of the literature on sentencing reform’s incarceration 
impacts, suggests these policies have helped propel the prison population increase. The 
literature suggests that the impact of sentencing reform may not be direct, as plea 
bargaining and a parole role shift from rehabilitation to monitoring may function to 
indirectly help spike the number of prison commitments per arrest.  
Despite the 1990’s crime plunge, there is still debate over whether incarceration, 
the economy, law enforcement presence, structural shifts in the crack-cocaine war, the 
aging of the population, or even abortion have driven the decrease (Levitt, 2004). Even 
studies that conclude the incarceration boom decreased crime, question whether the 
financial costs are worth it, while hypothesizing that the crime-reduction returns are 
diminishing. Still, other bodies of work have focused on the effect incarceration can have 
on crime once prisoner’s return due to stigma, being barred from resources, learning 
criminal ways of thinking while in prison, or through weakening of informal social 
institutions.  
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The literature studying the impact of the drug war comes to like-minded 
conclusions. One perspective is that the drug war has led to reductions in crime by 
increasing drug arrest rates from upward of 580,000 in 1988 to 1.7 billion in 2008 
(Uniform Crime Report 2009). This perspective is supported by Chapter 5’s regression 
analysis, which suggests a negative relationship between drug arrests and crime. On the 
other hand, some of the research reviewed in Chapter 3 argues that the drug war may be 
criminogenic, and cites many plausible reasons as to why. What is indisputable is that the 
financial cost of the war is astronomical, as, at the national level, drug enforcement is 
projected at $26.2 billion for fiscal year 2012 (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
2010).  
When compared to drug arrests, Chapter 5’s research suggest that collateral 
consequences are far more damaging to public safety. Reintegrating the unprecedented 
number of Americans with criminal records is made more difficult than ever due to 
skyrocketing releases. It is estimated that about 700,000 people are released from 
American prisons ever year, an additional 12 million from jails. These contribute to the 
approximately 47 million Americans who possess criminal records. It is also possible that 
the number of offenders in society may continue to increase, making collateral 
consequences more pertinent.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Kingdon (2002) cited the importance of problem 
definition as key to determining if and how policy makers will respond. Jeremy Travis 
applies this observation of Kingdon’s to collateral consequences, noting how defining 
collateral consequences as a civil issue as opposed to a criminal justice one,  has kept 
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them and the subsequent means through which they have been adopted away from the 
attention of traditional criminal justice policy makers and scholars.  
“. .. …these punishments typically take effect outside of the traditional 
sentencing framework— in other words, are imposed by operation of law 
rather than by decision of the sentencing judge—they are not considered part 
of the practice or jurisprudence of sentencing. Through judicial 
interpretation, legislative fiat, and legal classification, these forms of 
punishment have been defined as “civil” rather than criminal in nature, as 
“disabilities” rather than punishments, as the “collateral consequences” of 
criminal convictions rather than the direct results. Because they have been 
defined as something other than criminal punishment, scholars, legislators, 
criminal justice officials, and legal analysts have failed to incorporate them 
into the debates over sentencing policy that have realigned our criminal 
justice system over the past quarter century.000. .. … Although these criminal 
punishments look like typical legislative enactments, winding their way 
through the committee process, passage by majority vote, and approval by the 
executive, their legislative life cycle often follows an unusual course. Unlike 
sentencing statutes, they are not typically considered by judiciary committees. 
They are often added as riders to other, major pieces of legislation, and 
therefore are given scant attention in the public debate over the main event. 
They are typically not codified with other criminal sanctions. Some exist in the 
netherworld of the host legislation to which they were attached. Some exist 
under a separate heading of civil disabilities (Travis 2002, pp. 16-17).  
  
Several factors make the collateral consequences of today different, and more 
problematic, than those of the past: First, as mentioned above, due to the rise in 
incarceration these policies affect more people. Second, while the number of Americans 
with criminal records is increasing, collateral consequence policies have also 
substantially increased (Travis 2002).  Third, because of eased access to criminal 
background information and incentive to look it up, employers, welfare institutions and 
government agencies are more likely to impose the collateral consequences on the books 
(SEARCH 2005, 7-8). The fourth reason was hypothesized at the beginning of this paper 
and was substantiated by the research conducted at the end of Chapter 5. That research 
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suggests that a continued implementation of collateral consequence policies, particularly 
those barring access to employment, can have a positive impact on crime.  
Kurlycheck and Bushway (2006) have conducted empirical research that 
supplements the findings of Chapter 5’s study with recommendations for policy 
alternatives. The study analyzed data from a group of about 13,000 males born in 
Philadelphia in 1958 and compared the population who were arrested by the age of 18 to 
the population that was not. The study found that the men arrested at age 18, with zero 
arrests seven years after the fact, had chances of committing a new crime that “began to 
approximate” the population of men who had never been arrested. Coupled with the test 
of collateral consequence policies from Chapter 6, the policy implications are that 1) 
reducing collateral consequence barriers to employment can improve public safety and 2) 
employer property and personal safety can be better secured if employment barriers are 
waived after seven years. Similar conclusions can be drawn about welfare benefits and 
crime.  
While the results of the Chapter 6 study suggest negative relationships between 
collateral consequences policies and crime and non-economic institutions and crime, the 
study’s interactive terms due not support IAT theory. There can be many reasons for this, 
including the lack of a measure for anomie, the use of state categorical variables as 
opposed to cities, or the lack of a destructive collateral consequence effect on non-
economic institutions.  However, it is possible that other macro-social theories including 
social organization theory can also lead to models in which categorical consequence 
variables can be tested. It would also be interesting to see what impacts collateral 
consequences have on the recidivism of offenders. The Pew Center for Public Policy 
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(2011) has recently released a study of recidivism rates in most states that could serve as 
an excellent dependent variable in a regression test of collateral consequence effects.  
Such research on collateral consequences is currently pertinent because dynamics in the 
three streams are swinging the policy pendulum from Get Tough to reentry.  
 As noted, problems surrounding the issue of reentry include the unprecedented 
number of prisoners being released. Furthermore, as the nation weathers a deep 
recessions, states are finding it unfeasible to pay the median $40,000 per inmate, per year, 
necessary to keep offenders imprisoned (Petersillia 2009).  Also problematic is the fact 
that, on average, 66 percent of prisoners return within three years (Langan and Levin 
2002), accounting for about 20 percent of arrests. Without someway to stop their return, 
the prison population could be unmanageable.  
  In the political stream, public opinion no longer evokes as strong of a “get-tough” 
strain as it once did. A look at responses to the General Social Survey (2010) reveals this 
trend. Since 1972, the national survey has asked respondents whether they feel courts in 
their communities are too harsh or lenient in their treatment of convicted offenders. In 
tow with a then rising get-tough movement, between 1972 and 1982 the number of 
respondents contending that courts treated convicts too leniently rose from 73 to 90 
percent. After peaking in 1982, that number remained stable throughout the 1990s, 
ranging between about 80 and 90 percent. Since 1998, however, there has been steady 
shift in American public opinion, with an increasing number stating that the criminal 
justice system is too punitive. Since 1998, the number of Americans claiming that courts 
needed to be harsher with criminals has steadily declined each year. By 2006, the most 
recent year for which this information has been published, the number of Americans who 
 133 
 
responded that courts were not sufficiently tough declined to 68 percent, the lowest 
number since the GSS began asking the question (General Social Survey 2010). 
Furthermore, there is now more public support for policies based on addressing the “root 
cause” of crime. In 1994, about 51 percent of Americans thought social programs focused 
on education and job training was the best way to address crime, while 42 percent 
favored more police, prisons and judges. By 2003, only 29 percent favored the get-tough 
approach while 69 percent favored a root-causes focus on crime (Gallup 2004).  
 While get-tough support is declining, concern over economic issues (Gallup 
2010) such as state spending is high. Moreover, reducing corrections spending by 
replacing prison terms with community-based reentry and rehabilitation programs and 
sound policies such as the reduction of collateral consequences (options that are less 
expensive than prisons) is in tune with the concern of Americans over government 
spending (Petersillia 2001).  
 Another factor in the political stream is the rhetorical attention policymakers are 
giving to reentry issues. Between 1969 and 1999, not one U.S. president made public 
mention of the reentry issue. But by 2000, as the number of prisoners released began to 
raise, that changed. In his final year in office, Clinton made public reference to the 
importance of reentry five times. George W. Bush had four speeches in which he cited 
the importance of reentry, describing such efforts as the “Christian thing to do (Public 
Papers of the President of the United States). The Obama campaign also addressed the 
issue by claiming that mass incarceration was at crisis proportions and that reentry 
programs would reduce recidivism. After just more than one year in office, President 
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Barrack Obama had mentioned reentry twice in town hall meetings, where he claimed a 
focus on reentry is integral to crime reduction (Obama, 2010).   
As public opinion and presidential rhetoric has helped generate political capital 
for reentry proposals, there has also been much group organization and mobilization 
surrounding the issue. Organizations like the Sentencing Project (2011), the Open Society 
Policy Center (2011), the Legal Action Center (2011) and a host of civil rights 
organizations have lobbied Congress for alternatives to incarceration. The proposals, 
much more in the mindset of the rehabilitative paradigm, have been stirring quietly in 
academic and interest group circles for years (Travis 2002).    
Because mass incarceration is increasingly a financially unbearable problem and 
concerns over economic issues have eroded the political solvency of expensive get-tough 
solutions, there has been a call for proposals that, rather than emphasizing tougher 
punishment for offenders, focus on developing ways to reintegrate them— to turn them 
into taxpayers rather than tax burdens. These proposals have come from academics, 
offender rights activists and public policy think tanks in communication even while the 
get-tough movement was peaking. The proposals in many ways turn back to a Johnson-
era emphasis on root causes and revive the role of parole as a rehabilitative apparatus 
(Travis 2002). With prison no longer a financially available option, calls for proposals on 
how to keep these former offenders off the streets and productive are increasing rapidly 
(Vera Institute of Justice, 2010).  
Though such alternatives substantially reduce corrections costs, they permit 
offenders to serve sentences in communities where they consequently increase the 
concentration of persons with criminal records. Among the most frequently used of such 
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alternatives are those modeled after California’s Proposition 36, which sentences first and 
second time drug offenders to community rehabilitation programs. Since California’s 
adoption of the law in 2001, four states have followed suit. Other states have taken 
proposition 36’s emphasis on incarceration alternatives and expanded community 
supervision sentencing laws to non-drug offenses. Project HOPE in Hawaii, for example, 
sentences offenders who are at high risk for recidivism to intensely-monitored probation 
programs that enforce swift, certain, but relatively mild punishments, for violations.  
As another means of reducing inmate populations, states are eliminating 
mandatory incarceration time for parole or probation violations that are technical rather 
than criminal, reducing the percentage of inmates returning to prison for parole 
violations. Finally, many states are extending early release to more inmates on the 
condition that they participate in certain rehabilitation and reentry projects (King 2009).  
All of these factors contribute to the rising number of persons with criminal records who 
are no longer incarcerated and are seeking social reintegration.   
 However, reintegrating offenders is no easy task. The most common profile of an 
American prisoner is that he is male, black or Hispanic; possesses less than a high school 
education; and is relatively unskilled as a worker (Cnaan, Draine, Frazier and Sinha 
2008). As a result, most of the incarcerated masses have faced racial and economic 
obstacles to social integration before their experiences with the criminal justice system. It 
has also been argued convincingly that jails and prisons serve as factories for criminal 
behavior, worsening the problems of socialization inmates before “doing time” (Cnaan et 
al., 2008). In light of these facts, the paper makes several concluding policy 
recommendations.  
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First, job-training and substance abuse treatment must be available to prisoners. In 
short, some of the same programs types that pervaded during the rehabilitation/ 
indeterminate sentencing era should be re-implemented. Though this paper’s research did 
not test for the effects of work skills or drug treatment programs on recidivism or crime, 
it seems logical that if collateral consequence policies that marginalize ex-offenders to 
the low-wage market have a positive impact on crime, then so would other factors that 
impede chances of gainful employment, such as life-coping skills (provided in drug 
treatment programs) or work skills.  
Second, judges or parole boards should be tasked with supervising offenders from 
the time of sentence throughout incarceration and throughout reentry. The ultimate goal 
would not be to punish the offender but to transform him/her into a productive member of 
the community. As part of this more holistic approach, collateral consequences should be 
included in an offender’s sentence, and, like sentences, should eventually end. As a 
result, once an offender serves punishment, he will not have to face barriers that will 
hinder his and his family’s economic opportunities. Petersilia (2001) notes that most 
other OECD countries have similar policies and cites the United Kingdom’s 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which allows some criminal convictions to disappear 
from background checks seven to 10 years after the conviction. After this statutory time 
has elapsed, offenders are permitted to answer “no,” when asked whether they have ever 
been convicted of a crime. A similar model could be employed in the U.S. And while 
laws that allow for eventual expunging of criminal records are of help, the criminogenic 
affect of collateral consequences can be mitigated through the repeal of laws that create 
 137 
 
across-the-board bans on employment and trade licenses for persons with criminal 
records.  
Third, though the result’s of Chapter 6’s OLS regression suggest that a heavy 
emphasis on corrections decreases crimes, a repeal of many of the punitive elements of 
sentencing reform and the drug war should be reconsidered, if only for the extremely 
damaging effects such policies have had on African American communities.  
 Finally, new criminal justice policies should take non-economic institutions into 
account as an erosion of their strength may indeed be criminogenic. Such policies would 
seem to be in touch with the platforms of conservative and liberals alike. While 
community support has long been a staple of liberal crime policy, the strengthening of 
values through families and churches has long been a staple of Republican rhetoric. The 
bipartisan possibilities for such types of policy would facilitate a transition from getting 
tough to getting smart.      
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Codebook 
 
Variable name: “Underemployment rates” (total unemployed, plus all marginally 
attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the 
civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers, as defined by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2003).  
Source: http://www.bls.gov/lau/stalt03.htm 
Dates: 2003 (first year this statistic was made available at the state level of analysis). 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “Drug war” (Drug possession and use arrest rate per 100,000 persons in a 
state’s population as established by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (2001). 
Source: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2000/00sec4.pdf 
Dates: 2000 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “Black  population 2000”  
Description: The percentage of blacks in each state’s population 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Census Bureau (2001b), Census Data 2000 
Date: 2000 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “Urban density” (Total urban population per state in tens of thousands as 
determined by the 2000 U.S. Census (2001h) 
Source: http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/uaucinfo.html#lists  
Level of measurement: ratio 
Date: 2000 
 
Variable name: “Gini index” (Measures income inequality through an index value 
between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating perfectly equal distribution of wealth and 1 indicating 
the possession of all wealth by one person as dictated by the 2000 U.S. Census (2001e). 
Source: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/publications/ACS%20inequality%20report%2
02000-2005_v2.pdf 
Date: 2000 
 
Variable name:  “Personal income per capita” (Personal income per capita, current 
dollars, as determined by 2000 U.S Census (2001f)) 
Source: http://www.census.gov/statab/freq/00s0727.txt  
Dates: 2000 
Level of measurement: ratio 
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Variable name: “Percentage  married” (Households married 2000 (percentage of state 
households that were headed by a married couple as established by the 2000 U.S. Census 
(2001g) 
Source: http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-8.pdf 
Date: 2000 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “GOP in state House.” (Percentage of Republicans in each state’s House 
of Representatives. Determined by looking at House membership of Republicans as 
stated by the 2000 US Census (2001a) and then calculating their percentage).  
Source: https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0401.xls#Data!A1 
Date: 2000 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable Name: “Employment roadblocks” (Quantifies the number of roadblocks to the 
economic reentry to society for those with criminal records based on an index compiled 
by the Legal Action Center (2002). The Index compiled categories the LAC considers 
important for reentry. Categories include those state public policies that address access to 
employment, driver’s licenses, public assistance, records, voting, housing and public 
assistance. To determine scores the LAC examined 27 different kind of laws and 
practices, addressing the categories mentioned above, in each state. Scores for each 
policy category range from zero to 10. Since there are six categories, the lowest total 
score a state can receive is zero and the highest a 60).   
Dates: Between the fall of 2001 and the summer of 2002. 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “High school graduation”(Percent of population 25 years and over who 
completed high school as determined by the 20001 US Census (2003). 
Source: http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-24.pdf 
Level of measurement: ratio 
Dates: 2000 
 
Variable name: “Decommodification” (percentage of state budget spent on welfare as 
determined by the Us Census Bureau’s (2001d )Annual Survey of Government Finances).  
Source: http://www.census.gov/govs/state/historical_data_2000.html 
Date: 2000 
Level of Measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “Young population”  
Description: Percentage of total population between ages 15 and 14 in year 2000 as 
determined by U.S. Census (2001c) 
Source: http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/files/SummaryTabB1.pdf 
Date: 2000  
Level of measurement: ratio 
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Variable name: “State Corrections Budget:” (The percentage of each state budget spent 
on corrections as established by National Association of State Budget Officers (2001). 
Source:http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/StateExpenditureReport/StateExpenditureRe 
portArchives/tabid/107/Default.aspx 
Date: 2000 
Level of Measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: “Church attendance” Church attendance rates in 2000 as established by 
Glenmary statistics. 
Source: Jones, D. Doty, S. Grammich, C. Horsch, J.E. Houseal, R., Lynn, M., Marcum, 
J.P, Sanchagrin, K.M. & Taylor, R.H. (2001). Religious Congregations & Membership in 
the United States 2000: An Enumeration by Region, State and County Based on Data 
Reported for 149 Religious Bodies. Nashville, TN. Glenmary Research Center.  
Date: 2000 
Level of measurement: ratio 
 
Variable name: State 
Description: Each category is a U.S. state 
Level of Measurement: Nominal 
Coding specifications: Each state is abbreviated. The abbreviation go as follows: 
Alabama (AL), Alaska(AK), Arizona (AZ), Arkansas-(AR), California (CA), Colorado 
(CO), Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), Florida (FL), Georgia (GA), Hawaii (HI), Idaho 
(ID), Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IW), Kamas (KS), Kentucky, (KY), Louisiana 
(La), Maine (ME), Maryland (MD), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MN), Minnesota 
(MSTA) , Mississippi (MSPI), Montana (Mnt), Missouri (Msr), Nebraska (Nka), Nevada 
(NV), New Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ), New Mexixo (NM), New York (NY), 
North Carolina (NC), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), Oklahoma (OK), Oregon (OR),  
Pennsylvania (PN), Rhode Island (RI), South Carolina (SC), South Dakota (SD), 
Tennessee (TE), Texas (TX), Utah (UT), Vermont (VT), Virginia (VA), Washington 
(WA), West Virgina (WV), Wisconsin (WI), Wyoming (WY). 
 
Variable name: crime 
Description: 2007 Uniform Crime Reports for violent and property crimes per 100,000 
population. Violent crimes include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault. Property crimes include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. 
Source: http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_06/06crime/06c2_13.pdf Table 5: Index of Crime 
by State, 2003 
Date: 2003 
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Appendix B: Multicollinearity Tests:  
 
Table A.1 Underemployment multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation Sig. N 
Underemployment 1  50 
Drug war .137 .341 50 
Black pop. .238 .097 50 
Urban density -.041 .778 50 
Gini Index .086 .555 50 
Percent households married -.249 .082 50 
Personal income -.160 .267 50 
Republicans in State House -.222 .126 50 
Employment barriers .048 .742 50 
High school graduation rate -.286 .044 50 
Corrections budget .137 .334 50 
Welfare -.177 .219 50 
Young population .017 .905 50 
Church attendance -.065 .653 50 
 
Table A.2 Drug War multicollinearity tests  
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment .137 .341 50 
Drug war 1  50 
Black pop. .-.154 .286 50 
Urban density -.330 .019 50 
Gini Index  -.032 .825 50 
Percent households married .090 .534 50 
Personal income -.285 .045 50 
Republicans in State House -.093 .523 50 
Employment barriers -084 .560 50 
High school graduation rate .139 .337 50 
Corrections budget -.232 .105 50 
Decommodification .106 .463 50 
Young population -.018 .903 50 
Church attendance  -.089 .541 50 
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Table A.3 Black population multicollinearity tests 
 
High school graduation  Pearson’s correlation Sig. N 
Underemployment .238 .096 50 
Drug war -154 .286 50 
Black population 1  50 
Urban density .013 .931 50 
Gini Index  .185 .198 50 
Percent households married -.434 .002 50 
Personal income -.041 .658 50 
Republicans in State House -383 .007 50 
Employment barriers .218 .129 50 
High school graduation rate -.494 .000 50 
Corrections budget .281 .048 50 
Decommodification .106 .463 50 
Young population -.121 .404 50 
Church attendance  .382 .006 50 
 
Table A.4 Urban density multicollinearity tests  
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.041 .778 50 
Drug war -.330 .019 50 
Black pop. .013 .931 50 
Urban density 1  50 
Gini Index  .258 .070 50 
Percent households married -.245 .087 50 
Personal income .658 .000 50 
Republicans in State House -.130 .372 50 
Employment barriers -.411 .003 50 
High school graduation rate -.260 -.324 50 
Corrections budget .518 .000 50 
Decommodification -121 .402 50 
Young population -.180 .212 50 
Church attendance  .009 .950 50 
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Table A.5 Multicollinearity tests for Gini index 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.086 .555 50 
Drug war -.032 .825 50 
Black pop. .185 .198 50 
Urban density .259 .070 50 
Gini Index  1  50 
Percent households married -.278 .50 50 
Personal income .224 .118 50 
Republicans in State House -.203 .163 50 
Employment barriers -.096 .506 50 
High school graduation rate -.324 .022 50 
Corrections budget .133 .359 50 
Decommodification .300 .034 50 
Young population -.369 .008 50 
Church attendance  .136 .346 50 
 
Table A.6 Percent of married couples multicollinearity tests  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.249 .082 50 
Drug war .090 .534 50 
Black pop. -.434 .002 50 
Urban density -.245 .087 50 
Gini Index  -.278 .050 50 
Percent households married 1  50 
Personal income -.326 .021 50 
Republicans in State House .570 -.115 50 
Employment barriers .002 -.395 50 
High school graduation rate .415 -.004 50 
Corrections budget -.199 .291 50 
Decommodification -.286 .044 50 
Young population .601 -.541 50 
Church attendance  -.006 -.071 50 
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Table A.7 Personal income multicollinearity tests  
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.160 .267 50 
Drug war -.285 .045 50 
Black pop. -.041 .778 50 
Urban density .658 .000 50 
Gini Index  .224 .118 50 
Percent households married -.326 .570 50 
Personal income 1  50 
Republicans in State House -.115 .432 50 
Employment barriers -.395 .005 50 
High school graduation rate -.004 .980 50 
Corrections budget .291 -.013 50 
Decommodification .100 .040 50 
Young population -.541 .303 50 
Church attendance  -.071 -.218 50 
 
 
Table A.8 Republicans in State House  multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.222 .126 50 
Drug war -.093 .523 50 
Black pop. -.383 .007 50 
Urban density -.130 .372 50 
Gini Index  -.203 .163 50 
Percent households married .570 .000 50 
Personal income -.115 .432 50 
Republicans in State House 1  50 
Employment barriers .224 .122 50 
High school graduation rate .284 .048 50 
Corrections budget -.013 .931 50 
Decommodification -420 .003 50 
Young population .303 .034 50 
Church attendance  -.218 .133 50 
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Table A.9 Index of reentry roadblocks multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment .048 .742 50 
Drug war -.084 .560 50 
Black pop. .218 .129 50 
Urban density -.411 .003 50 
Gini Index  -.096 -.324 50 
Percent households married .002 .415 50 
Personal income -.395 .005 50 
Republicans in State House .224 .122 50 
Employment barriers 1  50 
High school graduation rate -.055 .705 50 
Corrections budget .195 .245 50 
Decommodification -.103 .477 50 
Young population .133 .358 50 
Church attendance  .007 .959 50 
 
Table A.10 High school graduation rate multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.286 .044 50 
Drug war .139 .337 50 
Black pop. -.494 .281 50 
Urban density -.260 .518 50 
Gini Index  -.324 .133 50 
Percent households married .415 .003 50 
Personal income -.004 .980 50 
Republicans in State House .284 .048 50 
Employment barriers -.055 .705 50 
High school graduation rate 1  50 
Corrections budget -.245 .086 50 
Decommodification -.074 .609 50 
Young population .179 .212 50 
Church attendance  .146 .313 50 
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Table A.11 Corrections budget multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation      Sig. N 
Underemployment .137 .344 50 
Drug war -.232 .105 50 
Black pop. .281 .048 50 
Urban density .518 .000 50 
Gini Index  .133 .359 50 
Percent households married -.199 .166 50 
Personal income .291 .040 50 
Republicans in State House -.013 .931 50 
Employment barriers .195 .175 50 
High school graduation rate -.245 .086 50 
Corrections budget 1  50 
Decommodification -.181 .209 50 
Young population -.036 .803 50 
Church attendance  .016 .910 50 
 
 
Table A.12 Decommodification multicollinearity tests 
  
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.098 .500 50 
Drug war .106 .463 50 
Black pop. .150 .298 50 
Urban density -.121 .402 50 
Gini Index  .300 .034 50 
Percent households married -.286 .044 50 
Personal income .100 .489 50 
Republicans in State House -.420 .003 50 
Employment barriers -.103 .477 50 
High school graduation rate -.074 .609 50 
Corrections budget -.181 .209 50 
Decommodification 1  50 
Young population .275 .053 50 
Church attendance  -.051 .724  50 
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Table A.13 Young population multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment .017 .905 50 
Drug war -.018 .903 50 
Black pop. -.121 .404 50 
Urban density -.180 .212 50 
Gini Index  -.369 .008 50 
Percent households married .601 .000 50 
Personal income -.541 .000 50 
Republicans in State House .303 .034 50 
Employment barriers .133 .358 50 
High school graduation rate .179 .212 50 
Corrections budget -.036 .803 50 
Decommodification .275 .053 50 
Young population 1  50 
Church attendance  .275 .053 50 
 
 
Table A.14 Church attendance multicollinearity tests 
 
 Pearson’s correlation          Sig. N 
Underemployment -.065 .653 50 
Drug war -.089 .541 50 
Black pop. .382 .006 50 
Urban density .009 .950 50 
Gini Index  .136 .346 50 
Percent households married -.006 .968 50 
Personal income -.071 .625 50 
Republicans in State House -.218 .133 50 
Employment barriers .007 .959 50 
High school graduation rate .146 .313 50 
Corrections budget .016 .910 50 
Decommodification .176 .220 50 
Young population .275 .053 50 
Church attendance  1  50 
 
 
